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The automated setup makes it less likely that the private key leaks. That alones makes it a reasonable justification to shorten the validity timeframe to force

The automated setup makes it less likely that the private key leaks. That alones makes it a reasonable justification to shorten the validity timeframe to force automation. And then if a certificate authority knows that it’s certificate root can be disabled quickly, it puts more pressure on them to follow the rules. Of cause it means that those who still run setups where the certificate cannot be updated quickly will suffer. But then one still has option to run http.

b112 1y ago
We have a single body deciding this, non-democratically. This isn't how RFCs used to work, how html used to be decided, how standards are crafted. The "big boys" aren't the standard setters of the older internet. For example, the more often you need to get a key, the more interactions you have where a leak may occur. If you get keys 36 times in 3 years, instead of once in 3 years, you're that many times more exposed. Further, automation provides many edge cases for non-human monitored issues to occur. A process that requires human intervention at least requires someone to see the process. Automation can be setup years ago, and people may not even realise it is occurring. That doesn't help security. At all. As I said, it's NIST forced password rotation all over again. Attempts to make things better, but the end result is worse. And of course Google thinks this is all grant. After all, in their eyes small mail servers, hobby mail servers, small orgs doing it on their own are a hassle. Everyone should just use gmail, yes?
- fpoling 1y ago
  The web server needs access to the key to sign the reply so the key is accessed all the time. With automation LE style one typically creates an account with LE when one renews the key so there is no need to have an account password or similar which decreases the attack surface compared with any manual procedure. So while I agree that Google and friends have too much power, in this case the decision was reasonable.

b112 1y ago

We have a single body deciding this, non-democratically. This isn't how RFCs used to work, how html used to be decided, how standards are crafted. The "big boys" aren't the standard setters of the older internet. For example, the more often you need to get a key, the more interactions you have where a leak may occur. If you get keys 36 times in 3 years, instead of once in 3 years, you're that many times more exposed. Further, automation provides many edge cases for non-human monitored issues to occur. A process that requires human intervention at least requires someone to see the process. Automation can be setup years ago, and people may not even realise it is occurring. That doesn't help security. At all. As I said, it's NIST forced password rotation all over again. Attempts to make things better, but the end result is worse. And of course Google thinks this is all grant. After all, in their eyes small mail servers, hobby mail servers, small orgs doing it on their own are a hassle. Everyone should just use gmail, yes?

fpoling 1y ago
The web server needs access to the key to sign the reply so the key is accessed all the time. With automation LE style one typically creates an account with LE when one renews the key so there is no need to have an account password or similar which decreases the attack surface compared with any manual procedure. So while I agree that Google and friends have too much power, in this case the decision was reasonable.