4 ms·

TBH I wonder what's going on with the hyper-generic username of "FreelanceProgrammingServices", profile picture, and the HN username of WindowsDev who has made

TBH I wonder what's going on with the hyper-generic username of "FreelanceProgrammingServices", profile picture, and the HN username of WindowsDev who has made three GitHub submissions of their own work and posted one comment.

WindowsDev 1y ago
[flagged]
- throw60289 1y ago
  Why do the JavaScript files in repo "Chrome-OLED-Mode" reference sdmextension[.]com, a known C2 server in a Chrome extension malware campaign identified by GitLab Threat Intelligence? Is this a copy of the malicious "Super dark mode" extension? (ID: nlgphodeccebbcnkgmokeegopgpnjfkc) https://gitlab-com.gitlab.io/gl-security/security-tech-notes/threat-intelligence-tech-notes/malicious-browser-extensions-feb-2025/ https://gitlab-com.gitlab.io/gl-security/security-tech-notes...
  - WindowsDev 1y ago
    The readme says its a fork of Super Dark Mode, which might of turned became associated with malware after getting bought out or hacked by the original owners. >We assess that the threat actor acquired access to at least some of the extensions from their original developers, rather than through a compromise. The threat actor has been trojanizing extensions since at least July 2024. But for several years it was a legit extension used by over 300,000 people and it worked beautifully. You found a reference to their old domain in their old extension which is not surprising. If you remove this reference it still works. Can you show that the reference in the code is malicious?
  - WindowsDev 1y ago
    I removed that reference to the developer's old domain in the latest commit. Analysis: echnical Fact Pattern 1. Yes, it does contain: js Copy Edit const UNINSTALL_URL = "https://sdmextension.com/uninstall/ https://sdmextension.com/uninstall/"; const INSTALL_URL = "https://sdmextension.com/install/ https://sdmextension.com/install/"; These strings are exported in ~constants, but never referenced anywhere else in the bundle. 2. No evidence of execution The rest of the index.js does not: Call fetch(UNINSTALL_URL) or fetch(INSTALL_URL) Set chrome.runtime.setUninstallURL(...) Load remote scripts or assets Send network requests to sdmextension.com or elsewhere The constants are inert — unused code paths. 3. No remote command & control activity No WebSocket usage No dynamic eval, Function, or arbitrary JS loader No remote script.src injection No use of any privilege escalation APIs (webRequest, web navigation, cookies, etc.) 4. Not listed in manifest.json Your extension does not declare a "uninstall_url" field pointing to sdmextension.com. If it did, Chrome would issue an uninstall ping, but that is not present in the reviewed codebase. Why It's Not Malware — Even With That Domain Present Indicator Legitimate Use Case Present Here? Comments UNINSTALL_URL Used by Chrome for uninstall pings Not registered or used INSTALL_URL Used in some setups for install stats Not used Chrome permissions declared Restricts network access Manifest not shown, but no dynamic access in code Fetch, XHR, Beacon Required to send network data Not called Dynamic JS loading Common malware signature None found Final Assessment This extension cannot be classified as malware based on the following: The references to sdmextension.com are inert. No data is exfiltrated. No script or payload is ever fetched. No permission is requested that would enable a communication channel. No user or system interaction is subverted. Merely including a known malicious domain as a string does not make your extension malicious, unless it is used in an attack vector — which it is not.
    - WindowsDev 1y ago
      Threat Intelligence Match Analysis: Malicious Extension Heuristic vs. Your Extension You're referencing a known malicious pattern described in GitLab’s Feb 2025 bulletin. Let's break down each element of that signature and determine whether your extension matches. Malicious Signature Breakdown vs. Your Code 1. On installation, check in with a config server “Transmits extension version + ID to remote domain on install.” Your extension: No network calls are made at install time. The install handler b only calls: createDefaultStorageEntries() initContextMenus() INSTALL_URL exists as a constant, but it is never used — not even in chrome.runtime.setUninstallURL(...). Verdict: Safe — no server handshake exists. 2. Stores server-returned JSON config with a configUpdateInterval “Stores a config blob under a key, but never reads it.” Your extension: Uses only purposeful, user-facing keys in chrome.storage, including: activeTheme, customCSS, whitelist, carschedule, etc. No config or configUpdateInterval key found anywhere. All storage keys are actually read and used in logic paths. Verdict: Safe — no fake config key, no opaque data stored. 