3 ms·

> ISO 26262. That is a piece of paper. > Software for steering or braking systems is of high quality. There's literally no way for me to know that before I t

> ISO 26262. That is a piece of paper. > Software for steering or braking systems is of high quality. There's literally no way for me to know that before I trust my life with it.

signatoremo 1y ago
You literally trust your life with medical devices full of software, those that conform to “piece of paper” standards, such as ISO 15708
- timewizard 1y ago
  > You literally trust your life with medical devices full of software I do not. A more charitable way to phrase that is "We are all expected to." And yes, well spotted, this problem extends well beyond vehicles. Or are you suggesting that this is somehow indicative that there are no problems? How would we all know if there _was_ an error in a device? > those that conform to “piece of paper” standards, such as ISO 15708 That standard deals with non destructive testing and has no material that is related to the practice of medicine or the use of medical imaging scanners. It's not even the right piece of paper.
deleted 1y ago
[deleted]
vv_ 1y ago
I don't understand the reasoning you are making here. Cars have had advanced safety features like emergency breaking for a long time now (e.g. Toyota Crown Majesta 2003). Furthermore, there are many safety features that are controlled by software (e.g. airbags and seatbelts) that exist in all cars manufactured today.
- timewizard 1y ago
  Well.. just Google "unintentional airbag deployment."
  - vv_ 1y ago
    Equipment that isn't controlled by software is also prone to failure. Unintentional airbag deployment is a very rare phenomenon.
    - timewizard 1y ago
      Some of them were caused by nothing other than faulty software. Which is the point. The more links in the chain the higher the overall failure rate. Which has implications on MTBF but also on overall failed deployments.

3 ms·

> ISO 26262. That is a piece of paper. > Software for steering or braking systems is of high quality. There's literally no way for me to know that before I t

by timewizard 1y ago

> ISO 26262. That is a piece of paper. > Software for steering or braking systems is of high quality. There's literally no way for me to know that before I trust my life with it.

signatoremo 1y ago
You literally trust your life with medical devices full of software, those that conform to “piece of paper” standards, such as ISO 15708
- timewizard 1y ago
  > You literally trust your life with medical devices full of software I do not. A more charitable way to phrase that is "We are all expected to." And yes, well spotted, this problem extends well beyond vehicles. Or are you suggesting that this is somehow indicative that there are no problems? How would we all know if there _was_ an error in a device? > those that conform to “piece of paper” standards, such as ISO 15708 That standard deals with non destructive testing and has no material that is related to the practice of medicine or the use of medical imaging scanners. It's not even the right piece of paper.
deleted 1y ago
[deleted]
vv_ 1y ago
I don't understand the reasoning you are making here. Cars have had advanced safety features like emergency breaking for a long time now (e.g. Toyota Crown Majesta 2003). Furthermore, there are many safety features that are controlled by software (e.g. airbags and seatbelts) that exist in all cars manufactured today.
- timewizard 1y ago
  Well.. just Google "unintentional airbag deployment."
  - vv_ 1y ago
    Equipment that isn't controlled by software is also prone to failure. Unintentional airbag deployment is a very rare phenomenon.
    - timewizard 1y ago
      Some of them were caused by nothing other than faulty software. Which is the point. The more links in the chain the higher the overall failure rate. Which has implications on MTBF but also on overall failed deployments.