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The more interesting part for me is, this is just one instance we found out because they screwed up. I am sure there are many many more of these channels where

The more interesting part for me is, this is just one instance we found out because they screwed up. I am sure there are many many more of these channels where national security details are discussed. Signal still is hosted in the US, do we know how much they will fight if the government asks it to retrieve someone's messages? I don't know if I trust messaging apps that are already pandering to the administration to keep my data safe or fight to not decrypt my data.

deleted 2y ago
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Vinnl 2y ago
Their shtick is that they won't have to fight much, because they can't turnover someone's messages. Here are some examples of where they were legally compelled to turn over everything they had, and they did - but it was roughly nothing: https://signal.org/bigbrother/ https://signal.org/bigbrother/
- Xelynega 2y ago
  This schtick is just that, a schtick thats only as strong as whoever is fighting against it... https://www.devever.net/~hl/webcrypto https://www.devever.net/~hl/webcrypto
  - vluft 2y ago
    What does that article have to do with Signal?
    - Xelynega 2y ago
      Signal is an app whose distribution is controlled by the same people that say they don't have access to your data. They could at any point push an update that decrypts your messages locally and pushes them decrypted to a server. The only way to prevent this would be to verify each binary update to signal matches the source code, and no modifications have been made to the source to do this. Is that part of your "signal update" routine?
  - eslaught 2y ago
    Signal is distributed as an app. Furthermore, the client is open source, you can see the repositories here: https://github.com/signalapp https://github.com/signalapp I don't know the latest details about Android/iOS app signing, but presumably reproducible builds + sufficiently strong signing would make it secure enough for most users. For those who are truly paranoid, then can build it themselves (subject to their own device OS's requirements, which are hardly a unique problem to Signal). In short, Signal's security should be as good as any mobile app can be, and can be even better if you're willing to put in legwork.
    - 01HNNWZ0MV43FF 2y ago
      The government could definitely compel Google to give a list of users a malicious Signal update
      - Xelynega 2y ago
        The government could compel signal to do this, no? They haven't, but if they decide they want to what's technologically stopping signal from: 1. Making an update that doesn't exist in git which pushes decrypted messages to their server when you launch the app 2. Push this update to the app store If a government ever compelled them to?
    - Vinnl 2y ago
      Well, the security should be good enough for most people's threat models. But government officials will probably want to have some restrictions on who can be added to a group, for example.
    - Xelynega 2y ago
      When was the last time you verified that the update being pushed to the app store by signal matches the git repo? When was the last time you checked what updates have been made to the git repo? Of course what you're saying is "technically" possible to avoid signal changing code and circumventing encryption, but show me one person who does a check of all the changes to signal source(and verified the binary matches) before they let their app store update it and they launch it... Everyone I know has signal auto-update through the app store and don't even know it updated until after they launch it.
  - Cyphase 2y ago
    I don't believe Signal has a web app. Am I wrong? I understand the point about the app being distributed by the same people who run the service, but it's much harder to hide shenanigans with a local app versus a web app, especially when the app is open source.
    - Xelynega 2y ago
      When was the last time you verified an update to signal against the source code? The threat model is circumvented for people that do that before every update, but unless you're doing that they can push whatever code they want to your app.
      - Cyphase 2y ago
        What's your point/goal with this and your cousin comments? Yes, of course at some point you need to trust a binary or verify yourself. I'm technically correct and you're technically correct. What are you getting at? Do you suggest people not use Signal? What do you suggest as an alternative? What should Signal do to change things? Splitting management of the app and service doesn't help much; a compromised browser, not co-owned with the services it accesses, is enough to eavesdrop on someone despite HTTPS.
