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> provide optional remote attestation to verify OS and baseband integrity And lock us out of our computing freedom while they're at it. Remote attestation ena

> provide optional remote attestation to verify OS and baseband integrity And lock us out of our computing freedom while they're at it. Remote attestation enables discrimination against free computers owned by users rather than corporations. They could theoretically allow users to set their own keys but it's not like apps and services are gonna trust people's personal attestation keys, they're only gonna trust Apple's and Google's. This is among the most dangerous developments in cryptography to date and it's gonna end free computing as we know it today. Before this, cryptography used to empower people like us. Now it's the tool that will destroy our freedom and everything the word "hacker" ever stood for. Malware is a small price to pay to avoid such a fate. It's not going to be "optional" either. Every major service is going to use it. Guaranteed.

fc417fc802 2y ago
IIRC wasn't it Librem that wanted to have the device attest itself to the user (ie a second device)? Agreed though. Any major vendor deploying this globally and making it available to developers without restriction would be an affront to our freedom.
- matheusmoreira 2y ago
  > Any major vendor deploying this globally and making it available to developers without restriction would be an affront to our freedom. Google and Apple have already done it. And one day it'll show up in desktops too.
transpute 2y ago
> Remote attestation enables discrimination against free computers owned by users rather than corporations. Not when my mobile device is attesting to my home server with OSS attestation software, or my USB Armory with OSS firmware for local "remote" attestation. GrapheneOS can attest to a 2nd mobile device running GrapheneOS, or a web verifier. This is not rocket science. Provide a mobile setting for attestation server URL. > Every major service is going to use it. Guaranteed. Hence there must be a mandatory option to define your attestation server. Advocating for the right to specify and/or host your arbiter of device trust (including firmware RoT) will do infinitely more for freedom than arguing against cryptography.
- LoganDark 2y ago
  > Not when my mobile device is attesting to my home server with OSS attestation software, or my USB Armory with OSS firmware for local "remote" attestation. GrapheneOS can attest to a 2nd mobile device running GrapheneOS, or a web verifier. This is not rocket science. Provide a mobile setting for attestation server URL. No, dude. Look at Google SafetyNet / Play Integrity. It's used by banking apps, streaming apps, certain games, and much, much more, to lock out devices that don't pass. I believe one of the last Android devices that will ever be able to pass SafetyNet while rooted is the OnePlus 7 Pro. Not that I'm ever going to tweak on Android again until TWRP adds a setting to disable OpenRecoveryScript, since a complete lack of prompting for consent is how I had my last major data loss. (Apparently it would kill them to add anything like a "script execution in 5 seconds, cancel?" popup.)
  - thunderfork 2y ago
    [dead]
  - transpute 2y ago
    Fully open Debian Linux VMs (and possibly Windows VMs via GrapheneOS) are coming to Android 16, which can run desktop GUI apps in those VMs. Already shipping in Android 15 on Pixel devices. ISV/app misuse of remote attestation does not preclude valid use cases under device owner control. Android Virtualization Framework is the first step in reducing the over-broad conflation of device measurements with "security". It can lead to narrower measurements and attestation of specific OS components , while opening up other components to user modification without "breaking" device verification.
    - LoganDark 2y ago
      > Android Virtualization Framework is the first step in reducing the over-broad conflation of device measurements with "security". It can lead to narrower measurements and attestation of specific OS components , while opening up other components to user modification without "breaking" device verification. Okay... and then someone releases some new "security" library with an all-or-nothing philosophy that contains every possible check under the sun for any kind of rooting, modification, customization or even unlocking - and then all the banking apps start using this. You can't win against security theater. You just can't.

fc417fc802 2y ago

IIRC wasn't it Librem that wanted to have the device attest itself to the user (ie a second device)? Agreed though. Any major vendor deploying this globally and making it available to developers without restriction would be an affront to our freedom.

matheusmoreira 2y ago
> Any major vendor deploying this globally and making it available to developers without restriction would be an affront to our freedom. Google and Apple have already done it. And one day it'll show up in desktops too.

transpute 2y ago

> Remote attestation enables discrimination against free computers owned by users rather than corporations. Not when my mobile device is attesting to my home server with OSS attestation software, or my USB Armory with OSS firmware for local "remote" attestation. GrapheneOS can attest to a 2nd mobile device running GrapheneOS, or a web verifier. This is not rocket science. Provide a mobile setting for attestation server URL. > Every major service is going to use it. Guaranteed. Hence there must be a mandatory option to define your attestation server. Advocating for the right to specify and/or host your arbiter of device trust (including firmware RoT) will do infinitely more for freedom than arguing against cryptography.

LoganDark 2y ago
> Not when my mobile device is attesting to my home server with OSS attestation software, or my USB Armory with OSS firmware for local "remote" attestation. GrapheneOS can attest to a 2nd mobile device running GrapheneOS, or a web verifier. This is not rocket science. Provide a mobile setting for attestation server URL. No, dude. Look at Google SafetyNet / Play Integrity. It's used by banking apps, streaming apps, certain games, and much, much more, to lock out devices that don't pass. I believe one of the last Android devices that will ever be able to pass SafetyNet while rooted is the OnePlus 7 Pro. Not that I'm ever going to tweak on Android again until TWRP adds a setting to disable OpenRecoveryScript, since a complete lack of prompting for consent is how I had my last major data loss. (Apparently it would kill them to add anything like a "script execution in 5 seconds, cancel?" popup.)
- thunderfork 2y ago
  [dead]
- transpute 2y ago
  Fully open Debian Linux VMs (and possibly Windows VMs via GrapheneOS) are coming to Android 16, which can run desktop GUI apps in those VMs. Already shipping in Android 15 on Pixel devices. ISV/app misuse of remote attestation does not preclude valid use cases under device owner control. Android Virtualization Framework is the first step in reducing the over-broad conflation of device measurements with "security". It can lead to narrower measurements and attestation of specific OS components , while opening up other components to user modification without "breaking" device verification.
  - LoganDark 2y ago
    > Android Virtualization Framework is the first step in reducing the over-broad conflation of device measurements with "security". It can lead to narrower measurements and attestation of specific OS components , while opening up other components to user modification without "breaking" device verification. Okay... and then someone releases some new "security" library with an all-or-nothing philosophy that contains every possible check under the sun for any kind of rooting, modification, customization or even unlocking - and then all the banking apps start using this. You can't win against security theater. You just can't.