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Even if they weren't scripted, they were mostly softballs, and the talk was more an introduction than a detailed roadmap. The most interesting question was abo
by ipsin 14y ago
Even if they weren't scripted, they were mostly softballs, and the talk was more an introduction than a detailed roadmap.
The most interesting question was about whether the NSA would prefer a perfectly secure internet or a usefully insecure one (roughly paraphrased).
That's not far from what I wanted to ask: given the offensive value of 0-day exploits (as seen with Stuxnet, regardless of who actually did it), can agencies in "Cyber Command" really be trusted to give theirs up via responsible disclosure?
- lawnchair_larry 14y agoYour definition of "responsible" is not the same as everyone else. Try asking an actual question, not a question disguised to inject a moral judgment and re-ignite the disclosure debate that everyone was sick of 20 years ago.
- ipsin 14y agoLate to the party, but... you really couldn't find a question in there? Let me try again. My definition of "responsible" doesn't matter. I was suggesting that the government could adopt a policy it considers responsible, rather than just sitting on the exploits and using them for strategic advantage. Unless there's a definition of "disclosure" that involves failing to disclose things to those in a position to fix the problems.