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Love me some Peter Gutmann. This is classic Gutmann. A lot of this presentation is mooted by understanding PQC as an scientific question rather than an enginee
by tptacek 2y ago
Love me some Peter Gutmann. This is classic Gutmann.
A lot of this presentation is mooted by understanding PQC as an scientific question rather than an engineering one. What are the precise natures of quantum-superior attacks on cryptosystems and what are key establishments and signatures that resist those attacks? Whatever else you think of quantum cryptanalysis those are undeniably important theoretical questions.
A few more slides are mooted by the likelihood that any mainstream deployed PQC system is going to be hybridized with a classical cryptosystem.
As an articulation of a threat model for modern computing, it simultaneously makes some sense and proves too much: if you think OWASP-type vulnerabilities are where everyone's head should be at (and I sort of agree), then all of cryptography is a sideshow. I'm a connoisseur of cryptographic vulnerabilities that break real systems the way SQL injection does (a bitflipping attack on an encrypted cookie, a broken load-bearing signature scheme) but even I have to admit there's 1 of those for every 10,000 conventional non-cryptographic attack.
But of course, it also depends on who your adversary is. Ironically, if you're worried about state-level SIGINT, the barrier for OWASP-style attacks may be higher than that of large-scale codebreaking; passive interception and store-now-decrypt-later is the SIGINT love language.
My biggest thing with all of this is a core belief about organizations like NSA: that they exist primarily to secure budget for NSA. Given that, the one thing you absolutely don't want to do is have a system that is breakable only at almost-implausible cost.
(Also, his RSA-1024 analysis is off; it's missing batch attacks).
- pclmulqdq 2y agoYeah, I don't think anyone told him about WindsorGreen, the RSA-cracking supercomputer that IBM built for the NSA. RSA-1024 probably should be assumed unsafe at this point.
- dadrian 2y agoI'm with you, but the government (at least in the US and UK) should definitely be spending more time figuring out how to patch reliably, and little less on PQC.
- thadt 2y agoPerhaps the other side of the coin Peter calls "churn" is "updated software". Government, like every other old organization, has a ton of legacy systems. Even if CRQC is a pipe dream, having an excuse to tell everyone across the board they need to update their stuff sometime in the next decade might be a net win.
- nabla9 2y ago> if you're worried about state-level SIGINT ... you might be worried about other things like postal interception, or physical security of your devices. You can never order any electronics or anything online, or use couriers services if you are person of interest for state level spooks like FBI, CIA. Tech spooks making personal visits to your home, phone or computers in-person also possible.
- LPisGood 2y agoState SIGINT is generally a lot easier than many of those actions. State SIGINT can especially if the state you’re primarily concerned about isn’t the one you live in.
- nabla9 2y agoIt's not as hard as you may think. For many foreign states like US and China its's easier to them to intercept and alter packages going trough borders. Both legally and logistically. It has already been documented how CIA and FBI have permanent presence in main courier airport hubs. It's easy for Amazon, FedEx or USPS to divert packet or letter trough convener belt that goes trough government areas. Same for Chinese of course. Anything ordered from China with your name or address cant' be trusted if you believe you might be sufficiently important person of interest for them.
- hammock 2y ago> NSA: that they exist primarily to secure budget for NSA. Given that, the one thing you absolutely don't want to do is have a system that is breakable only at almost-implausible cost I’m tempted to draw an analogy to the space race of the 60s, and the current AI panic
- oh_my_goodness 2y agoAll this "mooting" is just not happening as described above. Anyone can look at the presentation and see that it's not irrelevant.
- EdwardDiego 2y agoI've heard his name, but after reading this, I'm calling him a national treasure now. Right after I launch my new cryptocurrency QuantumDog.
- JoachimS 2y agoReading Gutmann I see a disconnect from reality. Yes a cryptographically relevant quantum computer may never materialize, nor a useful quantum computer at all. These are interesting research topics and interesting discussions. But it doesn't matter. Using that as arguments against PQC is moot, no longer relevant. The decision to move the world to PQC has already been taken, and we are in full transition mode. Orgs like NATO has transitioned. Many have published time plans to phase out classical algos (NSA, GHQC, Australia) or will shortly (EU). Orgs like ETSI will transition to PQC in upcoming revisions (5G) and next gen systems (6G). Just to name a few. In general, looking at agencies, nations pushing for PQC algorithms and transition time plans seems to be curiously well aligned. All using the NIST PQC algos, no real mentioning of hybrid solutions. Australias plan to ban the use of SHA-256 is one that sticks out a bit from the others. Regarding time plans, I find the suddenness, almost haste to be quite interesting. I've been searching quite extensively to gather info for PQC talks, and the motivation for a stated time plan are rarely well motivated. Much hand waving. And what drove the rush? I'm suspecting a bit of a crowd panic. But there is a clear change around 2022, 2023. Suddenly the PQ threat became very important. And within 10 years (or less) the world will be using PQC basically everywhere PKI is used besides legacy systems where lifetimes and update issues makes the change unrealistic. And are we really sure the schemes used will be hybrid? If DJB is right, NIST is pushing for PQC only. The NSA recommendations that was released last year AFAIK does not state anything about hybrid solutions. Details are less clear what NATO has transitioned to but seems to be PQC only. And the ETSI push for PQC in 5G, 6G does not seem to aim for hybrid solutions. I would love to be told to be wrong about the use of hybrid schemes. The iMessage protocol, Signal and things happening in IETF goes for hybrid schemes, which I think is the right way (if that count for anything). So it seems we have the open world and private sector versus governments, orgs fairly close to governments when it comes to hybrid vs PQC only.
- bem94 2y ago> I find the suddenness, almost haste to be quite interesting. > But there is a clear change around 2022, 2023. I think that's probably because the NIST competition [1] to choose their standard algorithms really started to heat up then. NIST has a very large gravity well in the academic and industrial cryptographic community, so as soon as it became clear which algorithms NIST would pick (they chose Kyber / ML-KEM and Dilithium / ML-DSA), the (cryptographic) world felt it could start transitioning with much more certainty and haste. 1. https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/post-quantum-cryptography/post-quantum-cryptography-standardization https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/post-quantum-cryptography/pos...
- sim7c00 2y agonice analysis. fully agree with you. all the crypto in the world does nothing if i can stream me your framebuffer via some gpu flaw, bring my own broken ass driver on your platform and take continual screenshots of what you so keenly decrypted for me, or sit in your baseband because the java running on your simcard was well... java (and protected with 0000/2580/1337 ♡). there are so many roads to rome, intelligence communities i gather have taken also to more open roads than breaking any type of crypto. (not to say they dont do that anymore) If its more operationally useful, so they will be doing it. That's a given.
- JoachimS 2y ago"Love me some Peter Gutmann. This is classic Gutmann." Indeed he don't hold back and is quite funny in his frankness. Though when it comes to his book draft, he really need an editor. https://www.cs.auckland.ac.nz/~pgut001/pubs/book.pdf https://www.cs.auckland.ac.nz/~pgut001/pubs/book.pdf