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That's not true, the authors of IIT [1] propose a number of experiments that would support or deny the underlying theory. To my knowledge, those experiments hav

That's not true, the authors of IIT [1] propose a number of experiments that would support or deny the underlying theory. To my knowledge, those experiments haven't shown much support. But there are aspects of it that are absolutely empirically falsifiable. [1: https://www.nature.com/articles/nrn.2016.44 https://www.nature.com/articles/nrn.2016.44]

wat10000 2y ago
I don't buy it. It might support the part of the theory that talks about how brains work. But the statement that this is qualia is different, and can't be proven or disproven. Let's say I believe that some person is actually a P-zombie, someone with no conscious experience but who behaves exactly like a normal person. Would these experiments be able to tell me if my belief is correct? I don't see how.
- heyjamesknight 2y ago
  You're welcome to read the paper. Tonini's work is well-known within CogSci and its not quackery by any stretch.
  - wat10000 2y ago
    I skimmed it. There's one mention of "qualia" and I didn't spot anything to connect their theory with the actual experience of consciousness besides them saying they think so.
    - heyjamesknight 2y ago
      Better let Nature know their Peer Review committee screwed up then!
      - skissane 2y ago
        > Better let Nature know their Peer Review committee screwed up then! The article you cite [0] is labelled as "opinion". The standards for peer review of opinion articles in scientific journals are a lot lower than those for ordinary research articles. While precise standards vary from journal to journal, for opinion articles peer reviewers often see their role as simply excluding egregious misinformation and blatant errors, as compared to research articles where their role is to make sure the article is presenting high quality evidence in support of its conclusions. [1] [0] https://www.nature.com/articles/nrn.2016.44 https://www.nature.com/articles/nrn.2016.44 [1] https://ecologyisnotadirtyword.com/2021/02/24/lets-talk-about-standards-for-scholarly-opinion-articles/ https://ecologyisnotadirtyword.com/2021/02/24/lets-talk-abou...
        heyjamesknight 2y ago
        That would be because I linked the wrong article. The original is here, different journal: https://journals.plos.org/ploscompbiol/article?id=10.1371/journal.pcbi.1011465 https://journals.plos.org/ploscompbiol/article?id=10.1371/jo...
        skissane 2y ago
        I think this article has the problem that it is addressing an interdisciplinary topic with too much focus on only a single discipline, which can be a sign of lacking sufficient diversity in disciplinary background of peer reviewers. Scott Aaronson’s attempted refutation of IIT - https://scottaaronson.blog/?p=1799 https://scottaaronson.blog/?p=1799 - I think is better in that he actually tries to relate IIT to some of the philosophical literature (e.g. his distinction between Chalmers’ “Hard Problem” and the distinct “Pretty Hard Problem” which he sees IIT as trying to address) I think it is a pity that Aaronson has never (to my knowledge) published his criticisms of IIT in a more formal setting-and I don’t know if Tononi has responded to them anywhere. I think Aaronson is probably right - that IIT fails as a mathematical model of what we intuitively consider conscious, since even though it excludes many common electronic devices we wouldn’t “conscious”, it is possible to mathematically construct an algorithm, capable of being physically implemented in electronics, which would be conscious per IIT but not per our intuition. And even if Tononi patches his mathematics to solve a particular case of that problem, someone with Aaronson’s skillset may just be able to construct another. Tononi might then argue that if there is no mathematical model of our intuitions about consciousness lacking in special pleading, that’s a sign our intuitions are flawed. Okay, but then if we accept our intuitions can be flawed in some cases, why not in more cases? One could decide the intuition of consciousness is completely erroneous and become an eliminativist about it. Or, if IIT forces you to accept (contrary to our intuitions) certain (special cases of) simple electronic devices or computer systems as just as conscious as humans, why not violate those intuitions further and insist on that for even more cases?

wat10000 2y ago

I don't buy it. It might support the part of the theory that talks about how brains work. But the statement that this is qualia is different, and can't be proven or disproven. Let's say I believe that some person is actually a P-zombie, someone with no conscious experience but who behaves exactly like a normal person. Would these experiments be able to tell me if my belief is correct? I don't see how.

heyjamesknight 2y ago
You're welcome to read the paper. Tonini's work is well-known within CogSci and its not quackery by any stretch.
- wat10000 2y ago
  I skimmed it. There's one mention of "qualia" and I didn't spot anything to connect their theory with the actual experience of consciousness besides them saying they think so.
  - heyjamesknight 2y ago
    Better let Nature know their Peer Review committee screwed up then!
    - skissane 2y ago
      > Better let Nature know their Peer Review committee screwed up then! The article you cite [0] is labelled as "opinion". The standards for peer review of opinion articles in scientific journals are a lot lower than those for ordinary research articles. While precise standards vary from journal to journal, for opinion articles peer reviewers often see their role as simply excluding egregious misinformation and blatant errors, as compared to research articles where their role is to make sure the article is presenting high quality evidence in support of its conclusions. [1] [0] https://www.nature.com/articles/nrn.2016.44 https://www.nature.com/articles/nrn.2016.44 [1] https://ecologyisnotadirtyword.com/2021/02/24/lets-talk-about-standards-for-scholarly-opinion-articles/ https://ecologyisnotadirtyword.com/2021/02/24/lets-talk-abou...
      - heyjamesknight 2y ago
        That would be because I linked the wrong article. The original is here, different journal: https://journals.plos.org/ploscompbiol/article?id=10.1371/journal.pcbi.1011465 https://journals.plos.org/ploscompbiol/article?id=10.1371/jo...
        skissane 2y ago
        I think this article has the problem that it is addressing an interdisciplinary topic with too much focus on only a single discipline, which can be a sign of lacking sufficient diversity in disciplinary background of peer reviewers. Scott Aaronson’s attempted refutation of IIT - https://scottaaronson.blog/?p=1799 https://scottaaronson.blog/?p=1799 - I think is better in that he actually tries to relate IIT to some of the philosophical literature (e.g. his distinction between Chalmers’ “Hard Problem” and the distinct “Pretty Hard Problem” which he sees IIT as trying to address) I think it is a pity that Aaronson has never (to my knowledge) published his criticisms of IIT in a more formal setting-and I don’t know if Tononi has responded to them anywhere. I think Aaronson is probably right - that IIT fails as a mathematical model of what we intuitively consider conscious, since even though it excludes many common electronic devices we wouldn’t “conscious”, it is possible to mathematically construct an algorithm, capable of being physically implemented in electronics, which would be conscious per IIT but not per our intuition. And even if Tononi patches his mathematics to solve a particular case of that problem, someone with Aaronson’s skillset may just be able to construct another. Tononi might then argue that if there is no mathematical model of our intuitions about consciousness lacking in special pleading, that’s a sign our intuitions are flawed. Okay, but then if we accept our intuitions can be flawed in some cases, why not in more cases? One could decide the intuition of consciousness is completely erroneous and become an eliminativist about it. Or, if IIT forces you to accept (contrary to our intuitions) certain (special cases of) simple electronic devices or computer systems as just as conscious as humans, why not violate those intuitions further and insist on that for even more cases?