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I haven't seen anyone proffer a reason to deviate from majority-rules decision procedure. If you think it benefits the Senate, then you should be able to articu

I haven't seen anyone proffer a reason to deviate from majority-rules decision procedure. If you think it benefits the Senate, then you should be able to articulate what those benefits are and explain why they other governing bodies wouldn't also benefit. So, can anyone explain to me why corporate boards shouldn't adopt a 60% majority rule as well?

noblethrasher 14y ago
In the case of the Senate, it only requires a simple majority to pass legislation. Terminating debate is what requires a supermajority. That seems fair to me since the Senate is supposed to be extremely deliberative. Also, the 60% supermajority isn't even that arbitrary: two-thirds of the Senate are up for reelection every couple of years. The requirement of a 60% supermajority to terminate deliberation almost ensures that the debate will benefit from the members that can afford the longer-term outlook (i.e. 5-6 years).
- MichaelSalib 14y ago
  The distinction between terminating debate and passing legislation is disingenuous. You can't pass legislation without terminating debate. Which means that you can't pass legislation unless you have 60%. And of course it is arbitrary. In the recent past, the threshold was 66%, not 60%. And in the distant past, Senate norms precluded this sort of arbitrary interference. Finally, the idea that the 60% threshold leads to more debate is silly. Consider how many judicial nominations are delayed for months but then sail through with 80-100% votes.
  - noblethrasher 14y ago
    The fact of the matter is that at any given time there are three different classes of sitting senators. The requirement of supermajority that is around two-thirds reflects that there is a qualitative difference between a group that doesn’t face reelection for another half decade and one that is likely in campaign mode. Thus, the supermajority is actually a simple majority among the classes of senators. Also, while a threat of a filibuster might not lead to more deliberation among the members, it certainly signals to the public that something important might be at stake. At the very least it will cause journalist to report and/or editorialize on the issue. With regard to judicial nominations, I know that there are some shenanigans but I would also expect an ideal process to look just about identical since the floor vote should be delayed until each senator has performed an independent investigation of the nominee.

noblethrasher 14y ago

In the case of the Senate, it only requires a simple majority to pass legislation. Terminating debate is what requires a supermajority. That seems fair to me since the Senate is supposed to be extremely deliberative. Also, the 60% supermajority isn't even that arbitrary: two-thirds of the Senate are up for reelection every couple of years. The requirement of a 60% supermajority to terminate deliberation almost ensures that the debate will benefit from the members that can afford the longer-term outlook (i.e. 5-6 years).

MichaelSalib 14y ago
The distinction between terminating debate and passing legislation is disingenuous. You can't pass legislation without terminating debate. Which means that you can't pass legislation unless you have 60%. And of course it is arbitrary. In the recent past, the threshold was 66%, not 60%. And in the distant past, Senate norms precluded this sort of arbitrary interference. Finally, the idea that the 60% threshold leads to more debate is silly. Consider how many judicial nominations are delayed for months but then sail through with 80-100% votes.
- noblethrasher 14y ago
  The fact of the matter is that at any given time there are three different classes of sitting senators. The requirement of supermajority that is around two-thirds reflects that there is a qualitative difference between a group that doesn’t face reelection for another half decade and one that is likely in campaign mode. Thus, the supermajority is actually a simple majority among the classes of senators. Also, while a threat of a filibuster might not lead to more deliberation among the members, it certainly signals to the public that something important might be at stake. At the very least it will cause journalist to report and/or editorialize on the issue. With regard to judicial nominations, I know that there are some shenanigans but I would also expect an ideal process to look just about identical since the floor vote should be delayed until each senator has performed an independent investigation of the nominee.