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> First, note that if it weren't for regulators deciding on the amount of reserve capital Citibank was required to hold, the market would probably have demanded
by cchooper 18y ago
> First, note that if it weren't for regulators deciding on the amount of reserve capital Citibank was required to hold, the market would probably have demanded that it hold much more.
This was your original point. Let's stay on track.
Your claim that regulators decide how big Citibank's reserves should be is false. They set a minimum, not a maximum.
You then tried to draw an analogy between speeding and regulation, one that, as I have explained, is totally inappropriate.
You then claimed that "most people take the fact that a firm is regulated to mean that it's totally safe", which is a massive exaggeration. If that were true, bank bonds would be considered as safe as government bonds and bank runs would never happen. All other regulated industries would be exactly the same. Also, you are confusing reserve requirements with broader regulation as a whole.
You then claim that banks raising their reserves would be "competing against the government for their definition of soundness", despite the fact that no government has ever claimed any 'definition of soundness'. This appears to be something that you have invented.
You then give an argument as to why other forms of regulation encourage banks to hold lower reserves. This contradicts your original point, which was that if reserve requirements were abolished then the market would force banks to raise reserves. What you have demonstrated is that the market, bail-outs and broader regulation would actually force reserves to even lower levels in the absence of reserve requirements. You have changed your argument from one about reserve requirements to one about broader regulation, and bail-outs such as TARP.
- grandalf 18y agoI don't think you have refuted my speeding analogy. Do you ever drive in an area with ice on the roads? I recommend that you observe the phenomenon before you dismiss it. I do not think you have refuted my claim that regulation leads to people suspending critical judgement about risks. Reserve requirements are a good example of this effect. Industry lobbyists try very hard to have the limit decreased while benefiting from the public perception that the regulator has assured that the bank's assets are sound. If you don't buy my argument then you probably believe that people are so stupid that without regulation banks would hold $0 in reserves. The alternative view of humanity is that people are sensible enough to demand sound practices from institutions they deal with on important matters. My argument is that banks don't use reserves as a way to win customers the way they would if regulators weren't giving an A+ to every bank that holds the minimum :) One exception is Goldman Sachs. It did not need TARP funds to remain solvent. Yet Treasury forced all banks to accept the funds. What did Goldman do? It immediately paid a huge dividend to its investors. What happened? Goldman actually had more sound practices than the rest of the industry and was not in danger of failing. It would probably have waited for bankruptcy proceedings and picked through the assets of the other banks, strengthening its already strong balance sheet. Regulators did not want more money to flow to the firm that had good practices, so it insisted on bailing everyone out. This was to hide information from investors and customers. Goldman angered regulators by paying out the dividend right away, but managed to signal its health. To understand the point of libertarians on this issue, consider the world in 10 years from today. We might have had a world where chastened investors and customers looked a lot more carefully at the risk management practices of banks before trusting them. Instead, we have a world in which our government owns 30% of all banks and regulators are being hailed as the saviors of the banking industry. Do you want to live in a world where people act based on reality, or one where taxpayer money is appropriated without congressional approval and given to selected industries, and the appropriators are hailed as heroes that helped the little guy keep his job, prevented another great depression, etc. It all comes back to the burden that people take upon themselves to assess the riskiness of the decisions they make. Industry loves to have its status quo practices rubber stamped by regulators, to add additional credibility. It all works out well as long as there can be another bailout, etc., but it's not based on reality and represents the slow transfer of wealth from the most productive companies to the ones with the most effective lobbying.
- gravitycop 18y agoregulation leads to people suspending critical judgement about risks. We have a name for that. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Risk_compensation http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Risk_compensation risk compensation is an effect whereby individual people may tend to adjust their behaviour in response to perceived changes in risk. It is seen as self-evident that individuals will tend to behave in a more cautious manner if their perception of risk or danger increases. Another way of stating this is that individuals will behave less cautiously in situations where they feel "safer" or more protected.
- grandalf 18y agoThanks for the link. I thought I'd invented it :)
- gravitycop 18y agoRisk compensation is also called "moral hazzard": http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/bios/Mirrlees.html http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/bios/Mirrlees.html Mirrlees also did highly theoretical work on another incentive problem: “moral hazard.” As is well known to those who study insurance, insurance coverage gives the beneficiary an incentive to take more risks than would be optimal. This is called “moral hazard.” Mirrlees’s insight, based on a complex mathematical model, is that the problem can be solved with an optimal combination of carrots and sticks. Insurance payments are essentially a carrot. But “sticks” could be designed also, so that an insured person who takes risks pays a penalty for doing so. With this combination of carrots and sticks, the insured person acts almost as if he is uninsured, and the insurer acts almost as if he were the insured.
- cchooper 18y ago>I don't think you have refuted my speeding analogy. My point was that you analogy doesn't apply. Pointing to ice on the roads is completely missing the point: that the analogy doesn't hold in the first place. >I do not think you have refuted my claim that regulation leads to people suspending critical judgement about risks. I did not say this! I said that specifying a reserve requirement does not reduce bank reserves. Please keep this argument to reserve requirements, not general regulation. >If you don't buy my argument then you probably believe that people are so stupid that without regulation banks would hold $0 in reserves. The UK does not have reserve requirements and they don't have zero reserves. But they did not raise their reserves to safe levels either, refuting your original point. Incidentally, it's you that's arguing that regulation encourages banks to hold lower reserves than they would without reserve requirements. You are constantly conflating reserve requirements and general regulation, moving an argument about one to a conclusion about the other. You then go on to talk about TARP again, illustrating my point.