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> The only EU member with nuclear weapons is France, which has it's own domestic nuclear ecosystem. The UK has US-derived (?) nuclear weapons, and so it would

> The only EU member with nuclear weapons is France, which has it's own domestic nuclear ecosystem. The UK has US-derived (?) nuclear weapons, and so it would perhaps make sense for them to hire the Americans that maintained them: * https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_weapons_of_the_United_Kingdom https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_weapons_of_the_United_... Given the 'waffling' of Trump on NATO support, Poland may want to develop their own. Also South Korea and Japan may want to ramp up their own native infrastructure given the waffling of US Pacific support.

alephnerd 2y ago
> The UK Not in the EU. And the same NatSec requirements hold. > Poland may want to develop their own. A nuclear shield is useless without second or third strike capabilities - which requires a nuclear triad - as both Russia and China have developed those capabilities due to their rivalry with the US. Poland hypothetically building 10 nuclear devices does nothing if Russia can launch multiple strike after getting striked. Furthermore, developing nuclear weapons is causus belli enough to justify a hot war for China or Russia, nor does it actually prevent war as can be seen with the Kargil War. More critically, nuclear programs are expensive and that money is better used in further building out conventional military capabilities, as can be seen with the Russia-Ukraine War, where a country with an ossified MIC (Ukraine) is able to cause significant pain to a nuclear power. Tl;dr - Nuclear weapons alone are useless in a world where most Nuclear Powers (US, Russia, China, India, Israel) have a nuclear triad and multi-strike capabilities. > Also South Korea and Japan may The Indo-Pac theatre is different from the European theatre, as there is bipartisan support to prioritize Asian defense over European defense. Furthermore, in a situation where American support is reduced, Asian countries can continue to retain conventional warfighting capabilities. This is because defense spending across Asia had always been high since the early-mid 2010 standoffs, so there hasn't been the same level of angst that much of Central Europe has. Furthermore, Korean and Japanese military exports are extremely competitive, with Indonesia, Vietnam, and Philippines all closely aligning with SK and JP on defense posture.
- actionfromafar 2y ago
  Russia is not the USSR. In practice, Russia is Moscow and St Petersburg. Pose a credible threat to those cities and be set. Because Poland and Russia are so close geographically, plausible second strike capability can be achieved many ways without having ICBMs and nuclear strike subs.
  - alephnerd 2y ago
    If you're at the point where you're actively considering nuclear strikes, you are fine with accepting the MASSIVE costs that arise. Even if Moscow or St Petersburg are completely wiped off the map, Novosibirsk, Kazan, Omsk, etc will remain while much of Poland is irradiated. > Russia is not the USSR It's not the USSR, but it's still a large country, and much of the defense industry has remained in Siberia since WW2.
    - ben_w 2y ago
      I'd focus on your previous point about second-strike capabilities. > Even if Moscow or St Petersburg are completely wiped off the map, Novosibirsk, Kazan, Omsk, etc will remain while much of Poland is irradiated. Yes, but the goal isn't to win a first strike, it's MAD to prevent the other side doing that. Russia has enough warheads to not just level Poland's cities, but every settlement and forest in the country. Poland with 10 credible nuclear weapons is enough to break the economic back of any country who attacks, so they won't attack. This needs what you said before, second-strike capability. Either that or a fast enough response time that they can launch while hostile missiles are still inbound. (Or does that still count as second-strike?)
      - alephnerd 2y ago
        > Poland with 10 credible nuclear weapons is enough to break the economic back of any country who attacks, so they won't attack. If you are in a situation where you are even seriously considering a nuclear strike, that means you are viewing a threat as existential, which completely undermines the economic argument. > This needs what you said before, second-strike capability. Either that or a fast enough response time that they can launch while hostile missiles are still inbound. (Or does that still count as second-strike?) Absolutely, but the issue is that this takes A LOT of time to build and implement, and a country like Poland or Germany cannot build that kind of capability overnight. Yet a nuclear program can be viewed as an existential threat that can be used as a causus belli for war (conventional or nuclear). This is a pretty bad RoI. Nuclear programs are expensive, and instead of spending the amount you would need to build a nuclear program, it's much better for Poland and Germany to double down and concentrate on conventional war capabilities such as rocket systems, drones, artillery, and heavy weapons. The fact that a country with an ossified MIC like Ukraine is able to bog down a military like Russia's with conventional capabilities is proof enough that doubling down on building conventional war-fighting capabilities is enough to cause severe pain on an aggressor while not turning a conflict into an existential one which justifies nuclear warfare. And this is why you never hear Polish or German military leadership talk about developing a nuclear program.

