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https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/defending_against_software_supply_chain_attacks_508.pdf https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publicati
by toomuchtodo 2y ago
https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/defending_against_software_supply_chain_attacks_508.pdf https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/defend... (page 8)
Refer to what CISA recommends. We track project dependencies and look for material changes between releases. We eliminate API keys whenever possible, and rely on trust relationships instead. We use runtime security to detect abnormal activity end to end from dev env to prod. We monitor role activity to alert on abnormal API request sources.
It’s not about perfection, but about building a system, monitoring and measuring it, and improving it when possible.
- ijdo 2y ago100% agree on building a system and not aiming for perfection. Do you solve most of those issues with internal tooling or are there some public tools you've found effective?
- toomuchtodo 2y agoAlmost everything is off the shelf except some glue between signal sources and central vulnerability management as well as between vuln mgmt system and SVN/pipelines (for enriching PRs and gating deploys). I run security, but developer experience and velocity remains paramount and top of mind when we build and operate.