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I don't understand what "blaming" the cryptographers gets you. Your system is either secure or it isn't. If you ship something insecure, that's on you.
by tptacek 2y ago
I don't understand what "blaming" the cryptographers gets you. Your system is either secure or it isn't. If you ship something insecure, that's on you.
- AlotOfReading 2y agoThere's definitely degrees of security that I'm having to constantly remind our security folks of when they aren't forced to deal with the costs of having expensive threat models.
- xvector 2y agoIf you're having to constantly remind your security engineers about "degrees of security," they may be trying to tell you that your threat model is unsustainably/nonsensically/dangerously lax.
- AlotOfReading 2y agoThe part I've been struggling with is getting them to put any threat model in writing that's not quote, "everything".
- dns_snek 2y ago"Blame" isn't the most productive way to frame the conversation, but as GP mentioned, there aren't many resources for developers to learn about cryptography. We're in desperate need of comprehensive resources that can (at a minimum) help us answer: 1. Has this problem been solved using a proven cryptographic protocol? Which guarantees does this protocol offer? What are all the important considerations? 2. What's the next closest thing? 3. Can we safely modify the protocol in any way to accommodate our use case, and what are some common pitfalls? Some people will ignore all that advice and do dumb things anyway, but if we want systems to be more secure, it's on cryptographers to make cryptography more approachable and on developers to actually listen when they do.