2 ms·
> Is there some minimum number of qubits at which some minimum viable quantum-supreme task can theoretically be achieved? That is a very broad range of possibi
by ryao 2y ago
> Is there some minimum number of qubits at which some minimum viable quantum-supreme task can theoretically be achieved?
That is a very broad range of possibilities, so allow me to narrow it to cryptography. I am by no means an expert on this, but I spent the weekend reading about quantum motivations to change the cryptographic algorithms society uses and as at as I can tell, nobody knows what the hard lower bound is for breaking hardness assumptions in classical cryptography. The best guess is that it is many orders of magnitude higher than what current machines can do.
We are so far from machines capable of this that it is unclear that a machine capable of it will be made in our lifetimes, despite optimism/fear/hope, depending on who you are, to the contrary.
> What would be required to factor a 1024 bit integer key?
I assume you mean a 1024-bit RSA key (if you mean a 1024-bit ECC key, I want to know what curve). You can crack 1024-bit RSA with 2051 logical qubits according to:
https://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0205095 https://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0205095
In order for it to actually work, it is believed that you will need between 1000 to 10000 physical qubits for every logical qubit, so it could take up to 20 million qubits.
Coincidentally, the following paper claims that cracking a 2048-bit RSA key can be done in 8 hours with 20 million physical qubits:
https://arxiv.org/abs/1905.09749 https://arxiv.org/abs/1905.09749
That sounds like it should not make sense given the previous upper estimate of 20 million physical qubits for a 1024-bit RSA key. As far as I can tell, there are different ways of implementing Shor’s algorithm and some ways use more qubits and some ways use less. The biggest factor in the number of physical qubits used is the error correction. If you can do better error correction, you can use fewer physical qubits.