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3. Align incentives of the judges and the judged, reducing the pressure on metrics (ex. shared fate, belief in the cause, personal growth and fulfillment)
by sdwr 2y ago
3. Align incentives of the judges and the judged, reducing the pressure on metrics (ex. shared fate, belief in the cause, personal growth and fulfillment)
- falcor84 2y agoI don't think this is possible. In a sufficiently large organization, however much you try to prevent it, some employees will be "psychopaths" (going by Hintjens's definition) looking to game the system. Whatever the metrics are, they will put in only enough effort to advance their own interests, and assuming they succeed (and at least some will) at getting raises/promotions, the org is then at risk of (legitimate) legal action from other employees who put in more actual work and get lower compensation.
- asdasdsddd 2y agoIt's not even that there are pyschos, it's that incentives wane with scale because individuals have less control over outcomes.
- s1artibartfast 2y agoThat is still an alignment problem. Psychopaths can be good for the org, you just need better mapping of the game and reality.
- Spooky23 2y agoThis is the answer. The higher performance orgs I’ve worked for have had excellent incentive alignment and cohesion. The metrics were there, but fairly mediocre. Places with robust metrics ranged from excellent to meh. One place had a sales team that was owning it, and the leadership was shoveling cash into wheelbarrows. But the company was losing a fortune because the sales metrics were precisely stupid.