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Interesting. I thought crypto lockers were kinda extinct though because most companies have their backup ducks in a row now so threat actors tend to go for blac

• ziddoap 2y ago
  >because most companies have their backup ducks in a row That is the most optimistic thing I've read in a long time! I still consult with companies storing all of the company-owned accounts (facebook, instagram, website admin, government & tax portals, etc.) in a spreadsheet called "passwords.xlsx", in a folder called "passwords", on the root of the network with no access control. Frequently. (they do not have their backup ducks in a row, nor have any clue what "XDR" stands for)
  • wkat4242 2y ago
    Really? We really don't do that anymore. We have a strong XDR (Extended Detection and Response), basically Antivirus + behavioural analysis + SIEM integration. A managed password manager, and even detection for such behaviour of stored passwords in plain text or office files (through Microsoft Purview DLP). XDR is an evolution of EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response) with a bit more in terms of data sources added (and a lot of marketing "Our <..>DR is better than yours because we have a cooler letter" :P Basically an XDR looks not only at malware but also at potentially malicious actions. This is a much more complete view because not every malicious action is triggered by malware. It can also be simply a user (and AI automation/control will be a new thing there). Big names in this are Crowdstrike (yes that one that killed half the enterprises), SentinelOne, Microsoft Defender for Endpoint (not to be confused with the normal consumer defender). An XDR will notice when a PC is doing a port scan, when a process is trying to gain root rights, when significant numbers of files are suddenly rewritten. It will immediately kill the process and/or trigger a ticket to the SOC (Security Operations Center). Who can take global actions on all endpoints to immediately kill the malware everywhere. It's pretty cool, you can trace back the entire process history, what launched what, what was were the system call parameters etc. Big companies really have this stuff figured out. Unfortunately exfiltration is harder to detect if the malicious actor is doing it through a cloud service that the company also subscribes to. If a company doesn't know what XDR is they are probably < 100 employees.
    • ziddoap 2y ago
      >If a company doesn't know what XDR is they are probably < 100 employees. Indeed, I do cybersec consulting primarily for small to medium-sized businesses. And I would say, especially for small businesses, somewhere over half of them have no backup plan (among all the other issues). So, sadly, it is far from true that "most companies have their backup ducks in a row" .
      • wkat4242 2y ago
        True, I was mainly thinking about the enterprise field in which I work. Of course those are also the fattest targets for these actors. We get some really serious stuff very regularly. Which I can't elaborate on, but I mean, the threat model for a small / medium business is also much less heavy. Also, most enterprises have cybersecurity insurance that will just pay out (and thus keep this activity going, sadly). I don't think smaller businesses would have that.
        • technion 2y ago
          My time consulting across random organisations really has been the complete exact opposite of what you describe. I've walked into billion dollar orgs and campaigned unsuccessfully for backups. And I have seen sole traders with cyber insurance.
    • MadsRC 2y ago
      Data exfil detection is a game of whack-a-mole. There is an endless variation of ways I can get data of your machine or out of your network. Your time is much better spend detecting or preventing compromise.
      • wkat4242 2y ago
        Yes, but for a company our size, to have something notable exfiltrated you are usually speaking about large volumes as well, which are easier to detect. And yes compromise detection is of course the priority. But it's not just one or the other. We do everything at the same time. The swiss cheese model and all that.
• duck-row 2y ago
  [dead]
• dylan604 2y ago
  The hack is essentially free for the attackers. All it takes is one ransom to be paid to make it worth their time. Every one after that is just bonus.
  • wongarsu 2y ago
    The hackers still have opportunity cost. Also the support costs (communicating with victims who may or may not pay), paying for payload delivery (either explicitly by letting someone else do it, or by putting in hours to do it themselves), server costs, the ransomware software itself might be bought or acquired in a SaaS or affiliate model. Just because it's crime doesn't mean it's free money
    • dylan604 2y ago
      I'll be on the look out for the next hacker group that folds to pick up some cheap Aerons.
• bongodongobob 2y ago
  I would venture to say that most companies actually don't have a backup solution at all. The other half is mixed between just scheduled copies to a NAS and/or do not do regular back up tests. Source: years of contracting for small-medium sized business.
• amarcheschi 2y ago
  One of my relatives works in a company making decorative plates, medals, any artsy basically, and they were hit with a ransomware a few days ago. I don't even know if they had some sort of cybersecurity. I think they paid eventually. About 70k€. It's not a huge company, ~40people, but still