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The person is alive when you kill them, but yes, I think it's not unusual to think that somebody's death doesn't particularly bother the dead person but everybo

The person is alive when you kill them, but yes, I think it's not unusual to think that somebody's death doesn't particularly bother the dead person but everybody around them.

DennisP 2y ago
So that would mean it's perfectly fine to sneak up behind a happy hermit and shoot them in the head. In fact, it's the best thing to do. They wouldn't suffer, they'd never know what they're missing, and they wouldn't experience anything bad anymore. I think most people would agree that an ethical argument with that result has something wrong with it.
- InsideOutSanta 2y ago
  Yes, I also intuitively agree. But now explain to me what is wrong with it.
  - DennisP 2y ago
    I think I already did but let me try a slightly different angle. If a conscious person has a bad experience, Benatar considers that Bad in some absolute sense. He thinks it's important that we reduce the number of bad experiences in the world. Benatar does not consider conscious existence itself to have any particular value. It doesn't matter whether there are more total experiences in the world. He also doesn't consider good experiences to be Good in any absolute sense, but just privately good to the person experiencing them. So we shouldn't care about increasing the number of good experiences in the world. Given that someone exists, maybe we should help that person have more good experiences, but it's no absolute loss if that person disappears and any good experiences with them. These are all value judgements: that conscious experience has no intrinsic value, and that we should reduce total bad experiences but not care about total good experiences. The asymmetric treatment of good and bad experiences, and the lack of value attached to existence itself, trivially lead to his odd conclusion. Most people disagree with his conclusion not because they're illogical, but because if they looked closely then they'd disagree with his premises. I would say that conscious existence is intrinsically good, even if it contains some bad experiences. I'd also say that it really is good to have more total good experiences in the world, just as it is bad to have more bad experiences. As I sit here on the floor in a slightly awkward position, I have a small pain in my hip. Since Benatar doesn't place any value on existence itself, to be consistent he'd have to argue that it'd better for me if a sniper blew up my head, than if I continued to have this little pain in my hip. This is a value judgment with which I disagree.
    - InsideOutSanta 2y ago
      My problem is that I agree with everything you say, but I can't make a logical argument for it. I also think that conscious existence is intrinsically good, that it is amazing that the universe has found a way to experience itself, and that out of thoughtless rocks, qualia have arisen. But I don't understand how to argue why this is so. In fact, it appears to make no sense. It seems to me that the only argument one could make that conscious existence is good is that there are conscious people who believe it is good, and without those people, the argument ceases to make sense. "I'd also say that it really is good to have more total good experiences in the world, just as it is bad to have more bad experiences." Philosophers do not make this specific argument because if you treat good and bad symmetrically, you can reach conclusions like "slavery is good if it produces more good than bad." Of course, this is also an outcome-driven decision, where people dismiss an argument because they don't like the logical conclusion, but I think it's fair to say that "good" and "bad" aren't the same thing in opposite directions.
      - DennisP 2y ago
        This is a more interesting discussion than I expected at first. Anyway... If you can't find a rational argument that conscious experience is good, can you find one that says bad experiences are bad? If "the only argument one could make that conscious existence is good is that there are conscious people who believe it is good," well doesn't that also apply to bad experiences? The only argument one could make that they're bad is that there are conscious people who believe they are bad. If that's not a sufficient argument, then why bother with reducing bad experiences at all? And if conscious existence itself doesn't matter then it's hard to see any reason why it should matter what sort of experiences conscious beings have. Whether there are lots of them or few, whether they have good or experiences or bad, none of it matters, any more than it matters what sort of chemical reactions happen as atoms bounce around on lifeless planets. On the other hand if we decide we should take into account the preferences of conscious beings, then we should consider that they prefer to exist. Regarding your second argument, you've alluded to an issue already. You say we can't count total good experiences because that leads to bad consequences. But Benetar's premises lead to even worse consequences. So why shouldn't we discount his approach as well? We should argue on a level playing field. If we use some criteria to reject an argument against Benatar, we shouldn't give Benatar a pass on that same criteria. I do agree we shouldn't simply count good vs. bad and choose the maximum total good. But that doesn't mean we should discount good experiences entirely. It's still good to have more good experiences in the world, even if we have to be careful about how we apply that principle. Ultimately, maybe we have to take the most basic things on faith, if we want to avoid utter nihilism. Even math doesn't prove everything; every kind of mathematics starts with a handful of unproven axioms and works out the consequences.

