No, and that wasn't the case under prior administrations either. Remember Dual_EC_DRBG[0]? NIST is an untrustworthy government agency that occasionally produce

No, and that wasn't the case under prior administrations either. Remember Dual_EC_DRBG[0]? NIST is an untrustworthy government agency that occasionally produces useful encryption standards. The answer to "should we use a NIST standard" is to look at what the wider academic cryptography community is talking about. Dual_EC_DRBG was complained about immediately (for various strange statistical properties that made it impractical) and people found the ability to hide a backdoor in Dual_EC_DRBG in 2004. If anything, the biggest issue is that the security experts pointing out the obvious and glaring flaws with NIST standards don't get listened to enough. [0] A random number generator standard designed specifically with a back door that only the creator of its curve constants could make use of or even prove had been inserted. It was pushed by NIST during the Bush Jr. administration.