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The Mystery of the Encrypted Gauss Payload
- jgrahamc 14y agoThe core of this is 'find X' such that md5(md5(...10,000 times...(md5(X + salt)...)) = hash where salt and hash are known. X is derived from the names of programs existing on a Windows machine with a particular format. Or, find a way to calculate md5(md5(...10,000 times...(md5(X + salt')...)) given that hash is known and salt' but X is not. Or alternatively, attempt a known plain text attack against RC4. Given that a certain amount of plain text is known (4 bytes) at the start of the RC4 payload then it's likely that the first few bytes of the keystream are known and an attack could be mounted via weakness in the RC4 key schedule.
- raverbashing 14y agoWell, wasn't MD5 broken? It should be possible to do a brute force search using a couple of days of EC2 or (insert your favorite cloud provider) here. And by bruteforce you can try text search, or just go for the raw bytes. Not sure a collision can work in this case as well.
- jgrahamc 14y agoTo recover X + salt you'd be looking at a preimage attack of MD5. I am only aware of one preimage attack against MD5 and it's only theoretical. The input to the RC4 key generator is an MD5 hash which means you'd be looking at doing a brute force attack against an input of 2^128 bits. Assuming you find the answer on average in 2^127 and you are looking at an enormous search space. According to a recent article EC2 has about 500,000 machines. Now assume that I buy them all and I am able on each machine to check 1,000,000,000 values as inputs to RC4 per second then I should have the answer in 800,000 times the age of the universe. But I think my credit card will have been cancelled first.
- raverbashing 14y agoI'd try to bruteforce X (to match the hash), not RC4 at first (though it may be easier) PBKDF2 is SHA-1 and 4096 rounds, this shouldn't be impossible Bonus points if you use FPGAs to calculate MD5s
- jgrahamc 14y agoThe question is how large that search space is. If you can get a reliable list of directory names and file names then it might be small, but if you are left iterating characters in filenames (and this appears to be Unicode) then I'd imagine you'd run into the same situation. I'd be much more tempted to look at the fact that the first four bytes of the RC4 key stream appear to be recoverable and look at key recovery from that.
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- tedunangst 14y agoPBKDF2 uses a hash function which need not be SHA-1 and applies it a variable number of rounds with a recommended minimum of 1000.
- mtkd 14y agoWhat about sourcing all known \Program Files\ paths out of search engine indexes which meet the criteria and brute forcing. Microsoft exception reporting must have a list of all apps ever seen too?
- raverbashing 14y agoThere is one aspect there that may or may not be important I don't know if the "Program files" path (or the full path) is added to the hash calculation, but at least in Windows XP this is localized Or who knows, the secret is that it only works in systems where Program files is in D:/
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- praptak 14y agoEven with a reverse-md5^10000 oracle, you'd only get some bits that hash to the same hash as the mysterious pair of strings. Unfortunately the decryption key is derived from the pair of strings themselves, not from their hash. Reverting md5 is not enough to retrieve the decryption key.
- orenmazor 14y agoI just imagined the author reading that post and smirking to themselves.
- tjic 14y agoMy thought exactly - how weird it must be to be inside looking out. Public key crypto was discovered on the inside long before it was rediscovered on the outside, and I figure that the insiders must have been amused by Diffie, Hellman, R, S, and A. -------- http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Public-key_cryptography#History http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Public-key_cryptography#History In 1997, it was publicly disclosed that asymmetric key algorithms were developed by James H. Ellis, Clifford Cocks, and Malcolm Williamson at the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) in the UK in 1973.[4] These researchers independently developed Diffie–Hellman key exchange, and a special case of RSA. The GCHQ cryptographers referred to the technique as "non-secret encryption". This work was named an IEEE Milestone in 2010.[5]
- fryguy 14y agoSo does this mean that if you're a high profile target, you should immediately add a random folder to all of your computers in the program files directory?
- ragmondo 14y agoNo..it means if you are running a specific program which unlocks the code you are going to have a bad time (I suppose you could rename all of your program directories though... would that defeat this ?)
- sounds 14y agoThe full implications of this code are that the attacker already has another channel to access your machine. It's not much consolation that you now know that you're being targeted by the Program Files entries (they're a major pain to rename). It's likely there are one or more plants inside your operation and they have physical access to the machine, which is considered game over.