The person is alive when you kill them, but yes, I think it's not unusual to think that somebody's death doesn't particularly bother the dead person but everybody around them.

DennisP 2y ago

So that would mean it's perfectly fine to sneak up behind a happy hermit and shoot them in the head. In fact, it's the best thing to do. They wouldn't suffer, they'd never know what they're missing, and they wouldn't experience anything bad anymore. I think most people would agree that an ethical argument with that result has something wrong with it.

InsideOutSanta 2y ago
Yes, I also intuitively agree. But now explain to me what is wrong with it.
- DennisP 2y ago
  I think I already did but let me try a slightly different angle. If a conscious person has a bad experience, Benatar considers that Bad in some absolute sense. He thinks it's important that we reduce the number of bad experiences in the world. Benatar does not consider conscious existence itself to have any particular value. It doesn't matter whether there are more total experiences in the world. He also doesn't consider good experiences to be Good in any absolute sense, but just privately good to the person experiencing them. So we shouldn't care about increasing the number of good experiences in the world. Given that someone exists, maybe we should help that person have more good experiences, but it's no absolute loss if that person disappears and any good experiences with them. These are all value judgements: that conscious experience has no intrinsic value, and that we should reduce total bad experiences but not care about total good experiences. The asymmetric treatment of good and bad experiences, and the lack of value attached to existence itself, trivially lead to his odd conclusion. Most people disagree with his conclusion not because they're illogical, but because if they looked closely then they'd disagree with his premises. I would say that conscious existence is intrinsically good, even if it contains some bad experiences. I'd also say that it really is good to have more total good experiences in the world, just as it is bad to have more bad experiences. As I sit here on the floor in a slightly awkward position, I have a small pain in my hip. Since Benatar doesn't place any value on existence itself, to be consistent he'd have to argue that it'd better for me if a sniper blew up my head, than if I continued to have this little pain in my hip. This is a value judgment with which I disagree.
  - InsideOutSanta 2y ago
    My problem is that I agree with everything you say, but I can't make a logical argument for it. I also think that conscious existence is intrinsically good, that it is amazing that the universe has found a way to experience itself, and that out of thoughtless rocks, qualia have arisen. But I don't understand how to argue why this is so. In fact, it appears to make no sense. It seems to me that the only argument one could make that conscious existence is good is that there are conscious people who believe it is good, and without those people, the argument ceases to make sense. "I'd also say that it really is good to have more total good experiences in the world, just as it is bad to have more bad experiences." Philosophers do not make this specific argument because if you treat good and bad symmetrically, you can reach conclusions like "slavery is good if it produces more good than bad." Of course, this is also an outcome-driven decision, where people dismiss an argument because they don't like the logical conclusion, but I think it's fair to say that "good" and "bad" aren't the same thing in opposite directions.
    - DennisP 2y ago
      This is a more interesting discussion than I expected at first. Anyway... If you can't find a rational argument that conscious experience is good, can you find one that says bad experiences are bad? If "the only argument one could make that conscious existence is good is that there are conscious people who believe it is good," well doesn't that also apply to bad experiences? The only argument one could make that they're bad is that there are conscious people who believe they are bad. If that's not a sufficient argument, then why bother with reducing bad experiences at all? And if conscious existence itself doesn't matter then it's hard to see any reason why it should matter what sort of experiences conscious beings have. Whether there are lots of them or few, whether they have good or experiences or bad, none of it matters, any more than it matters what sort of chemical reactions happen as atoms bounce around on lifeless planets. On the other hand if we decide we should take into account the preferences of conscious beings, then we should consider that they prefer to exist. Regarding your second argument, you've alluded to an issue already. You say we can't count total good experiences because that leads to bad consequences. But Benetar's premises lead to even worse consequences. So why shouldn't we discount his approach as well? We should argue on a level playing field. If we use some criteria to reject an argument against Benatar, we shouldn't give Benatar a pass on that same criteria. I do agree we shouldn't simply count good vs. bad and choose the maximum total good. But that doesn't mean we should discount good experiences entirely. It's still good to have more good experiences in the world, even if we have to be careful about how we apply that principle. Ultimately, maybe we have to take the most basic things on faith, if we want to avoid utter nihilism. Even math doesn't prove everything; every kind of mathematics starts with a handful of unproven axioms and works out the consequences.