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I'm glad ADP exists now, but you have to make sure everyone you message has it enabled too, or your messages are still Apple's to read whenever they choose. Mea
by modeless 1y ago
I'm glad ADP exists now, but you have to make sure everyone you message has it enabled too, or your messages are still Apple's to read whenever they choose. Meanwhile Google's equivalent backup feature (whatever other faults it may have) has been end-to-end encrypted by default for everyone since long before ADP was even available at all. The risk of losing access is practically nonexistent because the password is your screen lock code, the same one you enter on your lock screen literally every day.
Also, is government spying the only reason Apple decrypts messages? We don't know. They don't disclose that they do it for the government, but we know they do from other sources. What other purposes might they not be disclosing?
- ls612 1y agoThe concern is if you lose your devices with E2EE enabled then you are locked out permanently. Grandma won't know how to use a Yubikey (which is the alternative Apple provides for this eventuality with ADP enabled) and will be out of luck.
- modeless 1y agoThis is not a requirement with Google's solution. After losing all your devices you only need your lock screen code to decrypt your backup, as I said. This is achieved using a secure element on the datacenter side to protect against brute-force attacks on the screen lock code.
- londons_explore 1y ago> the password is your screen lock code You mean the one that by default is a 4 digit number and therefore trivially brute forcable? And neither android hardware nor the google servers have any kind of secure element enforcing brute force protections like '3 tries then we wipe the keys'.
- modeless 1y ago> neither android hardware nor the google servers have any kind of secure element enforcing brute force protections I don't know why you would say this when it is obviously false. https://security.googleblog.com/2018/10/google-and-android-have-your-back-by.html https://security.googleblog.com/2018/10/google-and-android-h...
- londons_explore 1y agodo they actually enforce these limits? I couldn't find any google UI which says "2 tries left or your data will be permanently erased". One can't implement brute force protections without such a UI... "You need to wait 5 minutes" isn't sufficient for a 4 digit pin...
- jjcob 1y agoThe waiting time increases after failed attempts.
- londons_explore 1y agoIn general that isn't secure unless the security chip has access to a secure time server to know that the required amount of time has passed. Otherwise you can simply say "yeah, we power cycled you and now the year is 100,000, can I have another guess?" I don't see any mention of that functionality in any public documentation.
- FireBeyond 1y agoSo now you just need to fake a cell tower and a GPS constellation so that the phone gets a new time on power cycle. Which would be about 60s minimum, to boot and acquire. And that’s with a power cycle, so 14,000 a day? I’ll not going to assume the button will last more than 100,000 presses, so I don’t see many combinations being tried.
- __turbobrew__ 1y agoYou can spoof GPS with a hackrf so this is not actually that crazy, I wouldn’t be surprised if certain 3 letter agencies have tried this already.
- DaSHacka 1y ago> And neither android hardware nor the google servers have any kind of secure element enforcing brute force protections The Titan M chip is present on all Pixel devices: https://grapheneos.org/faq#encryption https://grapheneos.org/faq#encryption
- firecall 1y agoI don’t believe that on Android or iOS it defaults to 4-Digits anymore, does it?