3 ms·

We are told the encryption keys reside only on your device. But Apple control “your” device so they can just issue an update that causes your device to decrypt

by jl6 2y ago

We are told the encryption keys reside only on your device. But Apple control “your” device so they can just issue an update that causes your device to decrypt data and upload it.

RenThraysk 2y ago
Would just upload the keys
- drexlspivey 2y ago
  Presumably these keys live in a hardware security module on your phone called “secure enclave” and cannot be extracted
  - RenThraysk 2y ago
    Ah yes, good point.
  - fsflover 2y ago
    Is this module auditable though, or is "just trust us", like everything in the Apple world?
    - LPisGood 2y ago
      It’s auditable in the sense that there is a very high potential for reward (both reputationally and financially) for security researchers to break it.
      - fsflover 2y ago
        The same reward exists with FLOSS, but it's much easier to audit, making findings more likely. Also, security through obscurity doesn't work.
    - theshrike79 2y ago
      If someone has a reliable and workable secure enclave hack they can become a multi-millionaire for selling to state actors or become one of the most famous hackers in the world overnight (and possibly get a life changing amount of bounty from Apple) Basically it's not a hack someone just throws on the internet for everyone to use, it's WAY too valuable to burn like that.
    - jmb99 2y ago
      An HSM bypass (extracting keys, performing unauthenticated crypto ops) on any recent iOS device is worth 10s of millions, easily. Especially if combined with a one-click/no click. In that sense, it’s auditable, because it’s one of the biggest targets for any colour hat, and the people smart enough to find a bug/backdoor would only be slightly aided by a spec/firmware source, and a bit more by the verilog. This is true for pretty much every “real” hsm on the planet btw. No one is sharing cutting edge enclave details, Apple isn’t unique in this regard.
  - watusername 2y ago
    From the Advanced Data Protection whitepaper [0], it appears the keys are stored in the iCloud Keychain domain, so not the Secure Enclave: > Conceptually, Advanced Data Protection is simple: All CloudKit Service keys that were generated on device and later uploaded to the available-after-authentication iCloud Hardware Security Modules (HSMs) in Apple data centers are deleted from those HSMs and instead kept entirely within the account’s iCloud Keychain protection domain. They are handled like the existing end-to-end encrypted service keys, which means Apple can no longer read or access these keys. [0]: https://support.apple.com/guide/security/advanced-data-protection-for-icloud-sec973254c5f/web https://support.apple.com/guide/security/advanced-data-prote...
    - calliduspavonis 2y ago
      [dead]
    - jiveturkey 2y ago
      wrapped by a key hierarchy ultimately rooted by a key stored in the secure enclave.
      - watusername 2y ago
        Well yes, the entire storage is. I was trying to explain how it's extractable.
        jiveturkey 2y ago
        fair!
  - kevincox 2y ago
    Apple can push firmware updates to the HSM just like the device. So if they really wanted they could add an operation that extracted the keys (likely by encrypting them to a key that lives in Apple's cloud).
GeekyBear 2y ago
Apple has already fought US government demands that they push an update that would allow the US governmrnt to break encryption on a user's device. > In 2015 and 2016, Apple Inc. received and objected to or challenged at least 11 orders issued by United States district courts under the All Writs Act of 1789. Most of these seek to compel Apple "to use its existing capabilities to extract data like contacts, photos and calls from locked iPhones running on operating systems iOS 7 and older" in order to assist in criminal investigations and prosecutions. A few requests, however, involve phones with more extensive security protections, which Apple has no current ability to break. These orders would compel Apple to write new software that would let the government bypass these devices' security and unlock the phones. https://www.wikipedia.org/wiki/Apple%E2%80%93FBI_encryption_dispute https://www.wikipedia.org/wiki/Apple%E2%80%93FBI_encryption_...
sneak 2y ago
Apple do not remotely control devices, and automatic updates are not mandatory.

by jl6 2y ago

We are told the encryption keys reside only on your device. But Apple control “your” device so they can just issue an update that causes your device to decrypt data and upload it.

RenThraysk 2y ago

Would just upload the keys

drexlspivey 2y ago
Presumably these keys live in a hardware security module on your phone called “secure enclave” and cannot be extracted
- RenThraysk 2y ago
  Ah yes, good point.
- fsflover 2y ago
  Is this module auditable though, or is "just trust us", like everything in the Apple world?
  - LPisGood 2y ago
    It’s auditable in the sense that there is a very high potential for reward (both reputationally and financially) for security researchers to break it.
    - fsflover 2y ago
      The same reward exists with FLOSS, but it's much easier to audit, making findings more likely. Also, security through obscurity doesn't work.
  - theshrike79 2y ago
    If someone has a reliable and workable secure enclave hack they can become a multi-millionaire for selling to state actors or become one of the most famous hackers in the world overnight (and possibly get a life changing amount of bounty from Apple) Basically it's not a hack someone just throws on the internet for everyone to use, it's WAY too valuable to burn like that.
  - jmb99 2y ago
    An HSM bypass (extracting keys, performing unauthenticated crypto ops) on any recent iOS device is worth 10s of millions, easily. Especially if combined with a one-click/no click. In that sense, it’s auditable, because it’s one of the biggest targets for any colour hat, and the people smart enough to find a bug/backdoor would only be slightly aided by a spec/firmware source, and a bit more by the verilog. This is true for pretty much every “real” hsm on the planet btw. No one is sharing cutting edge enclave details, Apple isn’t unique in this regard.
- watusername 2y ago
  From the Advanced Data Protection whitepaper [0], it appears the keys are stored in the iCloud Keychain domain, so not the Secure Enclave: > Conceptually, Advanced Data Protection is simple: All CloudKit Service keys that were generated on device and later uploaded to the available-after-authentication iCloud Hardware Security Modules (HSMs) in Apple data centers are deleted from those HSMs and instead kept entirely within the account’s iCloud Keychain protection domain. They are handled like the existing end-to-end encrypted service keys, which means Apple can no longer read or access these keys. [0]: https://support.apple.com/guide/security/advanced-data-protection-for-icloud-sec973254c5f/web https://support.apple.com/guide/security/advanced-data-prote...
  - calliduspavonis 2y ago
    [dead]
  - jiveturkey 2y ago
    wrapped by a key hierarchy ultimately rooted by a key stored in the secure enclave.
    - watusername 2y ago
      Well yes, the entire storage is. I was trying to explain how it's extractable.
      - jiveturkey 2y ago
        fair!
- kevincox 2y ago
  Apple can push firmware updates to the HSM just like the device. So if they really wanted they could add an operation that extracted the keys (likely by encrypting them to a key that lives in Apple's cloud).

GeekyBear 2y ago

Apple has already fought US government demands that they push an update that would allow the US governmrnt to break encryption on a user's device. > In 2015 and 2016, Apple Inc. received and objected to or challenged at least 11 orders issued by United States district courts under the All Writs Act of 1789. Most of these seek to compel Apple "to use its existing capabilities to extract data like contacts, photos and calls from locked iPhones running on operating systems iOS 7 and older" in order to assist in criminal investigations and prosecutions. A few requests, however, involve phones with more extensive security protections, which Apple has no current ability to break. These orders would compel Apple to write new software that would let the government bypass these devices' security and unlock the phones. https://www.wikipedia.org/wiki/Apple%E2%80%93FBI_encryption_dispute https://www.wikipedia.org/wiki/Apple%E2%80%93FBI_encryption_...

sneak 2y ago

Apple do not remotely control devices, and automatic updates are not mandatory.