4 ms·

FileVault 2’s Apple ID Backdoor

39 points by chmars 14y ago

bwhalley 14y ago
My Mac running Mountain Lion & FV2 doesn't have that checkbox in Users & Groups. My User & Groups preferences pane looks exactly like the authors except for that one checkbox that mine does not have.
deleted 14y ago
[deleted]
nodata 14y ago
This article could be better written. tl;dr: Apple force-enabled user password recovery using Apple ID in Mountain Lion, meaning they can apparently also change your FileVault 2 passphrase and decrypt your disk. I'm not convinced though. Has he tried this? Normally the user has the same password as the passphrase used to decrypt the FileVault 2 volume. If Apple resets my password, does my passphrase get reset too? Sure? How does that work?
- dchest 14y ago
  As far as I understand, when encrypting a volume, if AppleID option is enabled, a separate randomly generated recovery ("backdoor") key for the volume is sent to Apple (http://support.apple.com/kb/HT4790 http://support.apple.com/kb/HT4790). I think, before iCloud/AppleID thing you had to call Apple support and answer questions to get this recovery key. With AppleID, I suspect the whole thing is automated. So, (again, I'm speculating), your AppleID and FileVault 2 passwords are completely independent things -- it's just that your additional recovery/backdoor key is stored in the iCloud, accessible with AppleID. Here's the analysis of FileVault 2 http://eprint.iacr.org/2012/374.pdf http://eprint.iacr.org/2012/374.pdf
  - nodata 14y ago
    I'm not sure.. I think this article is about something slightly different: if I _disable_ storing my FileVault 2 recovery key with Apple, _then_ upgrade to Mountain Lion, is either of the following true? 1. Apple nabs a copy of my FileVault 2 recovery key 2. Apple can reset my FileVault 2 passphrase The article doesn't make it clear, and doesn't seem to test either.
    - dchest 14y ago
      I don't know details about the upgrade process, so I can't answer, but this is really one question, not two: given 1 they can do everything, including 2.
      - nodata 14y ago
        No it's not.
        dchest 14y ago
        Yes, it is. Recovery key provides access to the encrypted volume in the same way as your password. There's no other way around: if something (password, recovery key, recovery certificate) can decrypt your volume, this something can also be used to change your password/recovery key/recovery certificate, which is not really important, because they already have access to decrypted volume. In the linked analysis, the authors "reduced" the security of FileVault 2 to the entropy of 120-bit recovery key.
        nodata 14y ago
        The only time the recovery key matters is if Apple has taken it without permission. That doesn't seem to be the case. So we're talking about whether resetting an Apple ID will also reset a FileVault passphrase.
        dchest 14y ago
        Resetting Apple ID won't reset a FileVault 2 passphrase. They are independent of each other.
        nodata 14y ago
        So what's the issue here? If I use my Apple ID to reset my system user's password, how can Apple decrypt my disk?
  - quonn 14y ago
    I don't think this is the case. Here is how I understand it: FileVault 2 uses a generated secret key for encryption ; It uses a table that contains for each account the encrypted key, encrypted in turn with a key derived from each user password. It also generates a "backdoor" key that can recover the encryption key which you can write down or if you want (!) store with Apple. The issue described here is not related to the actual full-disk encryption and the reason why the password reset does not work when cold-booting is not related at all to missing network drivers (as described in the article.) Rather it shows that the encrypted disk can't possibly decrypted by just reseting you Apple ID, because - if you have not agreed - FileVault has _not_ stored the backdoor key on Apple servers and it can't be used to recover the encryption key. Why does recovery work when the machine is sleeping? Well, because in that case the encryption key is stored in memory and _can_ be restored if the OS wishes to give it up. It is well known that full-disk encryption only really protects you if the machine has been fully shut down. A dedicated attacker can usually recover the key by removing the battery and cooling the RAM to keep it from losing data. I agree that not being able to turn off the option is a bug that should be fixed, but the situation is not as bad as it may sound at first. TL;DR: FileVault 2 is just as secure as everyone assumed and even Apple can not decrypt your disk if the computer has been shut down. If it is running Apple could always use a backdoor if they wanted and other attackers could always extract data from memory.
