4 ms·
Meh, the title is not what this declaration is about. The meat of the declaration is this line "The absence of a neocortex does not appear to preclude an organi
by vacri 14y ago
Meh, the title is not what this declaration is about. The meat of the declaration is this line "The absence of a neocortex does not appear to preclude an organism from
experiencing affective states", which in layman's terms means 'you don't need a fancy brain to have self-awareness'.
(actually 'affective states' means 'emotions' in laymans terms, but in this given context, it's meant to mean 'self-awareness')
It's clear from the document that they already consider primates, cetaceans, and elephants to be in the 'self-aware' group with humans. This has generally been accepted for some time, both from the angle of behavioural studies and that of comparing the complexities of brains. What this declaration is really about is recognising the rather surprising result that some birds can do the behavioural part while not having a similarly complex brain.
Some of the other stuff in the declaration is incredibly humdrum and clearly visible to a layman. Animals are known to experience emotions - seen a happy or scared dog? An angry bird defending it's nest? The question of whether animals experience emotion is different to the one of self-awareness. Similarly, it's obvious that pharmaceutical compounds affect animal awareness - because vets use things like that all the time to sedate animals for surgery. Or if you want mood-altering evidence, check out catnip. Euphoria? vets have drugs for that too.
The only new thing here is "we recognise that self-awareness can be present in birds, which means that you don't need a fancy brain (neocortex) to have it". The stuff about emotion not necessarily being in the neocortex is very old hat, and was in textbooks when I did my degree nearly 20 years ago.
Personally, I'm also not fond of 'consciousness' to mean 'self-awareness' or perhaps 'sentience', because it conflates heavily with anaesthesiology. A vet can knock a dog out for an operation, after which it regains consciousness, but not consciousness, because while it was conscious before the operation, it wasn't conscious... :)
- derrida 14y agoIn the last paragraph, you said a dog is not conscious. How do you define conscious here? Why do you think it isn't? I define conscious as 'having qualia'. I see red, but also, I notice the 'redness of red'. One may consider this a sort of reflexive/recursive self awareness. I am thinking, so I know I am thinking about thinking. I am interested to hear why you believe a dog is not conscious. In my opinion, a positive test may be if a dog can count to infinity. Successor functions in mathematics might be an indicator of the presence of the recursive thinking necessary to conceptualise constructions such as "the redness of red" or "thinking about thinking", and these are necessary to understand the infinity of the natural number line. So 1 == S(0), 2 == S(S(0)), 3 == S(S(S(0))) and so on.
- LOLtampicoLOL 14y agoWhy do you restrict your definition of consciousness to the capacity of a being to experience qualia?
- vacri 14y agoMy last paragraph is intentionally supposed to humourously expose one of the difficulties in using 'consciousness'. I think the term is extraordinarily difficult to define, so a good start is removing it from easy conflators. My gut response is that it's the 'thinking about thinking' or being able to think in a 'meta' fashion that makes up self-awareness. That you can observe your own actions from a hypothetical third person view. Animal minds are of course a black box - dogs could theoretically be far more intelligent than the smartest humans, but it may just be that their brains don't allow them to express themselves appropriately. As they're a black box, we're reduced to things like the mirror test to try and approximate an idea. Ultimately I think the real answer will be that consciousness/self-awareness is not a binary thing, but a sliding scale. I think the biggest block in discussing these concepts is the next link in the chain: the unwritten assumption that once something is 'conscious', it has a 'soul' or 'special essence' of some kind and therefore can't be morally farmed/eaten/whathaveyou. Because the label of 'conscious' carries this weight, it becomes a sacred label we have to be cautious about applying. An interesting paradox, in that scientific observation might suggest other animals are capable of consciousness, but there is no scientific evidence to suggest that consciousness is particularly special in a moral sense, yet the latter is largely taken for granted.