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Yea, how is it that multiple people signed a transaction for over a billion dollars of assets without due diligence? If you did this for non crypto there woul

Yea, how is it that multiple people signed a transaction for over a billion dollars of assets without due diligence? If you did this for non crypto there would be lawyers, bankers, etc involved in the transaction. Root certificate authorities have already solved this problem with signing rituals which take place in person in an air gapped vault on specialized hardware and multiple parties as witness.

alwa 2y ago
TFA seems to suggest that the thieves modified the signers’ applications to display a routine transaction but actually sign the heist transaction.
jgilias 2y ago
Given that the UI they saw was compromised, they likely believed they were signing some routine 1M rebalancing transaction.
- fc417fc802 2y ago
  Odd that you wouldn't use separate keys for that given the wildly different levels of risk involved.
  - jgilias 2y ago
    Separate keys for what? They believed they were signing a routine transaction. That’s the whole idea of the hack. Splitting funds over 100 wallets would’ve helped. A 100x lower amount would be lost. And/Or having separate hardened devices used only for signing.
    - fc417fc802 2y ago
      Separate keys (ie wallets) for routine small transactions versus the cold wallets used for huge sums. Perhaps I've misunderstood but it sounded like they performed a rare transaction while being led to believe it was a routine one. I'm wondering why you wouldn't split the infrastructure given the differences in risk.
      - jgilias 2y ago
        Sorry, yeah, I misunderstood what you meant! Splitting funds more would’ve been a good idea. And being paranoid about _any_ transaction touching the “big-pot” wallet too!
greg7mdp 2y ago
They didn't sign a transaction for 1 billion dollars. They all signed what they thought was a routine transfer, but in reality what they signed gave the hacker full control of the smart contract (the Gnosis Safe) in which the 1.4B $ of tokens were stored. The hackers, having gained control of the smart contract, proceeded to empty it of funds.

alwa 2y ago

TFA seems to suggest that the thieves modified the signers’ applications to display a routine transaction but actually sign the heist transaction.

jgilias 2y ago

Given that the UI they saw was compromised, they likely believed they were signing some routine 1M rebalancing transaction.

fc417fc802 2y ago
Odd that you wouldn't use separate keys for that given the wildly different levels of risk involved.
- jgilias 2y ago
  Separate keys for what? They believed they were signing a routine transaction. That’s the whole idea of the hack. Splitting funds over 100 wallets would’ve helped. A 100x lower amount would be lost. And/Or having separate hardened devices used only for signing.
  - fc417fc802 2y ago
    Separate keys (ie wallets) for routine small transactions versus the cold wallets used for huge sums. Perhaps I've misunderstood but it sounded like they performed a rare transaction while being led to believe it was a routine one. I'm wondering why you wouldn't split the infrastructure given the differences in risk.
    - jgilias 2y ago
      Sorry, yeah, I misunderstood what you meant! Splitting funds more would’ve been a good idea. And being paranoid about _any_ transaction touching the “big-pot” wallet too!

greg7mdp 2y ago

They didn't sign a transaction for 1 billion dollars. They all signed what they thought was a routine transfer, but in reality what they signed gave the hacker full control of the smart contract (the Gnosis Safe) in which the 1.4B $ of tokens were stored. The hackers, having gained control of the smart contract, proceeded to empty it of funds.