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The online security world is so wild. In pretty much any other field of engineering, foreign nation states explicitly targeting the thing you built is just kind
by WJW 2y ago
The online security world is so wild. In pretty much any other field of engineering, foreign nation states explicitly targeting the thing you built is just kinda out of scope. There's no skyscraper in existence that is designed to withstand sustained artillery shelling, and your car is not going to withstand a tank shell either. Neither do they have to be designed to that specification. If North Korea killed someone with a missile or even destroyed a minor building or something, there would be public outrage and swift (military) repercussions.
But online, it's the wild wild west. The North Koreans can throw anything they want at your systems and the main response you get is "lol get good noob, should have built more secure systems" despite the opposing side literally having quite literally hundreds of people specifically trained to take on organisations like yours.
Not saying the Bybit people couldn't have been more careful of whatever, but let's appreciate how wild the online environment actually is sometimes.
- ip26 2y agoIt seems more analogous to the Soviets infiltrating your small business. Which no small business owner is prepared to screen for, and which happened.
- gregwebs 2y agoThe state of online security hasn't changed much. What has changed is that there is an digital (as opposed to gold) international form of money whose transactions cannot be reversed or stopped. Bybit and those holders of large crypto are operating with a fundamentally different threat model where its worthwhile for an attacker to invest millions of dollars of effort (for the Bybit payout even tens or hundreds of millions) attacking them. Everyone else just needs to worry about getting ransomed for a much smaller amount.
- Fade_Dance 2y agoThere's a long BBC podcast on Lazarus that touches on the spending. The members are state sponsored and young/bright. Top 0.1℅ academic sorts. At one point, the BBC got access to a conversation with one of the hackers, and their only question was "how much do you get paid?" (the context was that the hacker thought they were talking to Someone else in the tech space) Apparently they aren't paid very well at all. Far less than the average Western IT worker. Their lives are not luxurious either. They're in barracks style living quarters with strict schedules and travel. Presumably, the anonymous Lazarus hacker was putting out a probing question because they must have been ruminating about what life on the other side would be like, what they are really worth, etc. That's part of the power of Lazarus, the ability to dedicate resources far in excess of what most expect due to their indentured servant hackers (the opportunity to join is presented as a gift, Which to some extent it is because it does come with the extremely rare opportunity to travel. Many of them are in China.)
- brap 2y agoThat’s a really good point. If a nation state bombed a private oil rig with $1.5B in damages all hell would break loose. But if it’s a cyber attack no one cares and we blame the victim. I think it really boils down to plausible deniability, and the fact that it’s convenient for the governments on the receiving end to ignore the damages done to private citizens when there’s no physical harm and clear responsibility. No president is going to bomb NK because they attacked a crypro exchange. Maybe they should, but it’s not something the public will support. So it’s easy to say “oh well we don’t really know for sure who did it” and call it a day. It’s our own fault. I also agree that private citizens have a responsibility to secure ourselves, but where do you draw the line? If I don’t have an AA gun on my roof, am I responsible for enemy warplanes bombing my business? Isn’t this partially why I pay taxes?
- semi-extrinsic 2y agoWell, there's a couple of airliner shootdowns that kind of go in this category. MH17, PS752, AHY8243... That's at least $0.5B in damage plus many hundreds of civilian lives.
- flessner 2y agoAt a certain scale nation-state-level actors have to be part of your threat model, there's no excuse. But yeah, it's quite baffling how in a couple years we seemingly went from stealing email addresses to credit cards to straight up billions of dollars. If we can expect that everything shifts online eventually, where will this end? Clicked on the wrong link? Guess your house is gone... tough luck.
- InsideOutSanta 2y agoThis is why it is dangerous to replace people and laws with code. With laws, you eventually get to talk to a human being who has leeway in interpreting the situation. With code, it just works the way it does, regardless of circumstances. Cryptocurrencies avoid a central authority, but by doing that, they also avoid any possibility of human discretion, oversight, or recourse. There is no institution to appeal to, no customer service to call, and no regulator to enforce fairness.