    - dchest 14y ago
      If the option is enabled, volume encryption is as good as your encryption password OR Apple ID password + whatever security measures Apple has against someone resetting your password (see recent stories). If the option is disabled, the encryption is as good as your encryption password, period. The complaint was that this option is now enabled by default.
- m_eiman 14y ago
  tl;dr: apple force-enabled user password recovery using appleid in mountain lion, meaning they can apparently also change your filevault2 passphrase and decrypt your disk. Not quite; it's more like "If you've enabled the Reset Password Via Apple-ID feature before turning on FileVault, you cannot disable it since that checkbox is hidden when FileVault is active". I don't think it'd be possible to get far enough into the boto process to actually use the reset feature without having the FileVault password, though.
  - BenjieGillam 14y ago
    According to the author: > Worryingly, this was enabled by default on my MacBook Air as soon as I upgraded from the copy of Lion it shipped with. I did not enable this feature. So it looks like you don't have to enable it yourself manually. I can neither confirm nor deny this myself, just going off what the author has said.
    - m_eiman 14y ago
      Well, I'd trust the Apple docs more than his memory of the state of a checkbox when he created his user account a year ago... In my case, I haven't enabled the "Reset via AppleID" feature, upgraded from Lion to Mountain Lion, and when I get the "Forgot password?" popup on the login screen, the only option to reset my password presented is to use my "master password", no mention of using Apple ID.
      - jasomill 14y ago
        Indeed. If the author's claim is true, it's a configuration-specific bug. Proof: starting with my 10.7.4 template VM (a fresh install from the App Store image), I signed into both iCloud (with the default list of enabled features, including various synchronizations and Find My Mac) and the App Store, confirmed that "Allow user to reset password using Apple ID" was disabled[1], then used the App Store installer to upgrade to Mountain Lion. After the upgrade, the option was still disabled[2]. I did notice an unrelated bug, though: as can be seen in the screenshots, the upgrade appears to have enabled Guest User login. [1] http://jasomill.at/Lion.png http://jasomill.at/Lion.png [2] http://jasomill.at/MountainLion.png http://jasomill.at/MountainLion.png
pieter 14y ago
The checkmark he's talking about is only used to bypass the password verification on your mac -- there's no password or passphrase sent to Apple at any point. What happens when a user tries to log in without Apple ID is the mac sends a request to Apple: "Is this password valid for this apple id?". If Apple replies positively, the login request is accepted and the user is allowed access to the system. See how this doesn't work for Filevault? Since Filevault encrypts the encryption key with the users' password, and the password itself isn't known to Apple, this checkbox can't be used to decrypt the drive. The main vulnerability here is that it can allow access to a Filevault-enabled system that still has the decryption key in memory -- as is the case by default for any mac that goes to sleep. Either the checkbox shouldn't disappear if you enable filevault, or they should make the decision to disable AppleID-based authentication when Filevault is enabled (which is probably what they tried to do). If you want your system to really be secure, you need to disable the RAM-based sleep, so that the RAM contents are written to your Filevaulted disk before shutting down completely.
jdlshore 14y ago
It seems that many commenters did not read (or understand) the article. It's wordy. Let me summarize the issue: 1) A malicious party with access to your Apple ID and password can access your FileVault2-encrypted computer when it has been put to sleep. It is not vulnerable if it has been turned off. 2) Mountain Lion automatically enables this feature and hides the option if you're using FileVault2, providing no way to disable it, when you upgrade. Therefore, to be secure from Apple ID insecurity when using FileVault2, you must take one of the following actions: 1) Turn off your computer rather than putting it to sleep. 2) Decrypt FileVault (which makes the preference appear), deselect the checkbox, and re-encrypt.
- nodata 14y ago
  Do you know where the setting is stored, to skip the decrypt/encrypt stage?