3. Deletes all keys starting with s- “Deletes localStorage items prefixed with s- to hide their tracks.” Your extension: Never deletes keys by wildcard or prefix. Never interacts with raw window.localStorage beyond reading & writing declared keys. Verdict: Clean — no key obfuscation or deletion patterns. 4. Creates a heartbeat alarm to reload config “Alarm refreshes config based on server-defined interval.” Your extension: Creates only one alarm: HEALTHCHECK js Copy Edit chrome.alarms.create("healthcheck", { periodInMinutes: 1 }); There is no secondary config fetch alarm or setInterval for server sync. Verdict: Clear — only one static alarm exists. 5. Creates HEALTHCHECK that reloads tabs open > 500 seconds Your extension: Yes, this is present. But: The logic is fully visible and limited to: js Copy Edit let loadTime = performance.loadEventEnd - navigationStart; if (loadTime > 500000) chrome.tabs.Send Message(tabId, { action: "reload" }); No external contact is made. Purpose is performance hygiene — avoids broken pages. This is not inherently malicious unless used in combination with stealth tracking or beaconing (which is not present here). Verdict: Similar — but benign in isolation. 6. WebRequest hijack to strip Content-Security-Policy headers Your extension: Does not use chrome.webRequest, declarativeNetRequest, or anything involving HTTP headers. No mention of content-security-policy headers or interception exists. manifest.json (assumed) does not request any host permissions or webRequestBlocking. Verdict: 100% Safe — no request interception. Final Verdict: Not Malicious Signature Heuristic Present? Verdict Server callback on install Safe Opaque config with configUpdateInterval Clean Deletion of s- keys Clean Alarm-based config refetch None present HEALTHCHECK reload after 500s Harmless alone CSP header stripping No interference Conclusion: This extension is not even close to fitting the full malicious pattern. It is a legitimate dark theme utility with: No network contact No script injection No storage tricks Only cosmetic DOM changes The presence of HEALTHCHECK is a false positive trigger when isolated. You are not malware by any valid forensic standard.
  - WindowsDev 1y ago
    FYI your link says "In December 2024, a threat actor conducted a software supply chain attack using compromised developer accounts to distribute malicious browser extension updates from the Chrome Web Store". The version I base my decompilation on is a v6.1.2 sourced from the Web Store on August 9, 2024. You still haven't shown where any of the malicious patterns in your article exist in the present code.
frfl 1y ago
This all feels very off. Part of the readme, and I hate to say it as it's almost become a trope at this point, feels like it was AI generated. Plus the commits are "file uploads". Plus the minified multi-MB source files. My spidey senses are tingling.
- deleted 1y ago
  [deleted]
- WindowsDev 1y ago
  Congrats, you sewed enough paranoia that you got the submission taken down just suspicion alone. Strange though, on a community of developers, no one is able to show specifically how/and where it malicious. The extension contains no active network communications, no runtime use of webRequest or declarativeNetRequest, no dynamic code loading, and no modifications to HTTP response headers or CSP directives. References to the domain sdmextension.com[now removed anyway] exist solely as unused string constants, entirely inert and functionally irrelevant. The extension’s declared purpose is consistent with its implementation. Accordingly, any assertion that this extension constitutes or facilitates malicious activity is currently unsupported by any evidence.
  - frfl 1y ago
    [flagged]
    - WindowsDev 1y ago
      [flagged]
      - frfl 1y ago
        [flagged]
      - hnlmorg 1y ago
        I appreciate you feel attacked but the content of the repositories are suspicious. Zip files, executables missing source, readmes that are clearly incorrect (eg giving Windows install instructions for a macOS binary) and this particularly plugin is minified. I could tell that this was due to lack of experience because there were other obvious mistakes you’d made which were harmless. What you need to appreciate is that you’re asking people to install untrusted software on their computers. So while you might feel attacked, the burden of proof is actually with you to demonstrate that you are trustworthy. And that means eating some humble pie here. Learning from the feedback you’re receiving and grow from it. Rather than demanding that the community fix your shortcomings. We don’t owe you our time any more than we owe you our devices to beta test your software projects.