- alwa 2y agoIt does feel, doesn’t it, that the cryptocurrency crowd seems mainly to comprise the kinds of actors who correctly anticipate that the legitimate banking sector—and most humans, if asked—will say “no” to them… Which I guess the idealists would say is part of the point: “first they came for the DPRK extortionists, and I said nothing,” etc.
- fc417fc802 2y ago> correctly anticipate ... will say “no” to them Could conceivably, under different circumstances, say no. And are uncomfortable with that state of affairs. Or to be snarky. Doesn't it seem that the crowd that gets up in arms about unlawful search and seizure are the sort of actors who correctly anticipate that the legitimate authorities would take issue with their behavior?
- alwa 2y agoWhat concerns me is the idea that risks like these might leak into the regulated financial sector. Right now, if I want to avoid my dollars being among those billions stolen, I can (and do) keep them someplace far away from instant digital currency. With firms that, while they could move large sums of their money somewhere else, build in a whole lot of friction in proportion to the amount being moved—by their customers, their staff, and their counterparties. Limited and well-understood modes of potential malfeasance, and strong structural discouragement for each of them. There is nothing that I need to do that needs to move fast. But I’d hate for the firms servicing my slow, boring needs to be tempted by the new shiny.
- freehorse 2y agoIt is essentially a financial institution handling billions of dollars. It is not the average website of your neighbourhood restaurant that got hacked or a scattershot ransomware attack. I would expect that for that scale nation state actors are not out of scope, even if it is usually about infiltration and IP/secrets theft than outright getting robbed.
- lolc 2y agoEh said financial institution chose a field of operation where certain risks are present by design. They make good profits because other institutions judge those risks too high. It's the mob attacking a casino and making off with chips. That people keep valuing those chips is one of the mysteries of our days.
- Veserv 2y agoYour logic is backwards. Factories are not designed to withstand sustained aerial bombardment because the chance of sustained aerial bombardment is small to non-existent due to effective (geopolitical) mitigations. But, if you are in a active war and being actively bombed, then you absolutely design your factories to be resistant to sustained aerial bombardment. You do not just throw your hands up in the air and say: “Who could have expected this totally routine and expected situation in our operational environment? We can not be blamed for not adequately mitigating known risks and intentionally mischaracterizing our risk mitigations as adequate for commonplace risks we know we can not adequately mitigate.” If there were effective geopolitical mitigations that made the chances of a attack minimal, then your argument holds weight. But, that is not the case. Failure to accommodate for known, standard, commonplace failure modes is incompetence. Deceptively implying you do mitigate risks while lying or with a disregard for the truth is fraud and maliciousness. There is also a second problem with your argument which is the relative accessibility of executing these attacks being trivial compared to military operations; being easily within the reach of lone individuals, let alone groups, organized crime, or entire governments. They require 10,000% security improvements to actually stop commonplace and routine attacks. But that is a longer argument I am not going to get into right now since the qualitative argument I made above applies regardless of the quantitative difficulty.
- lifeisstillgood 2y agoI suspect the truth lies between the two - we are under constant attack, but we aren’t as a society reacting as if we were. It’s like a building occasionally gets hit by a shell and we dont get on a war footing. The closest analogy I can come up with is England in the 1600s and early 1700s. Fairly regularly ships would be attacked by pirates from North Africa, and sometimes an actual land raid woukd occur- pirates from North Africa would take slaves from small seaside towns. It was not till Englands navy grew strong enough that the threat was eliminated - and perhaps that’s the real issue here - we know it’s happening, we cannot turn the Wild West into urban peace, so we just have to keep taking the licks and keep building more secure and stronger
- lostlogin 2y ago
- dist-epoch 2y ago> If North Korea killed someone with a missile or even destroyed a minor building or something, there would be public outrage and swift (military) repercussions. Russia kills people in the West with nerve-gasses or Plutonium, cuts electrical and Internet cables, blows up ammunition factories or puts incendiary devices on cargo airplanes and there are no repercussions.