Memory encryption doesn't usually protect against these kinds of side channels. You're not reading memory directly, but inferring it based on discernible behavi

Memory encryption doesn't usually protect against these kinds of side channels. You're not reading memory directly, but inferring it based on discernible behavior of the privileged code. Inasmuch as SEV and TME-MK are marketed as protecting VM guest memory from host machine snooping, they've proven insufficient many times before.[1] In the end, you have to trust your VM hosting provider, and trust that they've written their hypervisors in a robust way that takes into account these unforeseen (yet predictable) issues when isolating guests from each other. [1] See, e.g., https://www.amd.com/en/resources/product-security/bulletin/amd-sb-3010.html https://www.amd.com/en/resources/product-security/bulletin/a... and https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/developer/articles/technical/software-security-guidance/best-practices/mktme-side-channel-impact-on-intel-tdx.html https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/developer/articles/t...