4 ms·

Curious for any specific feedback!

albroland 2y ago
1. How do you intend to pay for it? 2. How do you intend to enforce it? 3. How do you intend to defend it? How many tanks can you deploy? IFVs? Artillery? How much ammunition can you supply? How many fighters are in service and mission ready? Bombers? Tanker aircraft? Transport? Helicopters? How many battalions (of any type) can be formed/deployed? Repeat the same exercise in the context of a navy. https://www.statista.com/statistics/584035/defense-expenditures-of-nato-countries/ https://www.statista.com/statistics/584035/defense-expenditu... https://www.statista.com/statistics/1294391/nato-tank-strength-country/ https://www.statista.com/statistics/1294391/nato-tank-streng... https://www.statista.com/statistics/1293688/nato-aircraft-strength-country/ https://www.statista.com/statistics/1293688/nato-aircraft-st...
- DrNosferatu 2y ago
  1. Funding and Industrial Coordination: We would use something similar to the EU's Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) to fund this initiative - like a EU Marshall Plan, and, cooperate across partners’ ample industrial capacity: If we can make cars, airliners and cruise ships, we can make military equipment. Swedish gear is actually a good template: license manufacturing of what’s needed criss-crossing the Alliance, and joint develop new generation equipment and technologies as necessary. After all, it’s being done since Concorde and goes on today - we just need to increase the scale.
- DrNosferatu 2y ago
  2. Enforcement follows naturally from the funding mechanism: Access to joint funding, industrial cooperation, and defense capabilities is tied directly to maintaining democratic standards. Very simple - fail the democratic checks (Rule of Law index, ICC membership, etc.), and your access to the system's resources and voting rights gets restricted - like originally mentioned. Continue backsliding on democracy? The restrictions escalate proportionally. This creates both carrots (access to shared capabilities) and sticks (potential exclusion) that make democratic standards self-enforcing through practical incentives rather than just moral arguments. The Orbán playbook stops working when undermining democratic institutions has immediate defense and industrial consequences. It's a more robust enforcement mechanism than the EU's current Article 7 process.
- DrNosferatu 2y ago
  3. Defense strategy shifts from NATO's "US-centric" model to a distributed European capability matrix: Start with French and U.K. nuclear deterrence as foundation. Layer in proven European systems (Rafale, Gripen, Leopard) while rapidly developing next-gen capabilities through joint programs. Think European DARPA meets industrial policy. Key force multipliers: integrated air defense spanning the continent, standardized logistics, shared intelligence platforms, and fully interoperable command systems. Defense partnerships with Canada/Australia/New Zeland/Japan/South Korea/Taiwan provide complementary capabilities and strategic depth. No US kill-switches means full sovereign control of systems. Distributed manufacturing ensures supply resilience. Distributed architecture rather than centralized hub-and-spoke. This model isn't about matching US or legacy NATO capabilities 1:1, but creating a robust, autonomous system that potential adversaries can't easily disrupt or defeat. European industrial and technological capacity makes this feasible - we just need the political will to execute.
- DrNosferatu 2y ago
  Bonus: Times have indeed changed - Trumpist chaos (came back to bite us and) is upon us. It is high time our security Alliance evolves from anti-communism to effective upholding of Democracy. An overwhelming majority of democratic countries in the world recognize the ICC. Why accept exceptionalist members any longer? In short, - NATO: Accept compromised / exceptionalist members for strategic advantage. - This proposed new Alliance: Democratic standards ARE the strategic advantage.
chasd00 2y ago
Will the members truly be willing to goto war (even nuclear war) to enforce the agreement? Unless the entire planet believes that whole heartedly the pact is meaningless. I have my doubts, without the US NATO is largely toothless IMO.
- DrNosferatu 2y ago
  The credibility question cuts both ways - a Trump-compromised NATO isn't more reliable than a European alliance with clear democratic commitments and mutual interests. France and the UK already maintain a credible nuclear deterrent. European industrial capacity dwarfs Russia's. The EU's combined GDP exceeds China's. Scale isn't our problem - political will is. Sweden indeed shows how principled positions can be maintained while building serious defense capabilities. Now multiply that model by Europe's combined industrial and technological base. The ICC point is crucial - when most nations accept international law, continuing to accommodate "exceptionalism" becomes a weakness, not a strength. An alliance of genuine democracies, bound by shared values and mutual accountability, may prove more reliable than one held together by mere convenience. Rather than asking if Europe can afford to build this capability, perhaps we should ask if we can afford not to.