        Xelynega 2y ago
        My point is to make a comment on social media and get responses to see what other people think. All I'm getting at is that any company that distributes code to you and tells you they can't see your data is lying. They just don't want to access your data right now. I would suggest people understand this and position themselves accordingly security-wise. If that means not using signal because its not secure enough then ok. If that means continuing to use signal with the understanding that it's only secure until signal decides they want your data(or a gov forces them to), then ok Splitting management of an app and service is the exact solution. If signal can't control when to push updates to your phone then they can't control when they want to break encryption. In your compromised browser example we understand that browsers have an interest in imementing HTTPS correctly and treat them accordingly. That's part of the reason the market is dominated by 2 engines that do their development as much in the public as possible
- LeifCarrotson 2y ago
  We can expect that every military action has a principals committee (if not a principles committee). Most actions that are on the record, with classified data properly conveyed through their "high side" inboxes and properly archived, will have those records accessible to special counsel or historical analysts. If, as I suspect, most of the current cabinet's principals committees are meeting over Signal, the records of those communications will be conspicuously absent. It's not like these guys are masterminds meticulously generating compelling and consistent alternate records in the SCIF, then also pulling out their phones and telling most of the same people most of the same things in group chat messages. They're just not having the discussions in the SCIF at all, and that will be evident to anyone who cares to investigate.
  - Vinnl 2y ago
    Sorry, to clarify: when I said "they", I meant Signal.
rocqua 2y ago
Signal is quite militant about keeping as little information as possible, and actively resisting subpoenas. I think signal is one of the least likely companies to cooperate with the US government on surveillance. They aren't pandering to the government either. In fact they jokingly made fun of the US administration for this signal mistake.
jnsie 2y ago
End to end encryption. They don't store messages on their servers. There's nothing to retrieve...
ianburrell 2y ago
Signal can't retrieve anyone messages since messages are end-to-end encrypted. The whole point is that the server can't decrypt messages. In addition, Signal doesn't store the messages or even logs about the messages. There is no way to verify this, but Signal has shown how they responded to requests in the past. Signal hasn't been pandering to the US government. All their previous behavior is that they would tell off the government if asked to add a backdoor. Keep in mind that Signal is non-profit, not company trying to make money.
- sleepybrett 2y ago
  it doesn't matter. If I root your phone I can read your signal messages as soon as the app is open right out of memory. State level actors have, in the past and one imagines still, utilized sophisticated malware that doesn't even require any user action (aka 0click) to root android and ios.
  - Cyphase 2y ago
    It does matter that it requires compromising the device instead of the server being able to read all messages. All cryptosystems are vulnerable to compromised devices and $5 wrenches.
  - mr_woozy 2y ago
    [dead]
Glyptodon 2y ago
Like anything US based the risk from government is not so much technical correctness but the risk that they (or Google or Apple or whoever distributes the app) could secretly be compelled to do something like distribute a version of Signal that exfiltrates private keys or messages, perhaps based on specific criteria, w/o the user's knowledge. On top of the risks inherent in the underlying platforms (iOS, Android, etc.). Signal also does not think that warrant canaries pass legal muster. But it's still probably the best option. And if you're concerned by those risks I think building and auditing the public source code instead of relying on app store distribution would mitigate.
deleted 2y ago
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deleted 2y ago

