> The only thing you get is that you're connected to someone who has control of the domain. Yes, that's the entire scope of the web PKI, and with the exception

> The only thing you get is that you're connected to someone who has control of the domain. Yes, that's the entire scope of the web PKI, and with the exception of EV certificates it never was anything else. > it's pretty clear that with ACME and DNS challenges we don't need a huge centralized system to do this much weaker thing Agreed – what we are doing today is primarily a result of the historical evolution of the system. "Why don't we just trust the DNS/domain registry system outright if we effectively defer most trust decisions to it anyway" is a valid question to ask, with some good counterpoints (one being that the PKI + CT make every single compromise globally visible, while DANE does not, at least not without further extensions). My objection is purely on terminology: Neither the current web PKI nor any hypothetical DANE-based future would be TOFU. Both delegate trust to some more or less centralized entity.