1. How do you intend to pay for it? 2. How do you intend to enforce it? 3. How do you intend to defend it? How many tanks can you deploy? IFVs? Artillery? How much ammunition can you supply? How many fighters are in service and mission ready? Bombers? Tanker aircraft? Transport? Helicopters? How many battalions (of any type) can be formed/deployed? Repeat the same exercise in the context of a navy. https://www.statista.com/statistics/584035/defense-expenditures-of-nato-countries/ https://www.statista.com/statistics/584035/defense-expenditu... https://www.statista.com/statistics/1294391/nato-tank-strength-country/ https://www.statista.com/statistics/1294391/nato-tank-streng... https://www.statista.com/statistics/1293688/nato-aircraft-strength-country/ https://www.statista.com/statistics/1293688/nato-aircraft-st...

DrNosferatu 2y ago
1. Funding and Industrial Coordination: We would use something similar to the EU's Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) to fund this initiative - like a EU Marshall Plan, and, cooperate across partners’ ample industrial capacity: If we can make cars, airliners and cruise ships, we can make military equipment. Swedish gear is actually a good template: license manufacturing of what’s needed criss-crossing the Alliance, and joint develop new generation equipment and technologies as necessary. After all, it’s being done since Concorde and goes on today - we just need to increase the scale.
DrNosferatu 2y ago
2. Enforcement follows naturally from the funding mechanism: Access to joint funding, industrial cooperation, and defense capabilities is tied directly to maintaining democratic standards. Very simple - fail the democratic checks (Rule of Law index, ICC membership, etc.), and your access to the system's resources and voting rights gets restricted - like originally mentioned. Continue backsliding on democracy? The restrictions escalate proportionally. This creates both carrots (access to shared capabilities) and sticks (potential exclusion) that make democratic standards self-enforcing through practical incentives rather than just moral arguments. The Orbán playbook stops working when undermining democratic institutions has immediate defense and industrial consequences. It's a more robust enforcement mechanism than the EU's current Article 7 process.
DrNosferatu 2y ago
3. Defense strategy shifts from NATO's "US-centric" model to a distributed European capability matrix: Start with French and U.K. nuclear deterrence as foundation. Layer in proven European systems (Rafale, Gripen, Leopard) while rapidly developing next-gen capabilities through joint programs. Think European DARPA meets industrial policy. Key force multipliers: integrated air defense spanning the continent, standardized logistics, shared intelligence platforms, and fully interoperable command systems. Defense partnerships with Canada/Australia/New Zeland/Japan/South Korea/Taiwan provide complementary capabilities and strategic depth. No US kill-switches means full sovereign control of systems. Distributed manufacturing ensures supply resilience. Distributed architecture rather than centralized hub-and-spoke. This model isn't about matching US or legacy NATO capabilities 1:1, but creating a robust, autonomous system that potential adversaries can't easily disrupt or defeat. European industrial and technological capacity makes this feasible - we just need the political will to execute.
DrNosferatu 2y ago
Bonus: Times have indeed changed - Trumpist chaos (came back to bite us and) is upon us. It is high time our security Alliance evolves from anti-communism to effective upholding of Democracy. An overwhelming majority of democratic countries in the world recognize the ICC. Why accept exceptionalist members any longer? In short, - NATO: Accept compromised / exceptionalist members for strategic advantage. - This proposed new Alliance: Democratic standards ARE the strategic advantage.

chasd00 2y ago

Will the members truly be willing to goto war (even nuclear war) to enforce the agreement? Unless the entire planet believes that whole heartedly the pact is meaningless. I have my doubts, without the US NATO is largely toothless IMO.

DrNosferatu 2y ago
The credibility question cuts both ways - a Trump-compromised NATO isn't more reliable than a European alliance with clear democratic commitments and mutual interests. France and the UK already maintain a credible nuclear deterrent. European industrial capacity dwarfs Russia's. The EU's combined GDP exceeds China's. Scale isn't our problem - political will is. Sweden indeed shows how principled positions can be maintained while building serious defense capabilities. Now multiply that model by Europe's combined industrial and technological base. The ICC point is crucial - when most nations accept international law, continuing to accommodate "exceptionalism" becomes a weakness, not a strength. An alliance of genuine democracies, bound by shared values and mutual accountability, may prove more reliable than one held together by mere convenience. Rather than asking if Europe can afford to build this capability, perhaps we should ask if we can afford not to.