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Vinnl 2y ago

Their shtick is that they won't have to fight much, because they can't turnover someone's messages. Here are some examples of where they were legally compelled to turn over everything they had, and they did - but it was roughly nothing: https://signal.org/bigbrother/ https://signal.org/bigbrother/

Xelynega 2y ago
This schtick is just that, a schtick thats only as strong as whoever is fighting against it... https://www.devever.net/~hl/webcrypto https://www.devever.net/~hl/webcrypto
- vluft 2y ago
  What does that article have to do with Signal?
  - Xelynega 2y ago
    Signal is an app whose distribution is controlled by the same people that say they don't have access to your data. They could at any point push an update that decrypts your messages locally and pushes them decrypted to a server. The only way to prevent this would be to verify each binary update to signal matches the source code, and no modifications have been made to the source to do this. Is that part of your "signal update" routine?
- eslaught 2y ago
  Signal is distributed as an app. Furthermore, the client is open source, you can see the repositories here: https://github.com/signalapp https://github.com/signalapp I don't know the latest details about Android/iOS app signing, but presumably reproducible builds + sufficiently strong signing would make it secure enough for most users. For those who are truly paranoid, then can build it themselves (subject to their own device OS's requirements, which are hardly a unique problem to Signal). In short, Signal's security should be as good as any mobile app can be, and can be even better if you're willing to put in legwork.
  - 01HNNWZ0MV43FF 2y ago
    The government could definitely compel Google to give a list of users a malicious Signal update
    - Xelynega 2y ago
      The government could compel signal to do this, no? They haven't, but if they decide they want to what's technologically stopping signal from: 1. Making an update that doesn't exist in git which pushes decrypted messages to their server when you launch the app 2. Push this update to the app store If a government ever compelled them to?
  - Vinnl 2y ago
    Well, the security should be good enough for most people's threat models. But government officials will probably want to have some restrictions on who can be added to a group, for example.
  - Xelynega 2y ago
    When was the last time you verified that the update being pushed to the app store by signal matches the git repo? When was the last time you checked what updates have been made to the git repo? Of course what you're saying is "technically" possible to avoid signal changing code and circumventing encryption, but show me one person who does a check of all the changes to signal source(and verified the binary matches) before they let their app store update it and they launch it... Everyone I know has signal auto-update through the app store and don't even know it updated until after they launch it.
- Cyphase 2y ago
  I don't believe Signal has a web app. Am I wrong? I understand the point about the app being distributed by the same people who run the service, but it's much harder to hide shenanigans with a local app versus a web app, especially when the app is open source.
  - Xelynega 2y ago
    When was the last time you verified an update to signal against the source code? The threat model is circumvented for people that do that before every update, but unless you're doing that they can push whatever code they want to your app.
    - Cyphase 2y ago
      What's your point/goal with this and your cousin comments? Yes, of course at some point you need to trust a binary or verify yourself. I'm technically correct and you're technically correct. What are you getting at? Do you suggest people not use Signal? What do you suggest as an alternative? What should Signal do to change things? Splitting management of the app and service doesn't help much; a compromised browser, not co-owned with the services it accesses, is enough to eavesdrop on someone despite HTTPS.
      - Xelynega 2y ago
        My point is to make a comment on social media and get responses to see what other people think. All I'm getting at is that any company that distributes code to you and tells you they can't see your data is lying. They just don't want to access your data right now. I would suggest people understand this and position themselves accordingly security-wise. If that means not using signal because its not secure enough then ok. If that means continuing to use signal with the understanding that it's only secure until signal decides they want your data(or a gov forces them to), then ok Splitting management of an app and service is the exact solution. If signal can't control when to push updates to your phone then they can't control when they want to break encryption. In your compromised browser example we understand that browsers have an interest in imementing HTTPS correctly and treat them accordingly. That's part of the reason the market is dominated by 2 engines that do their development as much in the public as possible
LeifCarrotson 2y ago
We can expect that every military action has a principals committee (if not a principles committee). Most actions that are on the record, with classified data properly conveyed through their "high side" inboxes and properly archived, will have those records accessible to special counsel or historical analysts. If, as I suspect, most of the current cabinet's principals committees are meeting over Signal, the records of those communications will be conspicuously absent. It's not like these guys are masterminds meticulously generating compelling and consistent alternate records in the SCIF, then also pulling out their phones and telling most of the same people most of the same things in group chat messages. They're just not having the discussions in the SCIF at all, and that will be evident to anyone who cares to investigate.
- Vinnl 2y ago
  Sorry, to clarify: when I said "they", I meant Signal.

rocqua 2y ago

Signal is quite militant about keeping as little information as possible, and actively resisting subpoenas. I think signal is one of the least likely companies to cooperate with the US government on surveillance. They aren't pandering to the government either. In fact they jokingly made fun of the US administration for this signal mistake.

jnsie 2y ago

End to end encryption. They don't store messages on their servers. There's nothing to retrieve...

ianburrell 2y ago

Signal can't retrieve anyone messages since messages are end-to-end encrypted. The whole point is that the server can't decrypt messages. In addition, Signal doesn't store the messages or even logs about the messages. There is no way to verify this, but Signal has shown how they responded to requests in the past. Signal hasn't been pandering to the US government. All their previous behavior is that they would tell off the government if asked to add a backdoor. Keep in mind that Signal is non-profit, not company trying to make money.

sleepybrett 2y ago
it doesn't matter. If I root your phone I can read your signal messages as soon as the app is open right out of memory. State level actors have, in the past and one imagines still, utilized sophisticated malware that doesn't even require any user action (aka 0click) to root android and ios.
- Cyphase 2y ago
  It does matter that it requires compromising the device instead of the server being able to read all messages. All cryptosystems are vulnerable to compromised devices and $5 wrenches.
- mr_woozy 2y ago
  [dead]

Glyptodon 2y ago

Like anything US based the risk from government is not so much technical correctness but the risk that they (or Google or Apple or whoever distributes the app) could secretly be compelled to do something like distribute a version of Signal that exfiltrates private keys or messages, perhaps based on specific criteria, w/o the user's knowledge. On top of the risks inherent in the underlying platforms (iOS, Android, etc.). Signal also does not think that warrant canaries pass legal muster. But it's still probably the best option. And if you're concerned by those risks I think building and auditing the public source code instead of relying on app store distribution would mitigate.

deleted 2y ago

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