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By using this, you're saying that you trust cperciva more than you trust Stripe. I'm confident that neither are going to try and deliberately steal your credit
by bryanlarsen 14y ago
By using this, you're saying that you trust cperciva more than you trust Stripe. I'm confident that neither are going to try and deliberately steal your credit card numbers. But furthermore, you are saying that cperciva is going to protect paymentiframe.com from hacks better than stripe is going to protect theirs.
Myself, I'd place a lot of trust on cperciva, the former FreeBSD security officer, a guy who has written papers on security flaws in Pentium 4 processors. (http://www.daemonology.net/hyperthreading-considered-harmful/ http://www.daemonology.net/hyperthreading-considered-harmful...)
[edit] paymentiframe.com's FAQ now includes this:
Why should I trust you with my credit card entry form?
You probably shouldn't. This is more of a proof of concept — but you might also want to use the CGI script to generate an iframe which you download (along with the bits it links to) and serve up as a static file from a server you run (but make sure you get a separate domain name for it).
- semenko 14y ago> Myself, I'd place a lot of trust on cperciva Sure, but you can just compare the two sites' external measures of security, and they're not even close. Stripe domains: - Pass optional HTTP security headers (like X-Frame-Options on manage.stripe.com) - Are pinned to Chrome's HSTS list (http://src.chromium.org/viewvc/chrome?view=rev&revision=84125 http://src.chromium.org/viewvc/chrome?view=rev&revision=...) and pass a Strict-Transport-Security header
- tptacek 14y agoAren't you comparing Colin's iframe with a level of security unobtainable to normal Stripe developers? If you just use Stripe's JS interface the way they tell you to, you're not strictly speaking benefiting from Stripe's HSTS or XFO; your site still needs to defend against clickjacking and SSL stripping. I feel like Colin built this little thingy to solve a real problem --- that by adding Stripe to his site, he was giving Stripe control over his site, and his site hosts information more sensitive than credit cards --- and people are piling on because his solution to his little problem doesn't solve every other imaginable security problem. This would be less galling if the kinds of sites using Stripe today weren't almost uniformly rife with application security flaws that defeat most of the good intentions that Stripe has.