The problem here is that the issue is thrust upon the property owner without any deliberate action. This is unlike (say) industrial pollution, which requires a

The problem here is that the issue is thrust upon the property owner without any deliberate action. This is unlike (say) industrial pollution, which requires a deliberate action on the polluter's part (although you might argue historical shifts in what is acceptable might also be described as not deliberate). Perverse incentives abound. If you make your property more welcoming to nature, you risk having it taken from you if you are unlucky enough to make it too welcoming. Degradation is encouraged. You are incentivized to restrict access to your property to prevent unwelcome discovery of endangered species. A contrary scheme would involve payments for making land more natural, with sliding scales based on the importance. Providing habitat for critically endangered species? You get a large payout. It would encourage expansion of habitat for such species, not destruction. Of course governments would rather get benefits without having to themselves pay for them. That's actually something to worry about -- if costs are hidden, then the normal cost/benefit calculus that goes into formulating government policies is upset. Even in the case of industrial pollution, it could be sensible to pay polluters to stop polluting, or at least give them positive financial incentive to do so. Issuing tradeable emission permits to polluters can be viewed as an example of this. Such a scheme was highly effective in reducing SOx emissions in the US, achieving SOx emission reductions 6x more cost effectively than had been projected. Similar incentive programs exist or have existed for farms and automobiles ("Cash for Clunkers").