4 ms·

This schtick is just that, a schtick thats only as strong as whoever is fighting against it... https://www.devever.net/~hl/webcrypto https://www.devever.net/~h

This schtick is just that, a schtick thats only as strong as whoever is fighting against it... https://www.devever.net/~hl/webcrypto https://www.devever.net/~hl/webcrypto

vluft 2y ago
What does that article have to do with Signal?
- Xelynega 2y ago
  Signal is an app whose distribution is controlled by the same people that say they don't have access to your data. They could at any point push an update that decrypts your messages locally and pushes them decrypted to a server. The only way to prevent this would be to verify each binary update to signal matches the source code, and no modifications have been made to the source to do this. Is that part of your "signal update" routine?
eslaught 2y ago
Signal is distributed as an app. Furthermore, the client is open source, you can see the repositories here: https://github.com/signalapp https://github.com/signalapp I don't know the latest details about Android/iOS app signing, but presumably reproducible builds + sufficiently strong signing would make it secure enough for most users. For those who are truly paranoid, then can build it themselves (subject to their own device OS's requirements, which are hardly a unique problem to Signal). In short, Signal's security should be as good as any mobile app can be, and can be even better if you're willing to put in legwork.
- 01HNNWZ0MV43FF 2y ago
  The government could definitely compel Google to give a list of users a malicious Signal update
  - Xelynega 2y ago
    The government could compel signal to do this, no? They haven't, but if they decide they want to what's technologically stopping signal from: 1. Making an update that doesn't exist in git which pushes decrypted messages to their server when you launch the app 2. Push this update to the app store If a government ever compelled them to?
- Vinnl 2y ago
  Well, the security should be good enough for most people's threat models. But government officials will probably want to have some restrictions on who can be added to a group, for example.
- Xelynega 2y ago
  When was the last time you verified that the update being pushed to the app store by signal matches the git repo? When was the last time you checked what updates have been made to the git repo? Of course what you're saying is "technically" possible to avoid signal changing code and circumventing encryption, but show me one person who does a check of all the changes to signal source(and verified the binary matches) before they let their app store update it and they launch it... Everyone I know has signal auto-update through the app store and don't even know it updated until after they launch it.
Cyphase 2y ago
I don't believe Signal has a web app. Am I wrong? I understand the point about the app being distributed by the same people who run the service, but it's much harder to hide shenanigans with a local app versus a web app, especially when the app is open source.
- Xelynega 2y ago
  When was the last time you verified an update to signal against the source code? The threat model is circumvented for people that do that before every update, but unless you're doing that they can push whatever code they want to your app.
  - Cyphase 2y ago
    What's your point/goal with this and your cousin comments? Yes, of course at some point you need to trust a binary or verify yourself. I'm technically correct and you're technically correct. What are you getting at? Do you suggest people not use Signal? What do you suggest as an alternative? What should Signal do to change things? Splitting management of the app and service doesn't help much; a compromised browser, not co-owned with the services it accesses, is enough to eavesdrop on someone despite HTTPS.
    - Xelynega 2y ago
      My point is to make a comment on social media and get responses to see what other people think. All I'm getting at is that any company that distributes code to you and tells you they can't see your data is lying. They just don't want to access your data right now. I would suggest people understand this and position themselves accordingly security-wise. If that means not using signal because its not secure enough then ok. If that means continuing to use signal with the understanding that it's only secure until signal decides they want your data(or a gov forces them to), then ok Splitting management of an app and service is the exact solution. If signal can't control when to push updates to your phone then they can't control when they want to break encryption. In your compromised browser example we understand that browsers have an interest in imementing HTTPS correctly and treat them accordingly. That's part of the reason the market is dominated by 2 engines that do their development as much in the public as possible

This schtick is just that, a schtick thats only as strong as whoever is fighting against it... https://www.devever.net/~hl/webcrypto https://www.devever.net/~hl/webcrypto

vluft 2y ago

What does that article have to do with Signal?

Xelynega 2y ago
Signal is an app whose distribution is controlled by the same people that say they don't have access to your data. They could at any point push an update that decrypts your messages locally and pushes them decrypted to a server. The only way to prevent this would be to verify each binary update to signal matches the source code, and no modifications have been made to the source to do this. Is that part of your "signal update" routine?

eslaught 2y ago

Signal is distributed as an app. Furthermore, the client is open source, you can see the repositories here: https://github.com/signalapp https://github.com/signalapp I don't know the latest details about Android/iOS app signing, but presumably reproducible builds + sufficiently strong signing would make it secure enough for most users. For those who are truly paranoid, then can build it themselves (subject to their own device OS's requirements, which are hardly a unique problem to Signal). In short, Signal's security should be as good as any mobile app can be, and can be even better if you're willing to put in legwork.

01HNNWZ0MV43FF 2y ago
The government could definitely compel Google to give a list of users a malicious Signal update
- Xelynega 2y ago
  The government could compel signal to do this, no? They haven't, but if they decide they want to what's technologically stopping signal from: 1. Making an update that doesn't exist in git which pushes decrypted messages to their server when you launch the app 2. Push this update to the app store If a government ever compelled them to?
Vinnl 2y ago
Well, the security should be good enough for most people's threat models. But government officials will probably want to have some restrictions on who can be added to a group, for example.
Xelynega 2y ago
When was the last time you verified that the update being pushed to the app store by signal matches the git repo? When was the last time you checked what updates have been made to the git repo? Of course what you're saying is "technically" possible to avoid signal changing code and circumventing encryption, but show me one person who does a check of all the changes to signal source(and verified the binary matches) before they let their app store update it and they launch it... Everyone I know has signal auto-update through the app store and don't even know it updated until after they launch it.

Cyphase 2y ago

I don't believe Signal has a web app. Am I wrong? I understand the point about the app being distributed by the same people who run the service, but it's much harder to hide shenanigans with a local app versus a web app, especially when the app is open source.

Xelynega 2y ago
When was the last time you verified an update to signal against the source code? The threat model is circumvented for people that do that before every update, but unless you're doing that they can push whatever code they want to your app.
- Cyphase 2y ago
  What's your point/goal with this and your cousin comments? Yes, of course at some point you need to trust a binary or verify yourself. I'm technically correct and you're technically correct. What are you getting at? Do you suggest people not use Signal? What do you suggest as an alternative? What should Signal do to change things? Splitting management of the app and service doesn't help much; a compromised browser, not co-owned with the services it accesses, is enough to eavesdrop on someone despite HTTPS.
  - Xelynega 2y ago
    My point is to make a comment on social media and get responses to see what other people think. All I'm getting at is that any company that distributes code to you and tells you they can't see your data is lying. They just don't want to access your data right now. I would suggest people understand this and position themselves accordingly security-wise. If that means not using signal because its not secure enough then ok. If that means continuing to use signal with the understanding that it's only secure until signal decides they want your data(or a gov forces them to), then ok Splitting management of an app and service is the exact solution. If signal can't control when to push updates to your phone then they can't control when they want to break encryption. In your compromised browser example we understand that browsers have an interest in imementing HTTPS correctly and treat them accordingly. That's part of the reason the market is dominated by 2 engines that do their development as much in the public as possible