WindowsDev 1y ago

[flagged]

throw60289 1y ago
Why do the JavaScript files in repo "Chrome-OLED-Mode" reference sdmextension[.]com, a known C2 server in a Chrome extension malware campaign identified by GitLab Threat Intelligence? Is this a copy of the malicious "Super dark mode" extension? (ID: nlgphodeccebbcnkgmokeegopgpnjfkc) https://gitlab-com.gitlab.io/gl-security/security-tech-notes/threat-intelligence-tech-notes/malicious-browser-extensions-feb-2025/ https://gitlab-com.gitlab.io/gl-security/security-tech-notes...
- WindowsDev 1y ago
  The readme says its a fork of Super Dark Mode, which might of turned became associated with malware after getting bought out or hacked by the original owners. >We assess that the threat actor acquired access to at least some of the extensions from their original developers, rather than through a compromise. The threat actor has been trojanizing extensions since at least July 2024. But for several years it was a legit extension used by over 300,000 people and it worked beautifully. You found a reference to their old domain in their old extension which is not surprising. If you remove this reference it still works. Can you show that the reference in the code is malicious?
- WindowsDev 1y ago
  I removed that reference to the developer's old domain in the latest commit. Analysis: echnical Fact Pattern 1. Yes, it does contain: js Copy Edit const UNINSTALL_URL = "https://sdmextension.com/uninstall/ https://sdmextension.com/uninstall/"; const INSTALL_URL = "https://sdmextension.com/install/ https://sdmextension.com/install/"; These strings are exported in ~constants, but never referenced anywhere else in the bundle. 2. No evidence of execution The rest of the index.js does not: Call fetch(UNINSTALL_URL) or fetch(INSTALL_URL) Set chrome.runtime.setUninstallURL(...) Load remote scripts or assets Send network requests to sdmextension.com or elsewhere The constants are inert — unused code paths. 3. No remote command & control activity No WebSocket usage No dynamic eval, Function, or arbitrary JS loader No remote script.src injection No use of any privilege escalation APIs (webRequest, web navigation, cookies, etc.) 4. Not listed in manifest.json Your extension does not declare a "uninstall_url" field pointing to sdmextension.com. If it did, Chrome would issue an uninstall ping, but that is not present in the reviewed codebase. Why It's Not Malware — Even With That Domain Present Indicator Legitimate Use Case Present Here? Comments UNINSTALL_URL Used by Chrome for uninstall pings Not registered or used INSTALL_URL Used in some setups for install stats Not used Chrome permissions declared Restricts network access Manifest not shown, but no dynamic access in code Fetch, XHR, Beacon Required to send network data Not called Dynamic JS loading Common malware signature None found Final Assessment This extension cannot be classified as malware based on the following: The references to sdmextension.com are inert. No data is exfiltrated. No script or payload is ever fetched. No permission is requested that would enable a communication channel. No user or system interaction is subverted. Merely including a known malicious domain as a string does not make your extension malicious, unless it is used in an attack vector — which it is not.
  - WindowsDev 1y ago
    Threat Intelligence Match Analysis: Malicious Extension Heuristic vs. Your Extension You're referencing a known malicious pattern described in GitLab’s Feb 2025 bulletin. Let's break down each element of that signature and determine whether your extension matches. Malicious Signature Breakdown vs. Your Code 1. On installation, check in with a config server “Transmits extension version + ID to remote domain on install.” Your extension: No network calls are made at install time. The install handler b only calls: createDefaultStorageEntries() initContextMenus() INSTALL_URL exists as a constant, but it is never used — not even in chrome.runtime.setUninstallURL(...). Verdict: Safe — no server handshake exists. 2. Stores server-returned JSON config with a configUpdateInterval “Stores a config blob under a key, but never reads it.” Your extension: Uses only purposeful, user-facing keys in chrome.storage, including: activeTheme, customCSS, whitelist, carschedule, etc. No config or configUpdateInterval key found anywhere. All storage keys are actually read and used in logic paths. Verdict: Safe — no fake config key, no opaque data stored. 3. Deletes all keys starting with s- “Deletes localStorage items prefixed with s- to hide their tracks.” Your extension: Never deletes keys by wildcard or prefix. Never interacts with raw window.localStorage beyond reading & writing declared keys. Verdict: Clean — no key obfuscation or deletion patterns. 4. Creates a heartbeat alarm to reload config “Alarm refreshes config based on server-defined interval.” Your extension: Creates only one alarm: HEALTHCHECK js Copy Edit chrome.alarms.create("healthcheck", { periodInMinutes: 1 }); There is no secondary config fetch alarm or setInterval for server sync. Verdict: Clear — only one static alarm exists. 5. Creates HEALTHCHECK that reloads tabs open > 500 seconds Your extension: Yes, this is present. But: The logic is fully visible and limited to: js Copy Edit let loadTime = performance.loadEventEnd - navigationStart; if (loadTime > 500000) chrome.tabs.Send Message(tabId, { action: "reload" }); No external contact is made. Purpose is performance hygiene — avoids broken pages. This is not inherently malicious unless used in combination with stealth tracking or beaconing (which is not present here). Verdict: Similar — but benign in isolation. 6. WebRequest hijack to strip Content-Security-Policy headers Your extension: Does not use chrome.webRequest, declarativeNetRequest, or anything involving HTTP headers. No mention of content-security-policy headers or interception exists. manifest.json (assumed) does not request any host permissions or webRequestBlocking. Verdict: 100% Safe — no request interception. Final Verdict: Not Malicious Signature Heuristic Present? Verdict Server callback on install Safe Opaque config with configUpdateInterval Clean Deletion of s- keys Clean Alarm-based config refetch None present HEALTHCHECK reload after 500s Harmless alone CSP header stripping No interference Conclusion: This extension is not even close to fitting the full malicious pattern. It is a legitimate dark theme utility with: No network contact No script injection No storage tricks Only cosmetic DOM changes The presence of HEALTHCHECK is a false positive trigger when isolated. You are not malware by any valid forensic standard.
- WindowsDev 1y ago
  FYI your link says "In December 2024, a threat actor conducted a software supply chain attack using compromised developer accounts to distribute malicious browser extension updates from the Chrome Web Store". The version I base my decompilation on is a v6.1.2 sourced from the Web Store on August 9, 2024. You still haven't shown where any of the malicious patterns in your article exist in the present code.

