0_o it's concerning to see you express this view, given that Tor is quite explicit about the limitations of their approach on their site. Here is a survey: ht

0_o it's concerning to see you express this view, given that Tor is quite explicit about the limitations of their approach on their site. Here is a survey: https://css.csail.mit.edu/6.858/2023/readings/tor-traffic-analysis.pdf https://css.csail.mit.edu/6.858/2023/readings/tor-traffic-an... But in general: If any attacker can monitor traffic at both sides of a tor circuit they can with high probably confirm or deny the connection with most traffic patterns after watching for long enough, if they can stimulate transmissions on one side or the other they can do so extremely quickly ( https://mice.cs.columbia.edu/getTechreport.php?format=pdf&techreportID=556 https://mice.cs.columbia.edu/getTechreport.php?format=pdf&te... for one such example). This is a natural consequence of low latency variable bitrate services. Same sorts of issue exist for I2P. There are several papers by tor authors (e.g. https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/11957454_14 https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/11957454_14 ) on the idea of a parallel high latency service that would diminish these issues, but it's has never been developed.