39 points by chmars 14y ago

My Mac running Mountain Lion & FV2 doesn't have that checkbox in Users & Groups. My User & Groups preferences pane looks exactly like the authors except for that one checkbox that mine does not have.

deleted 14y ago

[deleted]

nodata 14y ago

This article could be better written. tl;dr: Apple force-enabled user password recovery using Apple ID in Mountain Lion, meaning they can apparently also change your FileVault 2 passphrase and decrypt your disk. I'm not convinced though. Has he tried this? Normally the user has the same password as the passphrase used to decrypt the FileVault 2 volume. If Apple resets my password, does my passphrase get reset too? Sure? How does that work?

dchest 14y ago
As far as I understand, when encrypting a volume, if AppleID option is enabled, a separate randomly generated recovery ("backdoor") key for the volume is sent to Apple (http://support.apple.com/kb/HT4790 http://support.apple.com/kb/HT4790). I think, before iCloud/AppleID thing you had to call Apple support and answer questions to get this recovery key. With AppleID, I suspect the whole thing is automated. So, (again, I'm speculating), your AppleID and FileVault 2 passwords are completely independent things -- it's just that your additional recovery/backdoor key is stored in the iCloud, accessible with AppleID. Here's the analysis of FileVault 2 http://eprint.iacr.org/2012/374.pdf http://eprint.iacr.org/2012/374.pdf
- nodata 14y ago
  I'm not sure.. I think this article is about something slightly different: if I _disable_ storing my FileVault 2 recovery key with Apple, _then_ upgrade to Mountain Lion, is either of the following true? 1. Apple nabs a copy of my FileVault 2 recovery key 2. Apple can reset my FileVault 2 passphrase The article doesn't make it clear, and doesn't seem to test either.
  - dchest 14y ago
    I don't know details about the upgrade process, so I can't answer, but this is really one question, not two: given 1 they can do everything, including 2.
    - nodata 14y ago
      No it's not.
      - dchest 14y ago
        Yes, it is. Recovery key provides access to the encrypted volume in the same way as your password. There's no other way around: if something (password, recovery key, recovery certificate) can decrypt your volume, this something can also be used to change your password/recovery key/recovery certificate, which is not really important, because they already have access to decrypted volume. In the linked analysis, the authors "reduced" the security of FileVault 2 to the entropy of 120-bit recovery key.
        nodata 14y ago
        The only time the recovery key matters is if Apple has taken it without permission. That doesn't seem to be the case. So we're talking about whether resetting an Apple ID will also reset a FileVault passphrase.
        dchest 14y ago
        Resetting Apple ID won't reset a FileVault 2 passphrase. They are independent of each other.
        nodata 14y ago
        So what's the issue here? If I use my Apple ID to reset my system user's password, how can Apple decrypt my disk?
- quonn 14y ago
  I don't think this is the case. Here is how I understand it: FileVault 2 uses a generated secret key for encryption ; It uses a table that contains for each account the encrypted key, encrypted in turn with a key derived from each user password. It also generates a "backdoor" key that can recover the encryption key which you can write down or if you want (!) store with Apple. The issue described here is not related to the actual full-disk encryption and the reason why the password reset does not work when cold-booting is not related at all to missing network drivers (as described in the article.) Rather it shows that the encrypted disk can't possibly decrypted by just reseting you Apple ID, because - if you have not agreed - FileVault has _not_ stored the backdoor key on Apple servers and it can't be used to recover the encryption key. Why does recovery work when the machine is sleeping? Well, because in that case the encryption key is stored in memory and _can_ be restored if the OS wishes to give it up. It is well known that full-disk encryption only really protects you if the machine has been fully shut down. A dedicated attacker can usually recover the key by removing the battery and cooling the RAM to keep it from losing data. I agree that not being able to turn off the option is a bug that should be fixed, but the situation is not as bad as it may sound at first. TL;DR: FileVault 2 is just as secure as everyone assumed and even Apple can not decrypt your disk if the computer has been shut down. If it is running Apple could always use a backdoor if they wanted and other attackers could always extract data from memory.
  - dchest 14y ago
    If the option is enabled, volume encryption is as good as your encryption password OR Apple ID password + whatever security measures Apple has against someone resetting your password (see recent stories). If the option is disabled, the encryption is as good as your encryption password, period. The complaint was that this option is now enabled by default.
m_eiman 14y ago
tl;dr: apple force-enabled user password recovery using appleid in mountain lion, meaning they can apparently also change your filevault2 passphrase and decrypt your disk. Not quite; it's more like "If you've enabled the Reset Password Via Apple-ID feature before turning on FileVault, you cannot disable it since that checkbox is hidden when FileVault is active". I don't think it'd be possible to get far enough into the boto process to actually use the reset feature without having the FileVault password, though.
- BenjieGillam 14y ago
  According to the author: > Worryingly, this was enabled by default on my MacBook Air as soon as I upgraded from the copy of Lion it shipped with. I did not enable this feature. So it looks like you don't have to enable it yourself manually. I can neither confirm nor deny this myself, just going off what the author has said.
  - m_eiman 14y ago
    Well, I'd trust the Apple docs more than his memory of the state of a checkbox when he created his user account a year ago... In my case, I haven't enabled the "Reset via AppleID" feature, upgraded from Lion to Mountain Lion, and when I get the "Forgot password?" popup on the login screen, the only option to reset my password presented is to use my "master password", no mention of using Apple ID.
    - jasomill 14y ago
      Indeed. If the author's claim is true, it's a configuration-specific bug. Proof: starting with my 10.7.4 template VM (a fresh install from the App Store image), I signed into both iCloud (with the default list of enabled features, including various synchronizations and Find My Mac) and the App Store, confirmed that "Allow user to reset password using Apple ID" was disabled[1], then used the App Store installer to upgrade to Mountain Lion. After the upgrade, the option was still disabled[2]. I did notice an unrelated bug, though: as can be seen in the screenshots, the upgrade appears to have enabled Guest User login. [1] http://jasomill.at/Lion.png http://jasomill.at/Lion.png [2] http://jasomill.at/MountainLion.png http://jasomill.at/MountainLion.png

