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>So while we can image, we can't know what correlates with a high degree of certainty. I don't think I agree just on this piece, though you are making importan

>So while we can image, we can't know what correlates with a high degree of certainty. I don't think I agree just on this piece, though you are making important points here. We can know, for instance, of visual or spacial awareness, reactions to certain stimuli or objects introduced in their environment, and so on. You're not wrong on the importance of learning from active brain functions but I think we can at least make meaningful inroads with animals. > Finding those foundational ideas and basic operating principles I know a lot of people talk this way about brains and consciousness, that we need to first have our definitional elements before we proceed with research. But I think we often have, as the object of research, closing in on those elements, while gathering all kinds of functional and theoretical data from the mass of complicated noise that is brain structure and activity. We can build out correlations, mechanisms, and so on and close in on foundational elements. It may even be the case that foundational organizing principles turn our understanding inside out in important ways, but I have never understood the idea that we are stuck if we can't start with such things in hand.

bena 2y ago
I'm sorry, I see where I wasn't clear. I'm talking about very specific correlation. Like when I type these words, exactly how and what fires to achieve that. Which neurons and pathways are the thought "hit these keys", what's the signal to the fingers etc. We know "When this area is active, this group of actions can happen". It's hard to get good resolution. And I believe it would be easier to replicate consciousness if we knew how it worked, I also believe it's possible we eventually figure it out. It will just be much harder. And we may not know when we do it either. I believe that is where we will need common, agreed upon definitions. But defining intelligence and consciousness is difficult because you have to define it in a way that includes everything we agree is conscious and excludes everything we agree is not. And we'll also have to agree what is and is not conscious. It's a way more involved problem than a lot of people give credit.
- glenstein 2y ago
  >But defining intelligence and consciousness is difficult because you have to define it in a way that includes everything we agree is conscious and excludes everything we agree is not. I think this is extremely important, but I would say that methodologically, messy definitions can nevertheless be stepping stones that bring us closer to full comprehension of definitions. I suppose I just have a specific hobby horse in this context and I don't know that I'm responding to you so much as a general idea I've seen elsewhere, that you're rhyming with, which is this idea that research has to start from agreed upon definitions. I would say instead that there are such things as characteristic instances that embody lots of the stuff we are interested in, such that we can say "whatever consciousness is, it involves that" and we can just point to something that's a wild, underdefined phenomenon, and make it subject of study. Without a definition, I can still understand that states of mind that involve, say, wakeful awareness and intention are going to be about consciousness. We can know necessary conditions even if we don't know "sufficient" conditions, and the former are a stepping stone to comprehending the latter.

bena 2y ago

I'm sorry, I see where I wasn't clear. I'm talking about very specific correlation. Like when I type these words, exactly how and what fires to achieve that. Which neurons and pathways are the thought "hit these keys", what's the signal to the fingers etc. We know "When this area is active, this group of actions can happen". It's hard to get good resolution. And I believe it would be easier to replicate consciousness if we knew how it worked, I also believe it's possible we eventually figure it out. It will just be much harder. And we may not know when we do it either. I believe that is where we will need common, agreed upon definitions. But defining intelligence and consciousness is difficult because you have to define it in a way that includes everything we agree is conscious and excludes everything we agree is not. And we'll also have to agree what is and is not conscious. It's a way more involved problem than a lot of people give credit.

glenstein 2y ago
>But defining intelligence and consciousness is difficult because you have to define it in a way that includes everything we agree is conscious and excludes everything we agree is not. I think this is extremely important, but I would say that methodologically, messy definitions can nevertheless be stepping stones that bring us closer to full comprehension of definitions. I suppose I just have a specific hobby horse in this context and I don't know that I'm responding to you so much as a general idea I've seen elsewhere, that you're rhyming with, which is this idea that research has to start from agreed upon definitions. I would say instead that there are such things as characteristic instances that embody lots of the stuff we are interested in, such that we can say "whatever consciousness is, it involves that" and we can just point to something that's a wild, underdefined phenomenon, and make it subject of study. Without a definition, I can still understand that states of mind that involve, say, wakeful awareness and intention are going to be about consciousness. We can know necessary conditions even if we don't know "sufficient" conditions, and the former are a stepping stone to comprehending the latter.