you have to trust Apple that the server side is running all that stuff Remote attestation should be proving to the client that the server is running the expect

you have to trust Apple that the server side is running all that stuff Remote attestation should be proving to the client that the server is running the expected firmware and PCC software hashes, https://security.apple.com/documentation/private-cloud-compute/hardwarerootoftrust https://security.apple.com/documentation/private-cloud-compu.... Apple has released (some? all?) source for PCC software on the server, https://github.com/apple/security-pcc https://github.com/apple/security-pcc > When a user’s device sends an inference request to Private Cloud Compute, the request is sent end-to-end encrypted to the specific PCC nodes needed for the request. The PCC nodes share a public key and an attestation — cryptographic proof of key ownership and measurements of the software running on the PCC node — with the user’s device, and the user’s device compares these measurements against a public, append-only ledger of PCC software releases. > compelled by a government Sadly, the bar is much lower than "compel". Devices are routinely compromised by zero-day vulnerabilities sold by exploit brokers to multiple parties on the open market, including governments. Especially any device with cellular, wifi or bluetooth radios. Hopefully the Apple C1 modem starts a new trend in radio baseband hardening, including PAC, ASLR and iBoot, https://www.reuters.com/technology/apple-reveals-first-custom-modem-chip-shifting-away-qualcomm-2025-02-19/ https://www.reuters.com/technology/apple-reveals-first-custo...