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The more charitable interpretation is that for most people losing their photos and messages is a bigger threat than the government spying on them. For those who

by ls612 1y ago

The more charitable interpretation is that for most people losing their photos and messages is a bigger threat than the government spying on them. For those who might have a different tradeoff there is Advanced Data Protection.

modeless 1y ago
I'm glad ADP exists now, but you have to make sure everyone you message has it enabled too, or your messages are still Apple's to read whenever they choose. Meanwhile Google's equivalent backup feature (whatever other faults it may have) has been end-to-end encrypted by default for everyone since long before ADP was even available at all. The risk of losing access is practically nonexistent because the password is your screen lock code, the same one you enter on your lock screen literally every day. Also, is government spying the only reason Apple decrypts messages? We don't know. They don't disclose that they do it for the government, but we know they do from other sources. What other purposes might they not be disclosing?
- ls612 1y ago
  The concern is if you lose your devices with E2EE enabled then you are locked out permanently. Grandma won't know how to use a Yubikey (which is the alternative Apple provides for this eventuality with ADP enabled) and will be out of luck.
  - modeless 1y ago
    This is not a requirement with Google's solution. After losing all your devices you only need your lock screen code to decrypt your backup, as I said. This is achieved using a secure element on the datacenter side to protect against brute-force attacks on the screen lock code.
- londons_explore 1y ago
  > the password is your screen lock code You mean the one that by default is a 4 digit number and therefore trivially brute forcable? And neither android hardware nor the google servers have any kind of secure element enforcing brute force protections like '3 tries then we wipe the keys'.
  - modeless 1y ago
    > neither android hardware nor the google servers have any kind of secure element enforcing brute force protections I don't know why you would say this when it is obviously false. https://security.googleblog.com/2018/10/google-and-android-have-your-back-by.html https://security.googleblog.com/2018/10/google-and-android-h...
    - londons_explore 1y ago
      do they actually enforce these limits? I couldn't find any google UI which says "2 tries left or your data will be permanently erased". One can't implement brute force protections without such a UI... "You need to wait 5 minutes" isn't sufficient for a 4 digit pin...
      - jjcob 1y ago
        The waiting time increases after failed attempts.
        londons_explore 1y ago
        In general that isn't secure unless the security chip has access to a secure time server to know that the required amount of time has passed. Otherwise you can simply say "yeah, we power cycled you and now the year is 100,000, can I have another guess?" I don't see any mention of that functionality in any public documentation.
        FireBeyond 1y ago
        So now you just need to fake a cell tower and a GPS constellation so that the phone gets a new time on power cycle. Which would be about 60s minimum, to boot and acquire. And that’s with a power cycle, so 14,000 a day? I’ll not going to assume the button will last more than 100,000 presses, so I don’t see many combinations being tried.
        __turbobrew__ 1y ago
deleted 1y ago
[deleted]
xvector 1y ago
ADP is a total joke if it doesn't also disable plaintext backups for the people you're talking to
- Jtsummers 1y ago
  > ADP is a total joke if it doesn't also disable plaintext backups for the people you're talking to Do you consider all security to be a joke then? If you send me a message, how will you actually guarantee that I do not make a copy of it once it's on my own computer?
  - modeless 1y ago
    There's no guarantee, but some apps intended for security actually make at least a minimal effort to be excluded from plaintext backups, rather than intentionally sending their encryption keys to the backup service that just happens to be run by the same company...
    - Jtsummers 1y ago
      Ok. So you concede that there is no way for you to ensure that messages you send me, that I can decrypt, are left unreadable by anyone but me. So what secure communication system should we be using given that none of them can guarantee that the recipient doesn't leak information to another country by choosing to use a compromised version of the client?
      - modeless 1y ago
        My complaint is not about guarantees, it's about defaults. Default non-e2e-encrypted backups of message encryption keys are the problem here. No system can guarantee absolute security, but that doesn't mean they're all equivalently bad. Some are definitely more secure than others, and defaults have a lot to do with it!
        Jtsummers 1y ago