alephnerd 2y ago

> The UK Not in the EU. And the same NatSec requirements hold. > Poland may want to develop their own. A nuclear shield is useless without second or third strike capabilities - which requires a nuclear triad - as both Russia and China have developed those capabilities due to their rivalry with the US. Poland hypothetically building 10 nuclear devices does nothing if Russia can launch multiple strike after getting striked. Furthermore, developing nuclear weapons is causus belli enough to justify a hot war for China or Russia, nor does it actually prevent war as can be seen with the Kargil War. More critically, nuclear programs are expensive and that money is better used in further building out conventional military capabilities, as can be seen with the Russia-Ukraine War, where a country with an ossified MIC (Ukraine) is able to cause significant pain to a nuclear power. Tl;dr - Nuclear weapons alone are useless in a world where most Nuclear Powers (US, Russia, China, India, Israel) have a nuclear triad and multi-strike capabilities. > Also South Korea and Japan may The Indo-Pac theatre is different from the European theatre, as there is bipartisan support to prioritize Asian defense over European defense. Furthermore, in a situation where American support is reduced, Asian countries can continue to retain conventional warfighting capabilities. This is because defense spending across Asia had always been high since the early-mid 2010 standoffs, so there hasn't been the same level of angst that much of Central Europe has. Furthermore, Korean and Japanese military exports are extremely competitive, with Indonesia, Vietnam, and Philippines all closely aligning with SK and JP on defense posture.

actionfromafar 2y ago
Russia is not the USSR. In practice, Russia is Moscow and St Petersburg. Pose a credible threat to those cities and be set. Because Poland and Russia are so close geographically, plausible second strike capability can be achieved many ways without having ICBMs and nuclear strike subs.
- alephnerd 2y ago
  If you're at the point where you're actively considering nuclear strikes, you are fine with accepting the MASSIVE costs that arise. Even if Moscow or St Petersburg are completely wiped off the map, Novosibirsk, Kazan, Omsk, etc will remain while much of Poland is irradiated. > Russia is not the USSR It's not the USSR, but it's still a large country, and much of the defense industry has remained in Siberia since WW2.
  - ben_w 2y ago
    I'd focus on your previous point about second-strike capabilities. > Even if Moscow or St Petersburg are completely wiped off the map, Novosibirsk, Kazan, Omsk, etc will remain while much of Poland is irradiated. Yes, but the goal isn't to win a first strike, it's MAD to prevent the other side doing that. Russia has enough warheads to not just level Poland's cities, but every settlement and forest in the country. Poland with 10 credible nuclear weapons is enough to break the economic back of any country who attacks, so they won't attack. This needs what you said before, second-strike capability. Either that or a fast enough response time that they can launch while hostile missiles are still inbound. (Or does that still count as second-strike?)
    - alephnerd 2y ago
      > Poland with 10 credible nuclear weapons is enough to break the economic back of any country who attacks, so they won't attack. If you are in a situation where you are even seriously considering a nuclear strike, that means you are viewing a threat as existential, which completely undermines the economic argument. > This needs what you said before, second-strike capability. Either that or a fast enough response time that they can launch while hostile missiles are still inbound. (Or does that still count as second-strike?) Absolutely, but the issue is that this takes A LOT of time to build and implement, and a country like Poland or Germany cannot build that kind of capability overnight. Yet a nuclear program can be viewed as an existential threat that can be used as a causus belli for war (conventional or nuclear). This is a pretty bad RoI. Nuclear programs are expensive, and instead of spending the amount you would need to build a nuclear program, it's much better for Poland and Germany to double down and concentrate on conventional war capabilities such as rocket systems, drones, artillery, and heavy weapons. The fact that a country with an ossified MIC like Ukraine is able to bog down a military like Russia's with conventional capabilities is proof enough that doubling down on building conventional war-fighting capabilities is enough to cause severe pain on an aggressor while not turning a conflict into an existential one which justifies nuclear warfare. And this is why you never hear Polish or German military leadership talk about developing a nuclear program.