3 ms·
> That doesn't necessarily mean full CT support – they might just as well choose to completely distrust anything tagged SCTNotAfter, or to ignore it. That's wh
by mcpherrinm 2y ago
> That doesn't necessarily mean full CT support – they might just as well choose to completely distrust anything tagged SCTNotAfter, or to ignore it.
That's what the blog post I linked in the top comment suggests is the "more disruptive than intended" approach. I don't think it's a good idea. Removing the root at `SCTNotAfter + max cert lifetime` is the appropriate thing.
There's an extra issue of not-often-updated systems too, since now you need to coordinate a system update at the right moment to remove the root.
- agwa 2y ago> Removing the root at `SCTNotAfter + max cert lifetime` is the appropriate thing. Note that Mozilla supports not SCTNotAfter but DistrustAfter, which relies on the certificate's Not Before date. Since this provides no defense against backdating, it would presumably not be used with a seriously dangerous CA (e.g. DigiNotar). This makes it easy to justify removing roots at `DistrustAfter + max cert lifetime`. On the other hand, SCTNotAfter provides meaningful security against a dangerous CA. If Mozilla begins using SCTNotAfter, I think non-browser consumers of the Mozilla root store will need to evaluate what to do with SCTNotAfter-tagged roots on a case-by-case basis.