by ls612 1y ago

modeless 1y ago

I'm glad ADP exists now, but you have to make sure everyone you message has it enabled too, or your messages are still Apple's to read whenever they choose. Meanwhile Google's equivalent backup feature (whatever other faults it may have) has been end-to-end encrypted by default for everyone since long before ADP was even available at all. The risk of losing access is practically nonexistent because the password is your screen lock code, the same one you enter on your lock screen literally every day. Also, is government spying the only reason Apple decrypts messages? We don't know. They don't disclose that they do it for the government, but we know they do from other sources. What other purposes might they not be disclosing?

ls612 1y ago
The concern is if you lose your devices with E2EE enabled then you are locked out permanently. Grandma won't know how to use a Yubikey (which is the alternative Apple provides for this eventuality with ADP enabled) and will be out of luck.
- modeless 1y ago
  This is not a requirement with Google's solution. After losing all your devices you only need your lock screen code to decrypt your backup, as I said. This is achieved using a secure element on the datacenter side to protect against brute-force attacks on the screen lock code.
londons_explore 1y ago
> the password is your screen lock code You mean the one that by default is a 4 digit number and therefore trivially brute forcable? And neither android hardware nor the google servers have any kind of secure element enforcing brute force protections like '3 tries then we wipe the keys'.
- modeless 1y ago
  > neither android hardware nor the google servers have any kind of secure element enforcing brute force protections I don't know why you would say this when it is obviously false. https://security.googleblog.com/2018/10/google-and-android-have-your-back-by.html https://security.googleblog.com/2018/10/google-and-android-h...
  - londons_explore 1y ago
    do they actually enforce these limits? I couldn't find any google UI which says "2 tries left or your data will be permanently erased". One can't implement brute force protections without such a UI... "You need to wait 5 minutes" isn't sufficient for a 4 digit pin...
    - jjcob 1y ago
      The waiting time increases after failed attempts.
      - londons_explore 1y ago
        In general that isn't secure unless the security chip has access to a secure time server to know that the required amount of time has passed. Otherwise you can simply say "yeah, we power cycled you and now the year is 100,000, can I have another guess?" I don't see any mention of that functionality in any public documentation.
        FireBeyond 1y ago
        So now you just need to fake a cell tower and a GPS constellation so that the phone gets a new time on power cycle. Which would be about 60s minimum, to boot and acquire. And that’s with a power cycle, so 14,000 a day? I’ll not going to assume the button will last more than 100,000 presses, so I don’t see many combinations being tried.
        __turbobrew__ 1y ago

deleted 1y ago

[deleted]

xvector 1y ago

ADP is a total joke if it doesn't also disable plaintext backups for the people you're talking to

Jtsummers 1y ago
> ADP is a total joke if it doesn't also disable plaintext backups for the people you're talking to Do you consider all security to be a joke then? If you send me a message, how will you actually guarantee that I do not make a copy of it once it's on my own computer?
- modeless 1y ago
  There's no guarantee, but some apps intended for security actually make at least a minimal effort to be excluded from plaintext backups, rather than intentionally sending their encryption keys to the backup service that just happens to be run by the same company...
  - Jtsummers 1y ago
    Ok. So you concede that there is no way for you to ensure that messages you send me, that I can decrypt, are left unreadable by anyone but me. So what secure communication system should we be using given that none of them can guarantee that the recipient doesn't leak information to another country by choosing to use a compromised version of the client?
    - modeless 1y ago
      My complaint is not about guarantees, it's about defaults. Default non-e2e-encrypted backups of message encryption keys are the problem here. No system can guarantee absolute security, but that doesn't mean they're all equivalently bad. Some are definitely more secure than others, and defaults have a lot to do with it!
      - Jtsummers 1y ago