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Plus too many of that generation see NAT as a "security feature" not an "IP bug" and can't seem to (re-)imagine traditional firewall/router design from the time
by WorldMaker 2y ago
Plus too many of that generation see NAT as a "security feature" not an "IP bug" and can't seem to (re-)imagine traditional firewall/router design from the time before NAT. "end-to-end connectivity" is not the same thing as "open and unsecured connectivity", we have the security tools to deal with that and they are not and have never been named "NAT".
- icedchai 2y agoTo say NAT has nothing to do with "security" is a lie. The most common NAT (PAT) configurations are basically acting as stateful firewalls with a default deny policy for all unsolicited inbound traffic to a private, non-routeable network.
- Dagger2 2y agoThey aren't doing that though. The most common NAT (PAT) configurations don't deny unsolicited inbound traffic. They are of course commonly deployed together with a firewall that does deny that traffic, but claiming that NAT blocks connections because it's usually deployed together with a different technology that handles all of the blocking would also be lying.
- ninkendo 2y ago> The most common NAT (PAT) configurations don't deny unsolicited inbound traffic That doesn’t make sense. If I have a single routable IPv4 addresses and 100 machines behind it with RFC1918 addresses, how can any possible router “allow by default” say, port 22? Which machine would it route it to? Would it pick the first one? Randomly select one? Of course NAT has to drop incoming unsolicited packets. Unless you tell it which machine to route them too, it couldn’t possibly know how to “allow” them in the first place.
- Dagger2 2y agoIP packets have a "destination IP" header field that specifies where the packet goes. The router reads that to figure out where to send the packet. The only thing NAT does is rewrite the dst or src headers of packets. If there's no rule or state entry that applies to a packet, it doesn't drop the packet. It just leaves the original headers on it.
- ninkendo 2y agoHow would a packet with a destination IP of my internal RFC1918 address have landed on my WAN interface in the first place? It would require my ISP to have a routing rule that sends it to my router. Is that the threat model you’re thinking about?
- icedchai 2y agoHe's assuming your non-routeable RFC1918 addresses are actually routed from the Internet, which won't be happening in the normal consumer use case.
- icedchai 2y agoEven if there's no blocking, using internal RFC-1918 addresses still adds a layer of security since they are not reachable globally.
- WorldMaker 2y ago> basically acting as stateful firewalls Stateful Firewalls are the security tool. NATs being mediocre to somewhat alright stateful firewalls "out-of-the-box" before adding a real Firewall is the accident (and sometimes bug). Something doing security by accident (or as a bug) isn't a security tool (just like security through obscurity isn't a security tool). You can have Stateful Firewalls without NAT. Everyone saying that you "need" NAT to have Stateful Firewalls doesn't understand Firewalls or even possibly why "firewall" is and has always been a different word from "NAT". NAT has something to do with security, but that's being generally always paired with a good firewall, not being a mediocre firewall mostly by accident.