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Sorry. Didn't get it. So, if iMessages IS e2ee (supposedly) and someone properly makes iCloud backups e2ee (supposedly), how the Feds will break it? I do unde
by kdmtctl 2y ago
Sorry. Didn't get it. So, if iMessages IS e2ee (supposedly) and someone properly makes iCloud backups e2ee (supposedly), how the Feds will break it?
I do understand the counterpart party problem, it is not someone can control. Sent once, it's free to be seen by anyone.
- nickburns 2y agoNobody has suggested that anyone, Feds included, has the present technical capability to break any of the security levels that are in widescale E2EE usage today.
- sneak 2y agoIf both you and the iMessage counterparty both have e2ee enabled for iCloud Backup, it's unlikely at present that the feds can read the messages without a warrant under FAA702 "foreign" intelligence collection (which as we now know thanks to Snowden is routinely used against even Americans). With an actual warrant or wiretap order, there is no guarantee that Apple can't or won't insert additional endpoint keys into the conversation. But, that said, 99.9%+ of users don't have e2ee enabled for iCloud Backup, so the e2ee in iMessage is mostly irrelevant, and it's available in full to the feds at any time, no warrant required. tl;dr: use Signal.