3 ms·

Tor is important for metadata resistance.

nullc 2y ago
Right but on a local network the attacker likely has no surveillance -- and if they do you probably have worse problems. And because Tor is relatively vulnerable to DOS attack, an attacker can force users off of it and likely on to more vulnerable communications methods. Tor also has its own vulnerable to traffic analysis which is quite significant. So I think for most users if you can satisfy communications you'd probably prefer it... Though I suppose I could argue it both ways.
- some_furry 2y ago
  > Tor also has its own vulnerable to traffic analysis which is quite significant. [citation needed] Here's a contrary one https://www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/2013/oct/04/tor-stinks-nsa-presentation-document https://www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/2013/oct/04/to...
  - nullc 2y ago
    0_o it's concerning to see you express this view, given that Tor is quite explicit about the limitations of their approach on their site. Here is a survey: https://css.csail.mit.edu/6.858/2023/readings/tor-traffic-analysis.pdf https://css.csail.mit.edu/6.858/2023/readings/tor-traffic-an... But in general: If any attacker can monitor traffic at both sides of a tor circuit they can with high probably confirm or deny the connection with most traffic patterns after watching for long enough, if they can stimulate transmissions on one side or the other they can do so extremely quickly ( https://mice.cs.columbia.edu/getTechreport.php?format=pdf&techreportID=556 https://mice.cs.columbia.edu/getTechreport.php?format=pdf&te... for one such example). This is a natural consequence of low latency variable bitrate services. Same sorts of issue exist for I2P. There are several papers by tor authors (e.g. https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/11957454_14 https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/11957454_14 ) on the idea of a parallel high latency service that would diminish these issues, but it's has never been developed.

Right but on a local network the attacker likely has no surveillance -- and if they do you probably have worse problems. And because Tor is relatively vulnerable to DOS attack, an attacker can force users off of it and likely on to more vulnerable communications methods. Tor also has its own vulnerable to traffic analysis which is quite significant. So I think for most users if you can satisfy communications you'd probably prefer it... Though I suppose I could argue it both ways.

some_furry 2y ago
> Tor also has its own vulnerable to traffic analysis which is quite significant. [citation needed] Here's a contrary one https://www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/2013/oct/04/tor-stinks-nsa-presentation-document https://www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/2013/oct/04/to...
- nullc 2y ago
  0_o it's concerning to see you express this view, given that Tor is quite explicit about the limitations of their approach on their site. Here is a survey: https://css.csail.mit.edu/6.858/2023/readings/tor-traffic-analysis.pdf https://css.csail.mit.edu/6.858/2023/readings/tor-traffic-an... But in general: If any attacker can monitor traffic at both sides of a tor circuit they can with high probably confirm or deny the connection with most traffic patterns after watching for long enough, if they can stimulate transmissions on one side or the other they can do so extremely quickly ( https://mice.cs.columbia.edu/getTechreport.php?format=pdf&techreportID=556 https://mice.cs.columbia.edu/getTechreport.php?format=pdf&te... for one such example). This is a natural consequence of low latency variable bitrate services. Same sorts of issue exist for I2P. There are several papers by tor authors (e.g. https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/11957454_14 https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/11957454_14 ) on the idea of a parallel high latency service that would diminish these issues, but it's has never been developed.