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> I would consider AES-CBC+HMAC to be an AEAD construction OK fair. > and I would consider whatever "secret key" you pass into HMAC along with the ciphertext
by vlovich123 2y ago
> I would consider AES-CBC+HMAC to be an AEAD construction
OK fair.
> and I would consider whatever "secret key" you pass into HMAC along with the ciphertext to be the "associated data"
The secret key isn't associated data. You take your base HKDF key and expand new crypto for an authenticated cipher from the offset as info (+ maybe other parameters like file name). That key is then used to decrypt. If you squint I guess you could call that AD but it's functionally a very different role.
> because cryptographic libraries will often implement AEAD constructions to fail in constant time, where as your scheme will take longer if post-decryption validation of contextual data encoded in the plaintext fails compared to if decryption fails.
I think you've misunderstood what I said. As I repeat above, the AEAD key is derived from the offset. There's no post-decryption validation of contextual data because the plaintext is empty. HKDF derivation is constant time and authenticated decryption is constant time. Once decrypted you have a valid block at that location. There's nothing extra left to validate (or perhaps the decrypted contents, but that's irrelevant for cryptographic purposes).
My broader point is that I have yet to encounter a use-case for a non-empty AD string.
- tptacek 2y agoThere are several of them on this thread. For example: encrypt a 10 gigabyte file. You'll need to chunk it; each chunk will exist at an offset. Encode the chunk offset into the Associated Data. Notice that you never store this Associated Data; you simply have it in the context of encrypting and decrypting the file. But the AEAD MAC captures it, and now you can't cut and paste chunks of a ciphertext.
- vlovich123 2y agoOr alternatively, as I said, derive a new key for each chunk where the offset is part of the info used to derive the key and have an empty AD. Same effect.
- tptacek 2y agoI may be missing a subtlety here but it seems like you've essentially reinvented Associated Data but with an extra KDF extraction and an AES key expansion for every chunk.
- hxtk 2y agoIt sounds like you have constructed a way to encrypt data such that it can only be decrypted by someone who has the same (secret) key and (non-secret) associated data that was used to encrypt it, or else decryption fails. As you said, same effect: the scheme you have described is not an alternative to AEAD. It is an example of AEAD. You're still using the offset as associated data, you just happen to be composing your AEAD scheme out of another AEAD scheme into which you pass an empty string as associated data. Other than differences in the limit to the number of messages you can encrypt before nonce exhaustion or the number of bits of secrecy or authentication strength provided, the external interface and use case of your system perfectly matches that of AES-GCM or other popular AEAD constructions.
- vlovich123 2y ago> Other than differences in the limit to the number of messages you can encrypt before nonce exhaustion or the number of bits of secrecy or authentication strength provided, the external interface and use case of your system perfectly matches that of AES-GCM or other popular AEAD constructions. Ahh, but that’s not a trivial part of the design and why this is strictly better than using a single AES-GCM key with AD. And also it’s more generic across whatever type of key you choose to derive.
- tptacek 2y agoWhatever else using a KDF to mix Associated Data into your key might be, it's not "strictly better" than GCM. I'm not sure there's much wrong with it (it's the same approach XAES uses for extended nonces) other than how slow it is, but there's a reason cryptographers don't design all the AEADs to work this way.