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The point is that a person who isn't born cannot make a value judgment about whether something is bad.

DennisP 2y ago
Nor can they make a judgement about whether the good outweighs the bad. So that's up to us. I'm saying it makes no sense to make that decision solely based on the bad while ignoring all that's good; if you do, then of course it follows that it's bad to procreate, but that's because you left out half of the equation. In my personal life, I feel that the good far outweighs the bad, and existence is far better than nonexistence. So it doesn't make sense to me to assume that another person who doesn't happen to exist yet won't feel the same way.
- InsideOutSanta 2y ago
  >I'm saying it makes no sense to make that decision solely based on the bad while ignoring all that's good They're not ignoring the good, they're arguing that an absence of good is not bad. You seem to be arguing that an absence of good is bad because there is a potential positive experience that could exist if a person came into existence and could experience it. But their point is that the person who would have that experience does not yet exist and thus is not harmed by not coming into existence and not having that positive experience.
  - DennisP 2y ago
    You could just as well say that killing someone is not bad, because after you kill them they will not experience any lack of positive experience.
    - InsideOutSanta 2y ago
      The person is alive when you kill them, but yes, I think it's not unusual to think that somebody's death doesn't particularly bother the dead person but everybody around them.
      - DennisP 2y ago
        So that would mean it's perfectly fine to sneak up behind a happy hermit and shoot them in the head. In fact, it's the best thing to do. They wouldn't suffer, they'd never know what they're missing, and they wouldn't experience anything bad anymore. I think most people would agree that an ethical argument with that result has something wrong with it.
        InsideOutSanta 2y ago
        Yes, I also intuitively agree. But now explain to me what is wrong with it.
        DennisP 2y ago
        I think I already did but let me try a slightly different angle. If a conscious person has a bad experience, Benatar considers that Bad in some absolute sense. He thinks it's important that we reduce the number of bad experiences in the world. Benatar does not consider conscious existence itself to have any particular value. It doesn't matter whether there are more total experiences in the world. He also doesn't consider good experiences to be Good in any absolute sense, but just privately good to the person experiencing them. So we shouldn't care about increasing the number of good experiences in the world. Given that someone exists, maybe we should help that person have more good experiences, but it's no absolute loss if that person disappears and any good experiences with them. These are all value judgements: that conscious experience has no intrinsic value, and that we should reduce total bad experiences but not care about total good experiences. The asymmetric treatment of good and bad experiences, and the lack of value attached to existence itself, trivially lead to his odd conclusion. Most people disagree with his conclusion not because they're illogical, but because if they looked closely then they'd disagree with his premises. I would say that conscious existence is intrinsically good, even if it contains some bad experiences. I'd also say that it really is good to have more total good experiences in the world, just as it is bad to have more bad experiences. As I sit here on the floor in a slightly awkward position, I have a small pain in my hip. Since Benatar doesn't place any value on existence itself, to be consistent he'd have to argue that it'd better for me if a sniper blew up my head, than if I continued to have this little pain in my hip. This is a value judgment with which I disagree.

Nor can they make a judgement about whether the good outweighs the bad. So that's up to us. I'm saying it makes no sense to make that decision solely based on the bad while ignoring all that's good; if you do, then of course it follows that it's bad to procreate, but that's because you left out half of the equation. In my personal life, I feel that the good far outweighs the bad, and existence is far better than nonexistence. So it doesn't make sense to me to assume that another person who doesn't happen to exist yet won't feel the same way.

InsideOutSanta 2y ago
>I'm saying it makes no sense to make that decision solely based on the bad while ignoring all that's good They're not ignoring the good, they're arguing that an absence of good is not bad. You seem to be arguing that an absence of good is bad because there is a potential positive experience that could exist if a person came into existence and could experience it. But their point is that the person who would have that experience does not yet exist and thus is not harmed by not coming into existence and not having that positive experience.
- DennisP 2y ago
  You could just as well say that killing someone is not bad, because after you kill them they will not experience any lack of positive experience.
  - InsideOutSanta 2y ago
    The person is alive when you kill them, but yes, I think it's not unusual to think that somebody's death doesn't particularly bother the dead person but everybody around them.
    - DennisP 2y ago
      So that would mean it's perfectly fine to sneak up behind a happy hermit and shoot them in the head. In fact, it's the best thing to do. They wouldn't suffer, they'd never know what they're missing, and they wouldn't experience anything bad anymore. I think most people would agree that an ethical argument with that result has something wrong with it.
      - InsideOutSanta 2y ago
        Yes, I also intuitively agree. But now explain to me what is wrong with it.
        DennisP 2y ago
        I think I already did but let me try a slightly different angle. If a conscious person has a bad experience, Benatar considers that Bad in some absolute sense. He thinks it's important that we reduce the number of bad experiences in the world. Benatar does not consider conscious existence itself to have any particular value. It doesn't matter whether there are more total experiences in the world. He also doesn't consider good experiences to be Good in any absolute sense, but just privately good to the person experiencing them. So we shouldn't care about increasing the number of good experiences in the world. Given that someone exists, maybe we should help that person have more good experiences, but it's no absolute loss if that person disappears and any good experiences with them. These are all value judgements: that conscious experience has no intrinsic value, and that we should reduce total bad experiences but not care about total good experiences. The asymmetric treatment of good and bad experiences, and the lack of value attached to existence itself, trivially lead to his odd conclusion. Most people disagree with his conclusion not because they're illogical, but because if they looked closely then they'd disagree with his premises. I would say that conscious existence is intrinsically good, even if it contains some bad experiences. I'd also say that it really is good to have more total good experiences in the world, just as it is bad to have more bad experiences. As I sit here on the floor in a slightly awkward position, I have a small pain in my hip. Since Benatar doesn't place any value on existence itself, to be consistent he'd have to argue that it'd better for me if a sniper blew up my head, than if I continued to have this little pain in my hip. This is a value judgment with which I disagree.