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In your scenario you could still apply additional protections to a user id after detecting X attempts of sending a forged JWT. At least you could alert on JWTs
by alisonatwork 1y ago
In your scenario you could still apply additional protections to a user id after detecting X attempts of sending a forged JWT. At least you could alert on JWTs that arrive with invalid signatures. Or you could put a 2FA challenge key inside the JWT, just use the JWT as a container to hold the information you would have shared with the client anyway.
I agree that JWTs don't really do anything more than a cookie couldn't already do, but I think the use case is for apps, not web browsers. In particular apps that do raw HTTP API calls and do not implement a cookie jar. And then because most companies do "app first development", we end up having to support JWT in the web browser too, manually putting it into localstorage or the application state, instead of just leveraging the cookie jar that was already there.
We just recently had to implement an SSO solution using JWT because the platform only gave out JWTs, so we ended up putting the JWT inside an encrypted HttpOnly cookie. Seemed a bit like a hat-on-a-hat, but eh.
- codethief 1y ago> we end up having to support JWT in the web browser too, manually putting it into localstorage or the application state, instead of just leveraging the cookie jar that was already there. > We just recently had to implement an SSO solution using JWT because the platform only gave out JWTs, so we ended up putting the JWT inside an encrypted HttpOnly cookie. Seemed a bit like a hat-on-a-hat, but eh. Why would you think that? Cookies are a perfectly normal place to store JWTs for web applications. If your frontend is server-side-generated, the browser needs to authenticate the very first request it sends to the server and can't rely on anything apart from cookies anyway.