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Cryptography doesn't really fix it. There are a zillion camera makers and all it takes is one of them to have poor security and leak the keys. Then the forger u
by AnthonyMouse 2y ago
Cryptography doesn't really fix it. There are a zillion camera makers and all it takes is one of them to have poor security and leak the keys. Then the forger uses any of the cameras with extractable keys to sign their forgery.
Or they just point a camera at a high resolution playback of a forged video.
This also assumes you can trust all the camera makers, because by doing this you're implicitly giving them each authorization to produce forged videos. Recall that many of these companies are based in China.
- bluGill 2y agoThe point is the camera maker certifies in court under perjury penalty that their cameras are not compromised and that is their image. "Other camera systems are compromised, but ours is not...".
- AnthonyMouse 2y agoCameras are an IoT device. The S is for security. What good is having the company certify something that isn't true? It seems like it would just be a mechanism to lend undeserved credibility to something that still isn't trustworthy.
- bluGill 2y agoHere the camera manufacture is asserting under oath that they (not their competitors) are secure. Just because IoT is almost always insecure doesn't mean it 100% is, being the exception can allow you to charge a premium price at times - but you better really be the exception.
- pixl97 2y agoThis isn't how security works. Devices like IoT stay in the field for decades quite often, and generally without updates (or if they do have updates, the updater itself is a security risk).
- gs17 2y ago> Or they just point a camera at a high resolution playback of a forged video. Exactly, it's just like DRM or cheating in video games. Even if everything in software is blocked, there's always the analogue hole.
- DrFalkyn 2y agoMaybe go back to old school analog. Like they did in Altered Carbon