- lifeisstillgood 14y agooh, this is the modern version of a microdot Release Gauss into the wild, have your agent in Fordu Nuclear plant be sure he has Gauss on his machine, and then just get him to name the jpgs or text files he wants sent back to the CIA as 'special.jpg' - Gauss nabs them, sends it back through the network of gauss infected machines, and hey presto - deniable, encrypted, distributed Dead Drops. Wow. Clever. Thank you
- pruman 14y agoClever. The font makes it possible for the agent to verify he is on a Gauss machine by visiting seemingly innocuous websites which have code to detect whether the font exists, and then inform him by outputting special text only he knows about. He could receive messages that way too. Once he knows it's a Gauss machine, he can drop his specially named files and they are delivered.
- mkup 14y agoIt looks like it would be easier to bruteforce fixed RC4 key than 10000 iterations of MD5, especially due to known weaknesses of RC4 key schedule. Name of target software in Program Files is interesting nevertheless. Probably it's mentioned in the encrypted code/data.
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- ceautery 14y agoThe article mentions "~" as a possible starting point, but "{" is also greater than 7A, which would match all the "InstallShield Installation Information" subfolders.
- eli 14y agoGreat point... are those uniquely named based on the application installed? That might be a nice, oblique way of checking if a particular program is installed.
- lt 14y agoYes, these are GUIDs in the following format: {931373E2-3DA4-4631-930C-F59510630DA3} It seems to me that's a good theory of what it might be looking for, as GUIDs should make good triggers. I wonder if this reduces the search space enough to make brute force feasible now.
- Zarathust 14y agoTo bruteforce like this, wouldn't you need every possible application installed on the computer? If the payload is a zero day for an obscure Iranian made piece of software, no one will ever get that
- Scaevolus 14y ago128 bit GUIDs give pairs of 256 bits -- too large to mount an efficient brute force.
- sunyc 14y agochecking prog directory might mean they are looking for specific machin with specific system image
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- mjs 14y agoSo whilst the malware will infect machines more or less indiscriminately, the payload itself can only be successfully decrypted (and therefore activated and executed), on machines that have a specific set of programs installed?
- dkokelley 14y agoI think it's actually just one specific program, who's name starts with a special character or high UNICODE character.
- kayge 14y ago"the attackers are looking for a very specific program with the name written in an extended character set, such as Arabic or Hebrew, or one that starts with a special symbol such as “~”." I suppose µTorrent is too obvious... Anyway, these kinds of mysteries help re-ignite my interest in Cryptography. I'd love to hear feedback from a fellow HNer about the course from Udacity (perhaps via email since it will probably be considered off-topic here).
- Achshar 14y agoI thought about uTorrent too, but Mu has a hex of 0x03BC. Plus it is a popular software and in windows, it's folder in program files uses 'u' instead of Mu. http://www.fileformat.info/info/unicode/char/3bc/index.htm http://www.fileformat.info/info/unicode/char/3bc/index.htm
- meatsock 14y agoa good point raised in the comments is that the "arabic or hebrew" part really meant to say a "non-letter us-ascii value including curley brackets, tilde, and pipe". not sure why anyone would want to jump the gun on narrowing down geography in this way.
- tjic 14y ago> not sure why anyone would want to jump the gun on narrowing down geography in this way. Because it's a tool designed to take out Iranian uranium refining tools.
- lifeisstillgood 14y agoI think it is fair to say it is a general purpose tool, that was configured at least once, to take out Uranium refining tools. So, I would be surprised to find this was not also using, say the parts of Unicode with Chinese characters as well.
- trebor 14y agoI'd like to see Kaspersky bust one of the Russian government-made viruses. I see them protecting customers from everyone else...
- DividesByZero 14y agoDo you have any examples of such a virus? So far only the US and Israel have been implicated in the creation of 'weaponised' malware.
- mjwalshe 14y agoIndeed and why would anyone for outside of Rusia who had insights or actulay got a break give it up to Kaspersky. I suspect that the Security Service /SIS , CIA NSA and a whole array of TLA's would be very interested in you :-)
- fleitz 14y agoAny chance that the Paladia Narrow font is designed to infect printers?