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> moving a message over BLE to untrusted hardware and worse accepting them back into iMessage is a massive, massive change in the security boundary Anyone can

> moving a message over BLE to untrusted hardware and worse accepting them back into iMessage is a massive, massive change in the security boundary Anyone can already screenshot iMessages and move them out of the "security boundary"... which btw doesn't exist much, as if you have any Mac connected to your iCloud account then those messages are being synced to an SQLite DB any process running under your user can access.

culi 2y ago
In what world is screenshotting an iMessage enough to move them out of the security boundary
- cmurf 2y ago
  World in which I've paired my two devices? Doesn't the boundary get broken asking messages be read to me into a BT audio device?
droopyEyelids 2y ago
Did you mean to reply to a different comment?
seanhunter 2y ago
I don’t think you understand what the security boundary of iMessage is. People’s phones got compromised by NSO sending images to them via whatsapp that used an exploit in one of the image libraries to run a malware payload. The security boundary isn’t about whether you can see your own messages, it’s whether bad people can root your phone by getting untrusted code to run. That’s a very different proposition if iMessage is a single codebase that they fully own end to end versus it has a plugin ecosystem. Having such a plugin system widens the security boundary by adding a much larger codebase that would require trust.
- Nextgrid 2y ago
  It doesn't need to be a plugin ecosystem - no third party code needs to run within the iMessage processes/sandboxes/containers. In fact, no third-party code needs to run at all on the phone - all that's needed is to expose an API over BLE that allows previously authorized external devices to query/send messages.
  - usrusr 2y ago
    In defense of the "it's security!" position (which is not mine): I think they mean a similar vulnerability could exist on the client side of the API. As in someone sends manipulated media that targets a vulnerability on the third party device, the media gets forwarded through the API, now that compromised third party device does bad things over the API. Personally, I think that it's really just a convenient third party lockout excuse, but the argument isn't quite as bad as it may seem at first glance.
    - darkwater 2y ago
      Following that line of reasoning, the Apple should ban WhatsApp and other messaging systems because they can add potential vulnerabilities.
      - xigoi 2y ago
        Don’t give them ideas!
- madeofpalk 2y ago
  > People’s phones got compromised by NSO sending images to them via whatsapp Has this happened on iOS via WhatsApp? I know Apple's had a view problems with this happening with iMessage, but always been unsure whether third party app sandbox does a good job of containing this?
  - saagarjha 2y ago
    I believe this was used to install Pegasus yes
- saagarjha 2y ago
  No, that’s not true. NSO Group already has the means to send people spicy JPEGs all they want. Adding this would not significantly change their capabilities.
threeseed 2y ago
> any process running under your user can access You will need to grant that app explicit Full Disk Access permissions in order for it to access that folder.
- bmicraft 2y ago
  Okay then let me grant "Full Notification Access permissions" on iPhone and we're good.
  - MichaelZuo 2y ago
    None of this comment chain makes sense… how is this relevant when Apple operates across hundreds of jurisdictions? Most of which don’t allow users to waive rights based on a prompt. So Apple would still have liability anyways for grandma getting scammed, regardless of how expertly worded the prompts are. Which entails extra customer service costs, handling lawsuits, etc… that someone has to pay for.
    - bloppe 2y ago
      Why would Apple be liable for these things? There are existing phones in every market that allow such things without any liability issues.
      - MichaelZuo 2y ago
        In which jurisdictions are there no court cases whatsoever regarding similar and related issues?
        Nextgrid 2y ago
        Can you point me to any court cases where an OS developer got sued because an idiot clicked through a security prompt and got pwned as a result?
        2y ago

culi 2y ago

In what world is screenshotting an iMessage enough to move them out of the security boundary

cmurf 2y ago
World in which I've paired my two devices? Doesn't the boundary get broken asking messages be read to me into a BT audio device?

droopyEyelids 2y ago

Did you mean to reply to a different comment?

seanhunter 2y ago

I don’t think you understand what the security boundary of iMessage is. People’s phones got compromised by NSO sending images to them via whatsapp that used an exploit in one of the image libraries to run a malware payload. The security boundary isn’t about whether you can see your own messages, it’s whether bad people can root your phone by getting untrusted code to run. That’s a very different proposition if iMessage is a single codebase that they fully own end to end versus it has a plugin ecosystem. Having such a plugin system widens the security boundary by adding a much larger codebase that would require trust.

Nextgrid 2y ago
It doesn't need to be a plugin ecosystem - no third party code needs to run within the iMessage processes/sandboxes/containers. In fact, no third-party code needs to run at all on the phone - all that's needed is to expose an API over BLE that allows previously authorized external devices to query/send messages.
- usrusr 2y ago
  In defense of the "it's security!" position (which is not mine): I think they mean a similar vulnerability could exist on the client side of the API. As in someone sends manipulated media that targets a vulnerability on the third party device, the media gets forwarded through the API, now that compromised third party device does bad things over the API. Personally, I think that it's really just a convenient third party lockout excuse, but the argument isn't quite as bad as it may seem at first glance.
  - darkwater 2y ago
    Following that line of reasoning, the Apple should ban WhatsApp and other messaging systems because they can add potential vulnerabilities.
    - xigoi 2y ago
      Don’t give them ideas!
madeofpalk 2y ago
> People’s phones got compromised by NSO sending images to them via whatsapp Has this happened on iOS via WhatsApp? I know Apple's had a view problems with this happening with iMessage, but always been unsure whether third party app sandbox does a good job of containing this?
- saagarjha 2y ago
  I believe this was used to install Pegasus yes
saagarjha 2y ago
No, that’s not true. NSO Group already has the means to send people spicy JPEGs all they want. Adding this would not significantly change their capabilities.

threeseed 2y ago

> any process running under your user can access You will need to grant that app explicit Full Disk Access permissions in order for it to access that folder.

bmicraft 2y ago
Okay then let me grant "Full Notification Access permissions" on iPhone and we're good.
- MichaelZuo 2y ago
  None of this comment chain makes sense… how is this relevant when Apple operates across hundreds of jurisdictions? Most of which don’t allow users to waive rights based on a prompt. So Apple would still have liability anyways for grandma getting scammed, regardless of how expertly worded the prompts are. Which entails extra customer service costs, handling lawsuits, etc… that someone has to pay for.
  - bloppe 2y ago
    Why would Apple be liable for these things? There are existing phones in every market that allow such things without any liability issues.
    - MichaelZuo 2y ago
      In which jurisdictions are there no court cases whatsoever regarding similar and related issues?
      - Nextgrid 2y ago
        Can you point me to any court cases where an OS developer got sued because an idiot clicked through a security prompt and got pwned as a result?
        2y ago