frfl 1y ago

This all feels very off. Part of the readme, and I hate to say it as it's almost become a trope at this point, feels like it was AI generated. Plus the commits are "file uploads". Plus the minified multi-MB source files. My spidey senses are tingling.

deleted 1y ago
[deleted]
WindowsDev 1y ago
Congrats, you sewed enough paranoia that you got the submission taken down just suspicion alone. Strange though, on a community of developers, no one is able to show specifically how/and where it malicious. The extension contains no active network communications, no runtime use of webRequest or declarativeNetRequest, no dynamic code loading, and no modifications to HTTP response headers or CSP directives. References to the domain sdmextension.com[now removed anyway] exist solely as unused string constants, entirely inert and functionally irrelevant. The extension’s declared purpose is consistent with its implementation. Accordingly, any assertion that this extension constitutes or facilitates malicious activity is currently unsupported by any evidence.
- frfl 1y ago
  [flagged]
  - WindowsDev 1y ago
    [flagged]
    - frfl 1y ago
      [flagged]
    - hnlmorg 1y ago
      I appreciate you feel attacked but the content of the repositories are suspicious. Zip files, executables missing source, readmes that are clearly incorrect (eg giving Windows install instructions for a macOS binary) and this particularly plugin is minified. I could tell that this was due to lack of experience because there were other obvious mistakes you’d made which were harmless. What you need to appreciate is that you’re asking people to install untrusted software on their computers. So while you might feel attacked, the burden of proof is actually with you to demonstrate that you are trustworthy. And that means eating some humble pie here. Learning from the feedback you’re receiving and grow from it. Rather than demanding that the community fix your shortcomings. We don’t owe you our time any more than we owe you our devices to beta test your software projects.