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We have thought harder. We know the solution. But you have to trade off privacy for security. It's having every person get a cryptographic key from the gover
by jedberg 1y ago
We have thought harder. We know the solution. But you have to trade off privacy for security. It's having every person get a cryptographic key from the government to identify themselves.
Some states are trying this now with porn sites and users are rightfully not having it.
- neilv 1y agoYou know a solution, not necessarily the? What do you have to do to characterize packets sufficiently to shield against DDoS with negligible false-positive significant blocking? (Without needing to associate packets with an identifiable person, nor zero-knowledge proofs of a person, etc.) It's OK to discard some prior requirements. (For example, it's OK to insert occasional brief latency (not barge-in Web browser JS) to some traffic, if that permits an approach that greatly reduces false-positive blocking. And it's OK to pass some traffic with a suspected single client, but then change your mind later. It's OK to forget about connection abstractions and clients, and look only at stateless packets and the entirety of traffic.)