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So, entirely, AppArmor profiles for shipped executables allow escape from privileged environments... Without that additional AppArmor 'blessing', wouldn't the
by mjevans 2y ago
So, entirely, AppArmor profiles for shipped executables allow escape from privileged environments...
Without that additional AppArmor 'blessing', wouldn't the standard Linux privileges / container groups prevent this?
- bri3d 2y agoNo; note the last sentence in the article: "a bypass is not even needed on most Linux distributions, because they allow unprivileged users to obtain full capabilities inside namespaces by default (and therefore to exploit CAP_SYS_ADMIN kernel vulnerabilities for example), without any restriction at all." From the kernel standpoint, without a rules engine (AppArmor, seccomp, SELinux), unprivileged user namespaces are an all-or-nothing thing (unprivileged_userns_clone), so distributions have to rely on complex and leaky rules engines to try to allow namespace segmentation without letting users touch the big, broken kernel too much.