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Yes, and why does it matter? I went and read Jeremy Bentham's bit again: https://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/Jeremy_Bentham#:~:text=number%20of%20legs https://en.wik

Yes, and why does it matter? I went and read Jeremy Bentham's bit again: https://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/Jeremy_Bentham#:~:text=number%20of%20legs https://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/Jeremy_Bentham#:~:text=number%... [villosity = hairiness, os sacrum = the bone above the tailbone] I think he has a lot of confusion to answer for. We've been focused on inner experience of people and animals, and in the spirit of utilitarianism, trying to micromanage our effects on all those unknown experiences on the basis that it's bad if suffering is happening. But maybe this is wrong-headed. Maybe "suffering" isn't even a thing, and the moral issue, the badness, is tied to ideas, knowledge, relationships, society, things like that. I'm being very vague because this is a half-formed idea. People are likely to come back with what about babies, or those with locked-in syndrome, or out-groups, or I Have No Mouth And I Must Scream? But I just think the focus on suffering, and experiences, and qualia, as a moral criterion, is a road to nowhere. Maybe those things aren't definable or meaningful except in the context of ideas (etc., as above). The wrangling, about what is or isn't having a morally significant experience, is an unresolved fudge that we live with and function under. I mean such is life, but it would be nice to find a way to escape from under some of life's fudge.

danaris 2y ago
Suffering is very real. I know, because I have experienced it. It is a bad thing to experience. Therefore, when I know—or reasonably believe—that something can experience it, I want to minimize that, because I care about the experiences of living things. We know, or reasonably believe, that dogs can have experiences, and feel pain, and thus can feel suffering. We know that a clockwork toy cannot have experiences, and thus cannot experience suffering. You may pontificate on all you want about what's really real and other deep philosophical concepts, or about edge cases; meanwhile, I will be here in actual reality, which I perceive and experience, where I am able to make very clear and straightforward observations of what is true in the majority of cases. (And to be clear: I am not saying that it is not important to understand the philosophical implications of things, nor that edge cases don't matter. I am saying that they do not negate very clear and observable facts about our universe. The existence of gray areas does not mean there are not things that are clearly black, or clearly white.)
- card_zero 2y ago
  OK, the Johnson vs. Boswell "I refute it thus!" thing. That's fine, I approve of this objectivity, I disapprove of sophists trying to make real things vanish through argument. But what's real is what has qualities. Dr. Johnson's rock was real because it had solidity. When kicked or whatever (Wikipedia says "stomped") it resists, and if subjected to geological inspection it yield rock-like information - or to switch from rock to ducks, what walks like a duck, quacks, etc., is a duck. What I'm saying here, though, is that suffering doesn't have qualities unless attached to ideas and relevant to knowledge. I also keep mentioning the social angle because I think that might be crucial to morality. Though I suppose I value knowledge in isolation too. I'm confident, anyway, that I don't value neurons, or any other kind of fancy cabling, in of itself. But, I'm short on time right now, will have to drop this and run (mercifully).

danaris 2y ago

Suffering is very real. I know, because I have experienced it. It is a bad thing to experience. Therefore, when I know—or reasonably believe—that something can experience it, I want to minimize that, because I care about the experiences of living things. We know, or reasonably believe, that dogs can have experiences, and feel pain, and thus can feel suffering. We know that a clockwork toy cannot have experiences, and thus cannot experience suffering. You may pontificate on all you want about what's really real and other deep philosophical concepts, or about edge cases; meanwhile, I will be here in actual reality, which I perceive and experience, where I am able to make very clear and straightforward observations of what is true in the majority of cases. (And to be clear: I am not saying that it is not important to understand the philosophical implications of things, nor that edge cases don't matter. I am saying that they do not negate very clear and observable facts about our universe. The existence of gray areas does not mean there are not things that are clearly black, or clearly white.)

card_zero 2y ago
OK, the Johnson vs. Boswell "I refute it thus!" thing. That's fine, I approve of this objectivity, I disapprove of sophists trying to make real things vanish through argument. But what's real is what has qualities. Dr. Johnson's rock was real because it had solidity. When kicked or whatever (Wikipedia says "stomped") it resists, and if subjected to geological inspection it yield rock-like information - or to switch from rock to ducks, what walks like a duck, quacks, etc., is a duck. What I'm saying here, though, is that suffering doesn't have qualities unless attached to ideas and relevant to knowledge. I also keep mentioning the social angle because I think that might be crucial to morality. Though I suppose I value knowledge in isolation too. I'm confident, anyway, that I don't value neurons, or any other kind of fancy cabling, in of itself. But, I'm short on time right now, will have to drop this and run (mercifully).