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You seem to consider convenient dependency management a security hazard, which I have always found to be a pretty weird take. It logically follows that the seve
by simonask 2y ago
You seem to consider convenient dependency management a security hazard, which I have always found to be a pretty weird take. It logically follows that the severe difficulty of managing dependencies in C and C++ projects is actually a security feature, or how else are we supposed to understand this opinion?
Let's not pretend that anything is better on the traditional C/C++ side, where the approach is usually one or more of:
1. Vendoring dependencies in-tree. This can result in security problems from missing out on bugfixes upstream.
2. Reinventing functionality that would otherwise be served by a dependency. This can result in security problems from much less battle-tested, buggy in-house implementation. In closed-source code, this is effectively security by obscurity.
I've seen both of these cause issues in large C++ projects.
For reference, the Rust/Cargo ecosystem contains a lot of tools and infrastructure to address supply-chain security, but it will always be a difficult problem to solve.
- pjmlp 2y agoRegardless of the programming language it is a security hazard, that is why we have now SBOM in the industry, and many corporations have procedures in place before adding that cool dependency into the project. Regardless it is cargo, vcpkg/conan, nuget, maven, npm,.... It isn't validated by legal and IT for upload into internal repos, doesn't get used.
- noitpmeder 2y agoThose same practices can be applied here where it matters.