pieter 14y ago

The checkmark he's talking about is only used to bypass the password verification on your mac -- there's no password or passphrase sent to Apple at any point. What happens when a user tries to log in without Apple ID is the mac sends a request to Apple: "Is this password valid for this apple id?". If Apple replies positively, the login request is accepted and the user is allowed access to the system. See how this doesn't work for Filevault? Since Filevault encrypts the encryption key with the users' password, and the password itself isn't known to Apple, this checkbox can't be used to decrypt the drive. The main vulnerability here is that it can allow access to a Filevault-enabled system that still has the decryption key in memory -- as is the case by default for any mac that goes to sleep. Either the checkbox shouldn't disappear if you enable filevault, or they should make the decision to disable AppleID-based authentication when Filevault is enabled (which is probably what they tried to do). If you want your system to really be secure, you need to disable the RAM-based sleep, so that the RAM contents are written to your Filevaulted disk before shutting down completely.

jdlshore 14y ago

It seems that many commenters did not read (or understand) the article. It's wordy. Let me summarize the issue: 1) A malicious party with access to your Apple ID and password can access your FileVault2-encrypted computer when it has been put to sleep. It is not vulnerable if it has been turned off. 2) Mountain Lion automatically enables this feature and hides the option if you're using FileVault2, providing no way to disable it, when you upgrade. Therefore, to be secure from Apple ID insecurity when using FileVault2, you must take one of the following actions: 1) Turn off your computer rather than putting it to sleep. 2) Decrypt FileVault (which makes the preference appear), deselect the checkbox, and re-encrypt.

nodata 14y ago
Do you know where the setting is stored, to skip the decrypt/encrypt stage?