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> elite and economic consolidation plays a greater role in building lasting ties with a country instead of ideological ties Elite and economic consolidation is

> elite and economic consolidation plays a greater role in building lasting ties with a country instead of ideological ties Elite and economic consolidation is a corrupting force, though. A country's actions are just as important as it's stated values - if it partners with others who don't share those values, then it's just performance. If your country signals that it doesn't actually care about its purported values, then why would any country which does care want to create long-term relationships or otherwise ally themselves with you? How would anyone be able to trust you if you compromise your foundational principles for economic gain? How could you trust them?

alephnerd 2y ago
Cambodia used to be American leaning in the 2010s during their transition to democracy, with support for democratic norm building and actual democracy. China on the other hand decided to only conduct outreach to Cambodian economic and political elite [0] The US government funded social infrastructure like health clinics, schools, and sanitation systems, but the Chinese government funded hard infra projects like canals, highways, energy systems, and weaponry without human rights oversight [0]. When Cambodia decided to end their democratic experiment, the US condemned it, but the Chinese government was indifferent. And now Cambodia has solidly shifted to the Chinese sphere of influence. This story has repeated all across ASEAN from Thailand to Malaysia to Indonesia. The reality is it's only the economic, military, and poltical decisionmakers that matter, and if you needle them too much, they will try to find alternatives or build their own strategic autonomy. France did the same thing in the De Gaulle era for the exact same reasons (military regime that didn't like getting needled about democratic backsliding). > then why would any country which does care want to create long-term relationships or otherwise ally themselves with you Cold hard cash, weapons, and legitimacy. Which is what ASEAN countries have begun to do by shifting closer towards China. They don't want or need lectures - they want to maintain their own power. Notice how Europe has grown silent about Turkish democratic decline now that European nations require Turkish support to stabilize Ukraine. And if PiS wins the Polish elections, you won't hear similar complaints about "democratic backsliding" compared to the PiS barely 3 years ago. When push comes to shove, values don't matter much. In an era where great power politics has returned, values matter less than hard power. [0] - https://www.iseas.edu.sg/articles-commentaries/iseas-perspective/2023-101-reviewing-chinas-elite-centric-approach-in-its-relations-with-cambodia-by-chhay-lim/ https://www.iseas.edu.sg/articles-commentaries/iseas-perspec...
- text0404 2y ago
  I (reluctantly) acknowledge the practicality of this, but what happens when those economic and political elite are too extreme and are overthrown? Supporting those actors creates a permanent divide and causes further isolation. Consider the various examples of regime change and/or support for dictators/authoritarians enabled by the United States in South America and the Middle East - has that made any of those countries (the US included) better off because there was alignment with political and economic elites? It seems like you make more enemies in the long run with this approach.
  - alephnerd 2y ago
    > what happens when those economic and political elite are too extreme and are overthrown Regimes fall when subsets of the elite decide to defect to the opposition. For example, Hosni Mubarak fell not because of protesters in Tahrir Square, but because Sisi didn't feel like shooting protesters at that time for Mubarak's sake (Sisi had ambitions). If Sisi and the Egyptian military didn't decide to return to the barracks, the Arab Spring in Egypt would have never happened. The only solution to this is by actually cultivating multiple different factions within those elites. Yet this is something the US is not good at anymore because this kind of knowledge and understanding requires significant cultural background, and State Dept hiring regulations prevent people of the same ethnicity from working on relations for those countries. > Consider the various examples of regime change and/or support for dictators/authoritarians enabled by the United States in South America and the Middle East The most notable one in the post 1971 era is Iran 1979 where US cultivated the secular Shah's government and military leadership, but not the organized Shia clergy. If the US had cultivated Khomenini, we wouldn't have been in such a severe situation. The French on the other hand engaged Khomeini and Shia clergy, and it helped ensure that France could maintain relations until the sanctions regime began in the 2010s. By the 1990s, US foreign policy in Latin America changed to democracy promotion due to the same points you brought up, and that caused Honduras to switch in favor of China after corruption investigations threatened their leadership, and Nicaragua switched in favor of China due to pushback for democratic backsliding in 2017-18.

alephnerd 2y ago

Cambodia used to be American leaning in the 2010s during their transition to democracy, with support for democratic norm building and actual democracy. China on the other hand decided to only conduct outreach to Cambodian economic and political elite [0] The US government funded social infrastructure like health clinics, schools, and sanitation systems, but the Chinese government funded hard infra projects like canals, highways, energy systems, and weaponry without human rights oversight [0]. When Cambodia decided to end their democratic experiment, the US condemned it, but the Chinese government was indifferent. And now Cambodia has solidly shifted to the Chinese sphere of influence. This story has repeated all across ASEAN from Thailand to Malaysia to Indonesia. The reality is it's only the economic, military, and poltical decisionmakers that matter, and if you needle them too much, they will try to find alternatives or build their own strategic autonomy. France did the same thing in the De Gaulle era for the exact same reasons (military regime that didn't like getting needled about democratic backsliding). > then why would any country which does care want to create long-term relationships or otherwise ally themselves with you Cold hard cash, weapons, and legitimacy. Which is what ASEAN countries have begun to do by shifting closer towards China. They don't want or need lectures - they want to maintain their own power. Notice how Europe has grown silent about Turkish democratic decline now that European nations require Turkish support to stabilize Ukraine. And if PiS wins the Polish elections, you won't hear similar complaints about "democratic backsliding" compared to the PiS barely 3 years ago. When push comes to shove, values don't matter much. In an era where great power politics has returned, values matter less than hard power. [0] - https://www.iseas.edu.sg/articles-commentaries/iseas-perspective/2023-101-reviewing-chinas-elite-centric-approach-in-its-relations-with-cambodia-by-chhay-lim/ https://www.iseas.edu.sg/articles-commentaries/iseas-perspec...

text0404 2y ago
I (reluctantly) acknowledge the practicality of this, but what happens when those economic and political elite are too extreme and are overthrown? Supporting those actors creates a permanent divide and causes further isolation. Consider the various examples of regime change and/or support for dictators/authoritarians enabled by the United States in South America and the Middle East - has that made any of those countries (the US included) better off because there was alignment with political and economic elites? It seems like you make more enemies in the long run with this approach.
- alephnerd 2y ago
  > what happens when those economic and political elite are too extreme and are overthrown Regimes fall when subsets of the elite decide to defect to the opposition. For example, Hosni Mubarak fell not because of protesters in Tahrir Square, but because Sisi didn't feel like shooting protesters at that time for Mubarak's sake (Sisi had ambitions). If Sisi and the Egyptian military didn't decide to return to the barracks, the Arab Spring in Egypt would have never happened. The only solution to this is by actually cultivating multiple different factions within those elites. Yet this is something the US is not good at anymore because this kind of knowledge and understanding requires significant cultural background, and State Dept hiring regulations prevent people of the same ethnicity from working on relations for those countries. > Consider the various examples of regime change and/or support for dictators/authoritarians enabled by the United States in South America and the Middle East The most notable one in the post 1971 era is Iran 1979 where US cultivated the secular Shah's government and military leadership, but not the organized Shia clergy. If the US had cultivated Khomenini, we wouldn't have been in such a severe situation. The French on the other hand engaged Khomeini and Shia clergy, and it helped ensure that France could maintain relations until the sanctions regime began in the 2010s. By the 1990s, US foreign policy in Latin America changed to democracy promotion due to the same points you brought up, and that caused Honduras to switch in favor of China after corruption investigations threatened their leadership, and Nicaragua switched in favor of China due to pushback for democratic backsliding in 2017-18.