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Here's an interesting thought experiment. Take any definition of consciousness or intelligence that is not based on biological components. For example "reacts t
by _1tem 2y ago
Here's an interesting thought experiment. Take any definition of consciousness or intelligence that is not based on biological components. For example "reacts to stimuli, exhibits anger". You can apply that definition to other entities like the United States. Does the United States react to stimuli (i.e. invasion) and exhibit anger? Yes (e.g. Pearl Harbor). Therefore the United States is conscious?
If a person argues that an LLM is conscious or intelligent based on how it responds, is the United States conscious or intelligent?
- FeepingCreature 2y agoI think the US is conscious.
- koakuma-chan 2y ago> Therefore the United States is conscious? Assuming the United States react to stimuli and exhibit anger, and assuming that the definition of being conscious is reacting to stimuli and exhibiting anger, yes, the United States are conscious.
- deleted 2y ago[deleted]
- svantana 2y agoThis is one of the themes of the classic 1979 book "Godel, Escher, Bach".
- cjfd 2y agoOne part of consciousness is the 'stream of consciousness'. I.e., a single-threaded, if you will, sequence of observations and/or language that is extracted from all the parallel processing that is happening in the brain. The US does not have that. If there were one single news broadcast that all people were listening to all the time and were basing their action on, one might start considering that the US is conscious. Also, considering who the current president is, the US is quite the opposite of intelligent.
- timewizard 2y agoIf I break a bone. It heals itself. Are my bones intelligent?
- Joker_vD 2y ago> "reacts to stimuli, exhibits anger". Nitroglycerin comes to mind.
- skissane 2y agoThere's a great philosophy paper making this argument: Schwitzgebel, Eric. “If Materialism Is True, the United States Is Probably Conscious.” Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition, vol. 172, no. 7, 2015, pp. 1697–721. https://faculty.ucr.edu/~eschwitz/SchwitzPapers/USAconscious-140130a.htm https://faculty.ucr.edu/~eschwitz/SchwitzPapers/USAconscious... Discussed previously on HN: July 2015 (210 comments): https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=9905847 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=9905847 Feb 2021 (78 comments): https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=26217834 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=26217834 Dec 2023 (1 comment): https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=38814769 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=38814769
- naasking 2y ago> There's a great philosophy paper making this argument: Schwitzgebel, Eric. “If Materialism Is True, the United States Is Probably Conscious.” Maybe, but this strikes me as a borderline category error, like saying, "If databases can order results, then they are probably sorting algorithms". The argument makes assumptions that consciousness is transitive or "sticky" in some sense, where if a property applies to a part of the system it must also apply to some aggregate of those parts.
- _1tem 2y agoThe difference here is we know the definition of sorting algorithms, but we don't have a working definition for "consciousness". The argument is, if we use materialist definitions, then lots of unexpected things fit the definition.
- naasking 2y ago> The argument is, if we use materialist definitions, then lots of unexpected things fit the definition. No, this doesn't follow, that's my point. This depends on further constraining materialist consciousness to have the specific kind of property I described. It's possible that consciousness is like "sorting algorithm", a specific property of a specific kind of system, and aggregates of such systems don't necessarily have that same property. They might, but it's too strong to say they definitely or probably do.